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Working in partnership is absolutely central to our approach. It is not only because we 
think solidarity is important, it is also because we believe that our partners are actors in 
their own right. I mean, to us they are not merely tools that allow us to achieve our goals. 
[…] But the fact is that we have the money and that means that we always have some 
sort of power in our hands. So what we do is try to offset that power, you know, through 
our attitudes and our procedures (interview Country Officer Christian Aid, 5-5-2008).
1.1 Introduction
Partnerships between Northern and Southern NGOs, as a particular kind of inter-organ-
isational collaboration, are a key feature of private development cooperation.1 Ideally, 
they reflect such values as equality, trust and reciprocity and foster the autonomy and 
organisational capacity of Southern NGOs (Fowler 1998, 2000a; Lister, 2000; Brehm, 
2004). Over the years, however, Northern NGOs - or private aid agencies as they are also 
called - have been consistently criticised for failing to live up to the principles associated 
with partnership (Ashman, 2001; Lister, 2000; Fernando, 2007). Some critics have even 
argued that their relational practices are actually contrary to these principles (Hudock, 
1995, 1999; Hately, 1997; Wallace et al., 2006). It is this (seeming) contradiction which is 
referred to in this dissertation as the partnership paradox. The partnership paradox is 
imperative to private aid agencies’ relevance and legitimacy because it touches upon 
their ability to achieve local ownership, their (perceived) unique ability to maintain 
‘genuine’ partnerships compared to governmental donors and the alignment between 
their values and practices.
 This study seeks to explain the partnership paradox. More specifically, it aims to 
clarify the gap between the principles and the practice of partnership and to shed light 
on the forces underlying this gap. In doing so it addresses some of the limitations of the 
existing literature on North-South NGO relations which has been struggling to explain 
the partnership paradox. Not only have studies thus far focused mainly on private aid 
agencies’ failure to live up to the principles of partnership, there has also been a 
tendency to overlook the room to manoeuvre of Southern NGOs. Furthermore, the 
1 Following Vakil (1997: 260) this study views development NGOs as ‘self-governing, private, not-for-profit 
organisations that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people’. This definition includes 
community-based or people’s organisations, as well as intermediary NGOs working with local communities. In 
addition, this thesis uses the basic distinction between ‘Northern NGO’, which refers to organisations whose 
origin lies in industrialised countries, and ‘Southern NGO’, which refers to organisations originating from 
developing countries.
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literature to date has not been particularly clear with regard to the concrete mechanisms 
which produce and reproduce inequality in partnerships. Existing studies have also 
tended to take the ideal of partnership for granted, while largely overlooking its 
underlying premises. Empirically, this thesis utilises a comparative case study design, 
which includes the partnership approaches of three private aid agencies – Christian Aid, 
Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and Action Aid - and 
their local partner organisations in India, Ghana and Nicaragua. For theorethical 
guidance, this dissertation draws upon different conceptualisations of power.
 Overall, this thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows that 
the inequality that characterises partnerships is institutionalised in the rules that govern 
the relationship. Whereas the standard notion in the literature is that private aid agencies 
exercise their greater power directly by means of their control over funding, this thesis 
argues that in day-to-day affairs such power is in fact exerted indirectly by means of the 
rules governing partnerships. Southern NGOs have a range of strategies at their disposal 
to maintain or increase their room to manoeuvre, but the rules remain beyond their 
influence. Second, this study demonstrates that the practice of partnership is based 
upon a set of premises and values regarding the conditions under which private aid 
agencies can best contribute to development. In establishing the rules that regulate 
their partnerships, private aid agencies draw upon these premises and values for 
guidance, meaning and legitimacy. Third, this thesis shows that within the private aid 
channel two competing ‘institutional logics’ (sets of shared goals, values, beliefs and 
practices) exist that have contrary implications for the practice of partnership. While the 
first set, referred to in this study as the ‘social transformation logic’, pushes private aid 
agencies towards the ideal of partnership, the second set, referred to as the ‘managerial 
logic’, pulls them away from this ideal. 
 This chapter begins by identifying why partnership, as a specific form of inter-or-
ganisational collaboration between Northern and Southern NGOs, is considered to be 
important in the field of private development cooperation. Section 1.3 discusses the 
criticism that has emerged regarding the practice of partnership, particularly private aid 
agencies perceived inability to realise ‘genuine’ partnerships and the role that funding 
plays in this failure. Section 1.4 identifies the main limitations of the literature on 
North-South NGO relations as perceived in this study, particularly in its understanding 
of the partnership paradox. Section 1.5 outlines the objective and central research 
questions of this thesis. Section 1.6 discusses the main concepts (influence, strategic 
responses, rules and institutional logics) used in the analysis and clarifies why they are 
crucial to explaining the partnership paradox. Section 1.7 deals with the study’s 
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methodology: design and sampling, methods and data, analysis and validity. Finally, 
section 1.8 presents the outline of this thesis.
1.2 The rationale of partnership 
‘Partnerships’ are widely acclaimed as being of central importance to development. The 
idea that successful development interventions require different groups of people and 
organisations has become so intrinsic to development thinking and practice that 
'everybody wants to be a partner with everyone, on everything, everywhere' (Fowler, 
2000c: 26). The notion of partnership is currently used to refer to all sorts of relationships 
between state, market and/or civil society actors aimed at promoting (sustainable) 
development (Glasbergen, 2007). These include cooperation between Northern and 
Southern NGOs, collaboration between individual companies and NGOs, relationships 
between donor and recipient governments and tri-sector initiatives combining the 
business and civil society sector with the government (Bäckstrand, 2006; Glasbergen & 
Miranda, 2003; Glasbergen, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Fowler, 1998).2
 This dissertation is about a particular kind of partnership, namely that between 
Northern and Southern NGOs in the field of international development cooperation. 
Much has been written about the ideal characteristics or principles associated with 
North-South NGO partnerships (e.g. Fowler 1998: 141, 2000b: 4-5; Lister, 2000: 229; 
Brehm, 2004: 17-19, Malhotra, 1997). Although no generally accepted definition exists, 
such partnerships are commonly associated with shared goals, mutual roles and re-
sponsibilities, shared governance, a long-term commitment for working together, an 
equitable distribution of costs and benefits, a shared responsibility for agreed outcomes, 
open dialogue and mutual accountability. Furthermore, writings about the ideal of 
North-South NGO partnership typically emphasise the need for respecting the 
autonomy of local partners, giving them right to set the final agenda for their own work 
and providing capacity building and flexible funding to foster their autonomy and 
capacity. Finally, ‘genuine’ partnerships are thought to be rooted in the values of 
equality, trust, reciprocity and mutual respect.
2 Different interests and beliefs underlie the various partnership types. The enthusiasm for inter-sectoral 
partnerships, for example, is typically associated with the neo-liberal emphasis on a less central role for the 
state and a stronger involvement of private parties in tackling societal problems (Glasbergen, 2007). Inter-
governmental partnerships, amongst other things, are based on the idea that a shift from conditionality to 
ownership improves the efficiency of budget support mechanisms (Unwin, 2005: 23).
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In the late 1980s private aid agencies embraced the notion of partnership both as a 
particular strategy to achieve their goals and as a way to structure their relations with 
Southern counterparts (Brehm, 2004: 7; Mawdsley et al, 2002: 165; Harrison, 2007: 398; 
Biekart, 1999).3 In this period, private aid agencies widely adopted a set of ideas about 
development – often referred to as ‘people centred’ or ‘alternative’ development – that 
put local people and their organisations at the centre of development processes (see 
Lewis & Kanji, 2009). At that time, many private agencies worked mainly with expatriate 
staff and implemented their own development projects. In the light of the ‘new’ 
development philosophy, but also because in many Southern countries an increasingly 
capable local NGO-community was emerging, this way of working was increasingly 
seen as inappropriate. Amongst other things, the alternative development philosophy 
implied a specific kind of North-South NGO relations – partnership - that was rooted in 
solidarity and attached much importance to the autonomy and organisational capacity 
of Southern NGOs, which were considered to be essential for achieving ownership 
(Biekart, 1999; Harrison, 2007; Fowler, 2000b). At the end of the 1990s, most private aid 
agencies were no longer operational themselves and considered working in partnership 
with Southern NGOs as integral to their developmental approach (Lewis, 1998: 503-504; 
Nyamugasira, 1998; Brehm, 2004: 30).4
 The literature provides a number of reasons why North-South NGO partnerships 
(from here onwards referred to as ‘partnerships’) are considered important: (1) enhanced 
performance, (2) added value for private aid agencies in the international aid system, (3) 
expression of private aid agencies’ values and civic identity. First, partnership - as a 
particular kind of relation in which Northern NGOs relinquish a degree of control to their 
Southern counterparts - is perceived to be crucial for aid performance. An idea which is 
widely shared within the field of international development is that initiatives imposed 
from the outside often fail to gain the same traction as those that have emerged locally 
on the basis of local priorities. As such, development interventions are considered to be 
more sustainable and effective if they are initiated and driven by local people and their 
organisations (Wallace et al., 2006: 42; Kanbur and Squire 2001: 215; Evans, 2004: 38; 
3 A number of private aid agencies already worked with local counterpart organisations since the early 1970s, 
although at that time the terminology of partnership was not yet used to describe North-South NGO relations.
4 While there is agreement in the literature that private aid agencies have widely moved towards a partnership 
approach, representative statistics are absent. Biekart (1999: 72) points to regional differences and argues that 
European and Canadian private aid agencies have historically attached more importance to solidarity-based 
partnerships than US-based ones. Furthermore, there are differences between private aid agencies’ perspective 
on partnership. Brehm (2004: 13) found that private aid agencies that had traditionally been implementing 
projects themselves had a more functional view of partnership than those with a longer history of working in 
partnership.
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Hately, 1997: 8; Abrahamsen, 2004: 1455).5 To realise ownership, a particular kind of inter-
organisational collaboration is required in which private aid agencies give Southern 
NGOs sufficient operational space: partnership (Harrison, 2007; Hudock, 1999: 31). From 
this perspective, partnership is perceived as a response to the shortcomings associated 
with the top-down and blueprint oriented development aid that characterised earlier 
eras (Fowler, 2000a: 5; Abrahamsen, 2004: 1453-1454). 
 Second, private aid agencies derive part of their added value in the international aid 
system from their (perceived) unique ability to maintain ‘genuine’ partnerships. Being 
able to build and maintain high quality relations with Southern NGOs is seen to 
distinguish private aid agencies from official donors and make them more than mere 
intermediaries of governmental subsidies.6 Due to their (shared) civic values and roots, 
private aid agencies are thought to be better able than official donors to relate to 
Southern NGOs, achieve local ownership, provide tailor made capacity building support 
and achieve equitable and long-term relations based on a shared mission and vision 
(Fowler, 1991: 11; Biekart, 1999: 62; Fernando, 2007: 2).7 Less acknowledged is the fact that 
private aid agencies, since they stopped implementing themselves, have had no other 
choice than to work with Southern NGOs to achieve their mission and secure their 
survival (Fowler, 1991: 13).
 Third, for most private aid agencies partnerships have an intrinsic value that is 
inseparably related to their (civic) values and identity. As part of their mission for social 
justice, many private aid agencies perceive partnership as an expression of solidarity 
while values like equality, trust and reciprocity reflect the aspiration to enter into 
relationships that go beyond financial aid (Lap, 1997: 292). From this perspective, 
development cooperation is not about fighting somebody else’s battle or about pity or 
charity but about people in different parts of the world fighting together in the face of 
injustice (Manji & O’Coill, 2002; Fowler, 1998: 141). The value-base underlying partnerships 
often manifest itself in a preference for ‘natural partners’, which are organisations with a 
similar background and identity. For most faith-based private aid agencies, for example, 
5 This idea, at least on paper, is also shared by bilateral and multilateral donors. For example, ownership is one of 
the five core principles of the ‘Paris Declaration’, a set of agreements to which international donors committed 
themselves in 2005 to improve aid effectiveness.
6 The term ‘official’ aid is generally used to refer to the aid provided by donor governments and multi-lateral 
institutions like the World Bank or the UNDP to poor countries.  For an overview of (the limitations of ) different 
definitions of development aid, see Riddel (2007: 17-21).
7 This kind of argumentation is closely related to the so-called ‘articles of faith’ (see Tendler, 1982: 3-7), which 
consist of a list of unique qualities attributed to development NGOs. These unique qualities are said to give 
development NGOs a comparative advantage compared to official donors. For a critical review of the articles of 
faith, see Tvedt (1998: 128-165).
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the idea of partnership expresses the solidarity that exists between Christians in 
different parts of the world. Collaborating with natural partners is important to private 
aid agencies as it helps to confirm their identity through a process of like-minded 
reinforcement (Fowler, 1991: 11). 
1.3 Criticism on partnership 
The debate on partnership is dominated by criticism of private aid agencies’ (in)ability 
to live up to their aspirations for ideal partnership. Overall, partnerships have often been 
depicted as relations that in reality are top-down rather than bottom-up and 
characterised by conditionality instead of ownership, control rather than trust and 
dependence rather than autonomy. To begin with, it has been argued that private aid 
agencies’ policy objectives are more aligned with constantly changing donor ‘fashions’ 
than local priorities and situational specificity (Mawdsley et al., 2002; Fowler, 2000b: 4). 
Not only are these policy objectives criticised for being established with little or no 
‘Southern’ input (Lister, 2001), private aid agencies are also said to impose their 
preferences during the design and implementation of projects (Fowler, 1998; Lister, 
2000; Michael, 2004) and interfere in the internal affairs of Southern NGOs (Brehm, 2004: 
25). Another strand of criticism has focused on the ‘rational’ management practices that 
private aid agencies enforce upon their partners in such fields as planning, monitoring, 
financial management and performance measurement. These practices are said to be 
contrary to participatory development approaches and begin from positions of distrust 
rather than of trust (Bornstein, 2003, 2006; Wallace et al., 2006; Mawdsley et al., 2002). 
Moreover, it has been argued that capacity building, in which such management 
practices are often promoted, primarily serves the accountability needs of private aid 
agencies rather than the priorities of local partners (James, 2001: 9). Contrary to the 
importance attached to ownership and local autonomy, private aid agencies have been 
reported to refrain from offering long-term and flexible core funding arrangements 
(Mawdsley et al., 2002; Wallace et al., 2006; Michael, 2004). Finally, accountability in 
partnerships has been identified as primarily ‘upward’ - from Southern to Northern 
NGOs - rather than reciprocal or downwards (Malhotra, 1997: 44; Bornstein, 2003; 
Ashman, 2001; Fowler, 2000b: 2). 
 Financial dependence has been identified as lying at the heart of the discrepancy 
between the principles associated with the ideal of partnership and the actual practice 
(Michael, 2004: 22; Hately, 1997: 23; Lister, 2000: 229). On the one hand, partnerships are 
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mutually dependent relationships in the sense that both parties need each other to 
achieve their objectives. Local organisations require financial resources to pursue their 
mission and private aid agencies need credible and reputable Southern partners to 
implement development interventions, produce information that demonstrates their 
success and legitimise their existence (Ebrahim, 2002, 2005). On the other hand, this 
mutual dependence does not generate equal leverage in practice. For many Southern 
NGOs, the lack of local fund raising opportunities, the abundance of ‘competitors’ and 
the relative scarcity of funding agencies means that there are major consequences if 
they lose their funding (Markowitz & Tice, 2002; Lap, 1997). Due to the funding involved, 
partnerships are said to automatically assume the characteristics of donor-recipient 
relations in which private aid agencies have far greater power than their partners 
(Hudock, 1995; Lister, 2000: 229). In that sense, it is not surprising that many Southern 
NGOs talk about their ‘donors’ instead of ‘partners’ while viewing their ‘partnership’ 
mainly in terms of the transfer of resources (Lewis, 1998: 504).8
 Several studies have shown that the inequalities within partnerships are intrinsic to 
the nature of so-called aid chains. Aid chains can be understood as the series of links 
through which aid flows on its way from donors to recipients (Biekart, 1999: 79). The 
funds that flow down aid chains, typically originating from bilateral and multilateral 
donors via private aid agencies to Southern NGOs, tend to be accompanied by a range 
of conditions (Bornstein, 2003: 396; Bornstein, 2006: 52). As funding conditions are 
passed down the aid chain, the conditions that Southern NGOs have to meet in their 
relations with private aid agencies often replicate the original conditions for 
governmental funding. This links the inequalities within partnerships to official donor 
policy and the pressures experienced by bilateral and multilateral donors to demonstrate 
an economic ‘bang for their buck’. Since the late 1990s, funding conditions in the private 
aid channel have become progressively more rigid and demanding due to an increasing 
emphasis on demonstrating tangible results and transparency (Nelson, 2006: 709; 
Overton & Storey, 2004: 43). Biekart (1999: 82) argues that the more private aid agencies 
depend on governmental subsidies, the more their relations with Southern partners are 
likely to be affected by back donor policies.9 
 Given the extensive criticism of partnership, there have been repeated calls in the 
literature to do away with the term altogether, although private aid agencies continue 
8 This illustrates that in many cases partnership is above all an aspiration of private aid agencies.
9 The phrase ‘back donor’ denotes those source(s) of private aid agencies’ funding that do not come from 
public donation. Often, but not necessarily, back donors are government ministries, departments or specialist 
agencies.
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to utilise it. Partnership is considered to be a particularly problematic term because ‘the 
language of equality’ is said to obscure and even deny the reality of North-South NGO 
relations. It has even been argued that the term partnership is deliberately used as a 
covert or subtle way of imposing the views, interpretation and agenda of private aid 
agencies on their partners (Crawford, 2003; Abrahamsen, 2004: 1455-1456). From this 
viewpoint, partnership is like a ‘Trojan Horse’ (Fowler, 2000a: 7) used to hide the real 
motives as part of a ‘new colonialism’ (Wallace et al., 2006: 38). Others have argued that 
the terminology of partnership is primarily used by private aid agencies to safeguard 
their perceived `added value’ in the development process (Lister, 2000: 229, Lister, 2001; 
Malhotra, 1997). Another concern is that partnership runs the risk of becoming a 
meaningless term given the tendency within the field of international development to 
refer to every kind of relationship as a partnership (Fowler, 2000c; Morse & McNamara, 
2006: 322). Despite the extensive criticism, however, the terminology of partnership has 
not only remained common currency in the every-day language of the private aid 
channel, but continues to be an aspiration for private aid agencies.10
 The contradiction between the principles and practices of partnership, which is 
referred to in this dissertation as the ‘partnership paradox’, has major consequences for 
private aid agencies’ legitimacy and relevance. The partnership paradox raises doubts 
about private aid agencies’ enhanced ability to achieve local ownership, their added 
value in the international aid system and the alignment between their values and 
practices. The failure to realise equitable and high quality relations not only undermines 
(claims related to) the performance of private aid agencies but also their distinctiveness 
from official donors (Fernando, 2007; Biekart, 1999; Ashman, 2001; Fowler, 2000b; 
Michael, 2004). Both are particularly relevant in an era characterised by the rise of direct 
funding from official donors to Southern NGOs and increasing doubts about what 
private aid agencies offer beyond being intermediaries for government finance (Ruben 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, by failing to realise ‘genuine’ partnerships, private aid agencies’ 
practices conflict with their own values. As value-driven organisations, private aid 
agencies must ultimately have their organisational structures and inter-organisational 
relations aligned with their core values to maintain their identity and external credibility 
(Edwards & Fowler, 2002: 7; Hudson, 2000). 
10 Usually three types of aid channels are distinguished in the development literature: multilateral (aid from 
multilateral organisations like the UN or Worldbank to Southern governments), bilateral (aid from Northern 
to Southern governments) and private or civilateral (aid from Northern to Southern NGOs) (Kinsbergen & 
Schulpen, 2010: 162).
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1.4 North-South NGO relations: gaps in the literature
While a cumulative body of knowledge about North-South NGO relations has emerged 
since the mid-1990s (see Appendix 1.1), it struggles to explain the partnership paradox. 
A review conducted for this study identified five limitations. First, many existing studies 
on the practice of partnership have emphasised private aid agencies greater power, 
while paying little to no attention to their Southern counterparts’ countervailing power 
(see Ashman, 2001; Oller, 2006; Hudock, 1995, 1999; Mawdsley et al., 2002; Wallace et al., 
2006). As a consequence, knowledge about the latter’s room to manoeuvre or their 
ability to influence decisions has remained limited.11 What makes this problematic is that 
it runs the risk of robbing Southern NGOs of their agency and (implicitly) victimises 
them in their relations with funders. This reflects a more general tendency within the 
NGO-literature that, according to Lewis (2007: 367), often follows a ‘Southern NGOs 
good, Northern NGOs bad’ line of thinking.
 Second, the literature thus far has predominantly focused on private aid agencies’ 
failure to live up to the ideal of partnership as opposed to their continued efforts to live 
up to the ideal. In examining the gap between the ideal and practice of partnership, 
studies have primarily employed a ‘negative’ perspective. The dominant approach has 
been to take characteristics of the ideal as the starting-point and subsequently pinpoint 
the areas where practices fall short (see Ashman, 2001; Lister, 2000, Hudock, 1995, 1999). 
Consequently, studies repeatedly arrive at the conclusion that private aid agencies fail 
to live up to the ideal of partnership. Yet, how they have tried to put the principles 
associated with the ideal of partnership into practice has received little attention.
 Third, existing research not only has largely taken the ideal of partnerships for 
granted but has also ended up reproducing this ideal without scrutinizing its underlying 
premises. Within the private aid channel, partnership has become a widely shared norm 
for North-South NGO relations (Harrison, 2007). It is a norm that has not only been 
internalised by private aid agencies, but also by most official donors to the extent that 
working in partnership is often a requirement for private aid agencies to qualify for 
subsidies (Brehm, 2004: 31). Partnership has not only achieved a taken-for-granted status 
11 The studies of Ebrahim (2002, 2005) and Fernando (2007: 311) are partial exceptions, although examining 
Southern NGOs’ room to manoeuvre was not the core focus of their work. Amongst other things, Ebrahim 
showed  how two Indian NGOs were highly selective in sharing information with their international funders to 
protect their core activities from interference. In addition, these NGOs produced information purely to satisfy 
their donors and lend legitimacy to their activities, not for their own decision-making. Fernando showed 
how Sri Lankan NGOs used the language and expectations of donors to their advantage by ‘sprinkling’ their 
proposals and reports with favoured jargon (e.g. participation, good-governance, gender).
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as the ‘appropriate’ way for structuring North-South NGO relations, it has also been the 
main source of inspiration and the conceptual starting-point of most research into 
these relations (Harrison 2007: 390). While researchers have tended to reproduce the 
norm of partnership, they have largely refrained from assessing the values and beliefs 
that explain why partnership is considered so important in the private aid channel.
 Fourth, prevailing research on partnerships has been largely limited to intra and 
inter-organisational dynamics while the analysis of the influence of the institutional 
environment on the principles and practice of partnership has been limited to funding. 
As with the lack of contextualisation in much of the prevailing research on development 
NGOs (Lewis & Opoku, 2006: 669), partnerships have often been analysed as if they exist 
within a vacuum. Although several studies (e.g. Biekart, 1999, Wallace et al., 20006, 
Bornstein, 2003) have demonstrated how partnerships are part of larger aid chains, 
these analyses have focused primarily on the financial basis of this integration. Yet actors 
in the private aid channel are also influenced by widely shared ideas, values and beliefs 
of development, which have a unifying, homogenizing and legitimising character 
(Tvedt, 2002: 369). Neo-institutional theorists have shown, amongst others things, how 
such shared ideas, values and beliefs may profoundly shape the way in which inter-or-
ganisational collaboration is structured (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Philips & Hardy, 
2000). As of yet, however, no systematic analysis has been undertaken to understand 
how the ideal and practice of partnership are shaped by, and connected to, the shared 
ideas, values and beliefs of the private aid channel.
 Fifth, the literature to date has not been particularly clear in terms of the concrete 
mechanisms through which inequality is produced and reproduced within partnerships. 
Many empirical studies on North-South NGO relations suffer from weak theorisation 
and a lack of analytical clarity (Fernando, 2007: 14). Of the 19 academic empirical studies 
reviewed for this thesis, for example, only seven appeared to be underpinned by theory 
(see appendix 1.1). This lack of theoretical grounding seems to have contributed to 
some studies achieving little analytical depth. Funding, for example, has been repeatedly 
identified as the main cause underlying the inequality characterising partnerships (e.g. 
Bornstein, 2003; Oller, 2006; Reith, 2010), whereas financial dependence is in fact just 
one of the factors explaining asymmetries in power within inter-organisational 
collaboration (see Clegg, 1989). Due to a lack of analytical focus and conceptual clarity, 
the literature thus far has not offered a clear picture regarding the actual mechanisms 
that enable private aid agencies to impose their preferences upon their partners. 
 From what has been said, it is not only clear that there is ample room to advance 
the understanding of the nature of North-South relations, but that a number of guiding 
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principles can be formulated in order to overcome the limitations of the existing 
literature. In sum, future research should:
·	 shed light on the countervailing power of Southern NGOs; 
·	 elucidate how private aid agencies try to put the ideal of partnership into practice; 
·	 identify why private aid agencies attach so much importance to the ideal of 
partnership;
·	 explore how the ideal and practice of partnership are linked to, and shaped by, the 
institutional context;
·	 clarify the mechanisms that produce and reproduce inequality within partnerships. 
1.5 Objective and research questions
The partnership paradox is an important topic that relates to ongoing debates about 
the relevance and legitimacy of private aid agencies. The primary objective of this 
dissertation is to contribute to these debates and address the limitations of the literature 
by providing an in-depth analysis of the partnership paradox. It asks the following 
central research question:
 
What explains the discrepancy between the principles and the practices of partnerships 
within private development cooperation?
This question implies a diagnostic, or explanatory, orientation, also because the research 
‘problem’ - the partnership paradox - has already been identified by earlier studies and 
is widely acknowledged by different stakeholders in the field. As the identification of 
causes is the starting-point of any course of action towards reaching a ‘solution’ 
(Verschuren & Dorewaard, 1999: 37), the secondary objective of this study is to explore 
the implications of the findings in view of the ongoing debates about the legitimacy 
and relevance of private aid agencies. 
 Before the main research question can be answered, it needs to be operationalised 
into a number of sub-questions. Given the need for theoretical grounding (see the 
limitations above), this dissertation departs from theory-informed sub-questions. These 
questions are formulated at the end of the next section which discusses the overall 
theoretical framework and different (sub-) concepts used for this thesis.
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1.6 Theoretical framework
Explaining the partnership paradox requires two types of knowledge: (1) descriptive 
knowledge about the gap between the principles and practice of partnership and (2) 
explanatory knowledge of those forces that push towards and pull away from the ideal 
of partnership. In view of these knowledge requirements, power has been identified as 
the the most suitable general concept for theoretical guidance. 
 For the first type of knowledge, this dissertation adopts an episodic conceptualisa-
tion of power. As the principles of partnership have already been extensively discussed 
in the literature, this study focuses on further clarifying its practice. While the literature 
clearly shows that the practice of partnerships is characterised by inequality due to the 
funding involved, the analysis it offers of this inequality falls short in terms of balance 
and depth. The first step of this study must therefore be to clarify the nature of this 
inequality. As inequality can only exists in situations where power is exercised, it makes 
sense to do this from the perspective of episodic power. Episodic power refers to 
discrete, strategic acts initiated by self-interested actors to achieve outcomes in 
interaction with other actors. This mode of power has been the traditional focus of 
organisational research and theory, with its emphasis on examining which actors are 
most able to influence organisational decision making (Clegg, 1989: 211). Power is 
viewed as a commodity: something to be acquired, owned and used (Barnett & Duvall, 
2005: 46), enabling actors to get others to do what they otherwise would not do (Dahl, 
1957). Episodic power is always exercised in the context of social relations. As such, it is 
highly situated and contained, in which episodes of power are tied to the deliberate 
actions of actors (Lawrence et al., 2001: 629).
 For conceptual guidance in generating the second type of knowledge, a body of 
theory is required that is capable of linking prevailing ideas, values and beliefs in the 
private aid channel to the ideal and practice of partnership. Partnerships do not exist in 
a vacuum but are embedded in a wider institutional context, which contains conflicting 
forces that push towards and pull away from the ideal of partnership. Regarding the 
latter, it is known from the literature that the conditions for official donor funding, on 
which many private aid agencies are dependent, have an effect on the internal dynamics 
of their partnerships with Southern NGOs. As official donors have become more 
demanding in terms of tangible results and transparency, it has become increasingly 
difficult for private aid agencies to live up to the ideal of partnership. As of yet, there has 
been no systematic examination of how the implicit values and beliefs underlying the 
growing emphasis on accountability and demonstrating results pull private aid agencies 
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away from the principles of partnership. Similarly, it remains unclear what the specific 
values and beliefs are that push private aid agencies towards the ideal of partnership. 
 Understanding power from a systemic perspective seems to be a particularly 
suitable way to analytically connect the principles and practice of partnership to the 
prevailing ideas, values and beliefs of the institutional environment. As a concept, 
systemic power develops from the idea that human behaviour takes place within 
socially constructed frameworks that both enable and constrain actors’ capacity to act 
(Lawrence, 2008: 174). Instead of viewing power as something that is held and used by 
self-interested actors in social relations, this perspective views power as something that 
is inherent to systems of meaning and signification which shape the identity, motives 
and interests of actors. Because these systems are frameworks of meaning, they 
determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain thoughts or actions (Arts & Van 
Tatenhove, 2005: 351). As such, they lead to self-regulation and internalised constraints 
and have a disciplining effect on what actors can and cannot do (Barnett & Duval, 2005: 
23). This also implies a more pervasive and less tangible form of power compared to the 
episodic perspective because it cannot be attributed to the strategic acts of self-inter-
ested actors. Neo-institutional theorists (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) in particular have shown how shared taken-for-granted norms, values and beliefs 
profoundly shape organisational behaviour by determining what conduct is normal or 
appropriate and what counts as a problem or a solution (see also Clegg, 1989: 224).
 While the above two perspectives on power offer important theoretical starting-
points for explaining the partnership paradox, they are still rather broad and abstract. 
Therefore, while taking these two perspectives as its starting point, this study uses four 
more concise power-concepts, which have been chosen specifically to address the 
earlier identified gaps and limitations in the literature:
1. Influence reflects an episodic perspective of power and refers to one actor getting 
another one to do what it otherwise would not do. It is based on the hierarchical 
ordering of authority grounded in resource control. In this study, the concept serves 
to establish the relative influence of local counterparts in decision-making and to 
explain why some are more influential than others. It has been chosen to shed light 
on the mechanisms through which private aid agencies exercise their greater power 
while clarifying the relative power of Southern NGOs.
2. Strategic responses are the ways in which actors try to manage the demands of other 
actors who are more powerful than them. This study employs this episodic power 
concept to understand which funding conditions are perceived by local counterparts 
as undesirable and what strategies they use to manage these conditions. The concept 
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has been particularly chosen to shed light on the countervailing power of Southern 
NGOs.
3. Rules are frameworks that structure inter-organisational relationships by simultaneously 
enabling and constraining actors’ capacity to act. The concept of rules is used to 
understand local partners’ room to manoeuvre as well as the manner in which private 
aid agencies have institutionally ‘designed’ their partnerships. It has been particularly 
chosen to clarify how private aid agencies try to live up to the ideal of partnership 
while establishing the way in which their practices are shaped by the institutional 
environment. As private aid agencies draw upon prevailing beliefs, norms and values 
from the institutional environment when establishing the rules, this concept connects 
the episodic and systemic perspectives of power.
4. Institutional logics are systems of meaning and signification originating from the 
institutional environment which shape organisational behaviour. This systemic 
power concept is used to shed light on the shared ideas, beliefs and values of the 
private aid channel that both pull towards and push away from the ideal of 
partnership. Besides clarifying why private aid agencies attach so much importance 
to the ideal of partnership, this concept has been chosen to explore how the ideal 
and practice of partnership are shaped by the institutional context.
The remainder of this section introduces the concepts in greater detail and establishes 
their mutual connections.
Influence
In most policy domains, actors do not operate in isolation but work together in inter-
organisational relations that take shape around certain policy problems and programmes 
(Arts et al., 2000: 57). As actors tend to have diverging or even conflicting preferences 
and interests, it is in these relations that power is exercised in a way that Dahl (1957: 
202-203) famously defined as the ability of ‘A to make B do something that B otherwise 
would not do’. When power is exercised to realise an effect, it is referred to as influence 
(Arts, 1998: 57).12 Influence, which is also referred to as ‘power as capacity’, ‘power over’ 
or ‘agent power’ in the literature (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004: 349), has been identified 
as the ‘normal power’ of the social sciences due to its apparent nature and visibility 
(Clegg, 1989: 211). The inter-organisational relations under examination in this thesis are 
primarily those between private aid agencies and their Southern counterparts, although 
12 The underlying distinction here is between having power and exercising power. While having power is the 
ability of A to influence B, exercising power is using that ability to realise an actual effect (see Huberts & 
Kleinnijenhuis, 1994).
31
General Introduction
1
the collaboration between private aid agencies and official donors is also indirectly 
considered. 
 Within inter-organisational relations, influence is usually based on resource-based 
inequalities which are reproduced by socially constructed hierarchies in authority 
(Clegg, 1989: 217). Access to and control over certain resources is routinely required to 
achieve organisational goals. Actors depend upon each other for resources such as 
money, expertise, credibility, information or contacts to achieve their goals and ensure 
their survival. Within these relations, each actor brings in its own set of resources. Yet, 
not all resources are of equal value in the relation (Clegg & Hardy, 1996: 372), leading to 
relations of autonomy and dependence between actors (Arts et al., 2000: 57). When one 
actor relies on another for a critical resource, the dependent organisation is at a power 
disadvantage. The relative ‘leverage’ of a resource depends on the extent to which a 
resource is needed for survival and operation and whether alternative sources of a 
resource are available and accessible (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 45-51). Actors can use 
their control over critical resources as a ‘carrot and stick’ tactic to modify the behaviour 
of others. This way the desire for resources or the fear of having them withheld ensures 
the obedience of those being influenced. As long as actors sustain their resource 
control, their ability to exercise power is maintained (Clegg, 1989: 121). 
 While actors may use their control over critical resources directly to impose their 
will upon others, in most day-to-day interactions influence is derived from the 
hierarchical authority that is grounded in resource control. Hierarchical authority, also 
referred to as ‘legitimate power’ or ‘position power’, refers to the recognised, legitimate 
right to make decisions associated with a certain position in a relationship (Weber, 1978; 
Hardy & Clegg, 1996: 370; Hardy & Philips, 1998: 219). In most cases subordinates obey 
superiors because they perceive that the latter have the right to exercise power by 
virtue of their position. The superior’s right to exercise power is thus considered by both 
superior and subordinate as legitimate (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984: 105-106). This gives the 
influence derived from hierarchical authority a major advantage over that associated 
with (the threat of) sanctions, as it tends to invoke far less resistance (Clegg, 1989: 212). 
Strategic responses
While power relations signify acceptance on the part of those subject to them, they 
invariably also imply resistance (Clegg, 1989: 208). While actors may accept the authority 
of those who have power over them, this does not mean that they cannot attempt to 
moderate its effects. Power is always exercised within the context of the rules of the 
game that constrain and enable action (more about this below). This creates 
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opportunities for resistance as rules are never free of ambiguous meaning and 
surveillance mechanisms are never infallible (Clegg & Hardy, 1996: 380). Giddens’ (1984) 
notion of the ‘dialectics of control’ points out that even the most subordinate actor 
always has some countervailing power at its disposal to resist the actions of its superiors. 
The resistance strategies which are used by actors to manage the demands of more 
powerful actors are referred to in the neo-institutional literature as strategic responses 
(Oliver, 1991). The nature, extent and success of strategic behaviour depends on the 
resources, knowledge and skills of the actor involved (Lawrence, 2008: 185). The more 
successful strategic responses are, the more they prevent the full realisation of the 
intentions of the one in power (Clegg, 1989: 217). In that sense, they contribute to the 
outcome of power relations by imposing limits on power (Barbalet, 1985: 532). This 
dissertation examines the strategic responses employed by Southern NGOs towards 
their donors.
 Strategic responses can assume different forms although open defiance is rare in 
power-laden relationships. However, the lack of overt resistance does not mean that the 
weaker party passively accepts the dictates of the stronger party (Clegg, 1989). This is 
because dominated actors tend to disguise their resistance ‘for the interest of safety and 
success’ (Scott, 1990: 86). From neo-institutional theory, for example, we know that 
organisations subtly offer resistance by giving the appearance of obeying more 
powerful actors without actually doing so in practice (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In such 
cases, organisations maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders, while 
simultaneously ‘decoupling’ their core activities from interference. While influence and 
resistance are interrelated, most strategic responses leave the hierarchical authority 
structures and underlying rules of the game unquestioned. In such cases, the mere 
exercise of power is resisted, not the premises that make that exercise possible. As such, 
strategic behaviour tends to reproduce existing configurations of power (asymmetry) 
(Clegg, 1989: 207, 220).
Rules
While power is implicated in authority and grounded in resource control, it is ultimately 
constituted by rules (Hardy & Clegg, 1996: 380). Inter-organisational relations do not 
exist in a vacuum. Instead, actors interact within socially constructed frameworks which 
can be conceptualised as the ‘rules of the game’ (Clegg, 1989: 212). These rules structure 
and temporarily stabilise the relationship and simultaneously enable and constrain 
actors’ capacity to act. They tend to be unilaterally established by the actor with control 
over critical resources and both reflect and solidify prevailing power asymmetries. 
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Besides fixing the hierarchical authority structure in the relationship and putting actors 
in their positions, rules formalise lines of responsibility, regulate (inter)action and 
standardise procedures (Klijn & Koppejan, 2004). Amongst others things, they define 
what type of outcomes ought to be achieved, how problems should be interpreted and 
tackled and who qualifies for membership (Phillips & Hardy, 2000: 32). Rules allow power 
to be exercised indirectly in the sense that they influence behaviour independent from 
time or space (Clegg, 1989: 213). As such, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 52) refer to rules as 
‘frozen configurations of privilege and bias’ which continue to shape the future choices 
of actors long after they have been established. The rules studied in this thesis are those 
that shape the relations between private aid agencies and their Southern counterparts.
 Rules can be conceptualised as having three analytical dimensions – regulative, 
normative and cognitive - reflecting different institutional approaches (Scott, 2008: 
50-59). In economically oriented institutional theories, particularly public choice theory 
and neo-institutional economics (see Ostrom, 1986; Ostrom & Crawford, 2005; 
Williamson, 1985), the regulative understanding of rules prevails. In this perspective, 
formalised rules within inter-organisational relations are primarily seen as a protection 
against the opportunistic behaviour of other actors while compliance is ensured 
through (the threat of) sanctions. The normative and cognitive understandings of rules 
originate from (organisational) sociology. Both stress that organisational behaviour is 
profoundly shaped by the shared ideas, beliefs and values originating from the 
institutional environment (see below), upon which actors draw for guidance and 
meaning when establishing rules. The normative perspective of rules emphasises how 
organisations conform to prevailing normative expectations and standards of appropri-
ateness (see March and Olsen, 1989). Rules reflect social obligations or shared 
professional standards and are followed because they are widely seen as normal, 
morally just or perceived as ‘best practices’ (Scott, 2008: 55). The cognitive perspective 
focuses on how organisational behaviour is guided by shared conceptions about the 
nature of social reality and interpretive frames through which meaning is made (see 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such rules guide behaviour because they render certain ideas 
and actions (e.g. problem-definitions, proposed solutions) meaningful while others 
senseless or even inconceivable. Rules are most influential when the regulative, 
normative and cognitive dimensions are aligned (Scott, 2008), for example, when 
prevailing norms and cognitive frames are codified in formal legislation.
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Institutional logics
Organisations are not only directly influenced by other organisations but also by the 
broader institutional environment in which they are embedded. As mentioned above, 
the institutional environment offers shared goals, ideas, values and beliefs – also referred 
to as institutional logics - that determine which kind of conduct is considered 
appropriate and meaningful. These logics become shared through repeated interactions 
by organisations which are grouped around a set of issues and participate in related 
activities (Hoffman, 1999: 352). Such a group of organisations, which can be understood 
to inhabit the same organisational field, draws upon and adheres to prevailing 
institutional logics for guidance, meaning and legitimacy (Philips & Hardy, 2000: 29).13 As 
such, the institutional environment provides organisations with collective identities, 
motives and vocabularies while offering guidance with regard to which problems get 
attended to, which solutions get considered, what outcomes are to be achieved and 
what practices are considered (Townley, 1997: 263; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 111—114; 
Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). While institutional logics may profoundly influence 
organisational behaviour, they do not work through discrete acts of agency but exist 
independent from the strategic acts of other actors (Clegg, 1989: 209; Lawrence, 2008). 
In this thesis, we conceptualise the private aid channel as an organisational field and 
seek to examine those institutional logics that shape the ideal and practice of 
partnership. 
 In organisational fields where commonly accepted bottom-line standards and 
proven methods for establishing performance are absent, such as those primarily 
inhabited by non-profit organisations like the private aid channel, compliance with 
prevailing institutional logics is key to organisational survival. Because actors cannot 
objectively prove their fitness, they have to derive their legitimacy in important respects 
from their compliance with institutionally prescribed expectations and rationales 
(Clegg, 1989: 226; Alexander, 1995). Those actors not in conformity are perceived to be 
illegitimate and will have difficulties attracting resources and ensuring their survival. 
One consequence is that organisations within organisational fields tend to become 
increasingly similar over time as they face similar institutional pressures, a process which 
Powell and DiMaggio (1983) refer to as isomorphism. In the private aid channel, private 
aid agencies share many characteristics because they share the same institutional logic. 
Amongst other things, they all (claim to) attach importance to ensuring local 
participation, work in partnership with Southern NGOs and comply with ‘best practices’ 
13 The concept of organisational field bears resemblance to Bourdieu’s (1984) ‘social field’, which refers to a social 
arena governed by distinctive values and approaches in which actors and their social positions are located.
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in the areas of planning, monitoring and evaluation (Tvedt, 1998; Roberts et al., 2005: 
1851). 
 As institutional logics profoundly shape inter-organisational collaboration (see 
Clegg, 1989: 214), they offer a useful entry-point for understanding North-South NGO 
relations. In establishing the rules that structure inter-organisational collaboration, 
actors draw upon prevailing institutional logics for guidance and meaning. Amongst 
other things, these logics provide norms or standards for the appropriate way in which 
actors ought to relate to each other. By conforming to the parameters of existing norms 
and beliefs, actors gain legitimacy and ensure their survival (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996: 1026). In the private aid channel, for example, private aid agencies can be expected 
to draw upon the prevailing norm of ‘partnership’ to structure their relations with 
Southern NGOs as other types of inter-organisational relations are considered less 
appropriate (see Harrison, 2007). In a similar way, prevailing institutional logics will shape 
what goals (e.g. gender equality, empowerment) and strategies (e.g. rights-based 
approach, participation) are considered meaningful by private aid agencies and which 
accountability practices (e.g. use of logical framework) will be viewed as appropriate. In 
this way, widely shared norms, values and beliefs originating from the institutional 
environment, become solidified in the rules governing the collaboration (Philips & 
Hardy, 2000: 32).
Sub-questions
Based on the above, the following sub-questions have been formulated:14
1. To what extent are local counterpart organisations able to influence decision-mak-
ing within partnerships and what explains their influence?
2. What kind of funding conditions do local counterpart organisations perceive as 
undesirable and what kind of strategic responses do they employ to manage those 
conditions? 
3. How do the prevailing partnership rules shape local counterpart organisations’ room 
to manoeuvre within their relationships with private aid agencies?
4. What are the prevailing institutional logics within the private aid channel and how 
do they shape the principles and practice of partnership?
14 This thesis has not been written as a monograph but instead is based on four self-contained articles written for 
publication in international peer-reviewed journals. As each chapter starts from its own research ‘problem’, the 
respective research questions in the chapters have been tailored to fit the specific way in which this problem 
has been framed. As such, there are slight differences between the formulation of the research questions in the 
chapters and the sub-questions presented here.
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1.7. Methodology
There is no single, accepted way of doing social science. How researchers conduct their 
studies depends upon a range of factors, including how they perceive the nature of the 
social world and what can be known about it (ontology) and the nature of knowledge 
and how it can be acquired (epistemology) (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 1). The perspective 
employed in this study closely resonates with what has been referred as ‘subtle realism’ 
(see Hammersley 1992; Silverman, 2005). Ontologically, this perspective assumes that 
our ability to know social reality is imperfect at best and that claims about reality must 
be subject to a wide-ranging critical examination to achieve the best possible 
understanding of reality. Epistemologically, it argues that how we understand the world 
is a central part of how we understand ourselves and others. Given this perspective, this 
thesis seeks to make its (theoretical) assumptions explicit and provide information of 
both technical details of conduct and potential bias, enabling others to scrutinise the 
validity of the research (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 20). In this vein, this section covers the 
following topics: design and sampling, methods and data, analysis and validity.
Design and sampling 
Given the study’s focus on ‘how and why questions’ (see main and sub-questions), it 
primarily employs a qualitative methodology. A survey was conducted to complement 
the analysis. Three out of the four empirical chapters - the chapter about strategic 
responses is the exception - are based on a comparative case study design. The selected 
cases are the partnerships of three private aid agencies, Action Aid (AA), Christian Aid 
(CA), and Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and (a selection 
of) their local partners in Ghana, India, and Nicaragua. By including multiple cases into 
the analysis, it became possible to systematically compare the different partnership 
approaches and identify the factors underlying their similarities and differences. 
Furthermore, the evidence derived from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling (Yin, 2003).
 For multiple case studies, selection criteria are required for both establishing 
membership of the ‘parent population’ and ensuring a degree of diversity between the 
cases to make optimal use of the comparative research design (Lewis, 2003: 96; Gobo, 
2004: 444). Private aid agencies had to meet the following three criteria to qualify for 
selection. First, they had to work on an international scale on a variety of themes in the 
field of international development with local counterpart organisations in developing 
countries. Second, in their policy papers they had to perceive partnerships with 
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Southern NGOs as integral to their development approach. Third, selected agencies 
had to differ from each other in terms of the level at which decision-making takes place 
(centralised vs. decentralised). The work of Young (et al., 1999) suggests that a 
decentralised management-structure is likely to result in more democratic decision-
making.  At the time of fieldwork, ICCO managed its partnerships centrally from its head 
office in the Netherlands while CA and AA maintained relationships with partners at the 
national-level.15 While CA maintains its relations in each country from a single country-
office, AA manages its partnerships through its various regional offices throughout the 
countries where it works. By selecting multiple agencies with different governance 
structures, the likelihood of encountering variety in decision-making practices would 
be greater.
 Fieldwork was carried out in Ghana, India and Nicaragua. The work of Brehm (2004: 
50) and Michael (2004: 24) suggests that the practice of partnerships differs between 
regions and countries. Brehm found Latin American NGOs to be more vocal in expressing 
their views than African NGOs. Similarly, Michael argues that countries like Bangladesh, 
India, Argentina, Brazil or Peru accommodate numerous ‘strong’ NGOs, whereas such 
organisations tend to be much rarer in African countries. By choosing multiple countries 
with vastly different NGO-sectors (Heinrich, 2007), it not only became possible to 
improve validity but also assess the effect of country-context on prevailing partnership 
practices. Ghana, India and Nicaragua were chosen specifically because their inclusion 
allowed the study to build on existing research contacts. As the amount of work related 
to planning and conducting research in three countries eventually proved to be too 
much, another researcher was hired with the specific objective to collect the data in 
Nicaragua.16 For the data-collection in Nicaragua the same interview guides and 
questionnaire were used as for the Ghana and India studies (more about this below).
 The nature of the research questions required the perspectives of both private aid 
agencies and those of local counterpart organisations to be taken into account. First, a 
sample of local partners of AA, CA and ICCO had to be selected. Unlike most quantitative 
studies, qualitative research does not set out to estimate the incidence of phenomena 
in the wider population statistically. For the purpose of this study a maximum variation 
sampling strategy was used, which implies that selected units have to be as diverse as 
15 At the time of fieldwork in Ghana, India and Nicaragua (March-September 2008), ICCO was planning to 
transform its governance model into an international network organisation in which, amongst other things, 
decision-making authority will be transferred to Southern stakeholders. Because the new governance model 
was not yet operational, however, the findings presented in this study are not indicative of the new model.
16 The researcher for the Nicaragua study, Alexandra Tuinstra, had experience with doing research among 
Nicaraguan NGOs.
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possible within the boundaries of the defined population. This is to ensure that all the 
key characteristics of relevance to the research topic are covered (Lewis, 2003: 78-79). To 
ensure that the sample was as diverse as possible, the sampling aimed for heterogeneity 
in thematic focus, size in terms of budget and staff, and geographical spread. These are 
all criteria that have been identified as the defining features of development NGOs 
(Vakil, 1997). In addition, an effort was made to include both long-time partners and 
those that had their first contract.17 In total 25 ICCO partners, 21 AA partners, and 22 CA 
partners participated in the study (see table 1.1). All partners were approached via their 
respective agencies and extended their support for the research.
Methods and data
For the data-collection, semi-structured interviews and a survey were conducted and 
relevant (policy) documents were gathered (see table 1.2). The data was primarily 
collected from November 2007 through September 2008, although a limited number 
of (follow up) interviews were also conducted in 2009 and 2010. In the first few 
months, the emphasis was on designing, testing and improving the interview guides 
and questionnaire. Obviously, the interview guide relating to staff of ICCO, CA and AA 
17 As the actual selection was the outcome of a collaborative effort between the researcher and agency-staff, 
there is a possibility that it may have been biased. For example, agency-staff may have tried to steer the research 
away from partners with whom they had a strained relationship. There were no indications that this happened, 
however, while partners of all three agencies were encountered that openly voiced criticism towards their 
respective project-officer.
19 In Nicaragua AA ultimately did not participate in the study. Despite repeated attempts over a six-month period 
to establish contact, it did not respond to the invitation to participate in the study. In order to maintain the 
deadline of the study, there was no other choice but to exclude AA Nicaragua from the research.
Table 1.1   Partner breakdown per country 19
Agency Ghana India Nicaragua Total
Christian Aid 7 8 7 22
ICCO 7 10 8 25
Action Aid 10 11 - 21
Total 24 29 15  68
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Table 1.2   Breakdown of research questions and data-sources 
Research questions agency staff partners documents
1. To what extent are local 
counterpart organisations 
able to influence decision-
making within partnerships 
and what explains their 
relative influence?
(Group) 
interviews:
- 9 ICCO-staff
- 8 CA-staff
- 11 AA-staff 
Interviews and 
survey:  
- 25 ICCO partners
- 22 CA partners
- 21 AA partners
X
2.  What kind of funding 
conditions do local 
counterpart organisations 
perceive as undesirable 
and what kind of strategic 
responses do they employ 
to manage those conditions?
X Interviews:
- 25 ICCO partners
- 22 CA partners
- 21 AA partners
X
3.  How do the prevailing 
partnership rules shape local 
counterpart organisations’ 
room to manoeuvre within 
their relationships with 
private aid agencies?
(Group) 
interviews:
- 9 ICCO-staff
- 8 CA-staff
- 11 AA-staff 
Interviews:  
- 25 ICCO partners
- 22 CA partners
- 20 AA partners
- strategic plans
-  partnership 
policy 
- annual reports
- partner selection 
   policy
- contracts
4.  What are the prevailing 
institutional logics within 
the private aid channel and 
how do they shape the 
principles and practice of 
partnership?
(Group) 
interviews:
- 9 ICCO-staff
- 8 CA-staff
Interviews: 
- 25 ICCO partners
- 22 CA partners
- strategic plans
-  partnership 
policy 
- annual reports
- partner selection
   policy
- contracts
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differed considerably from that used for interviewing representatives of local partners in 
Ghana, India and Nicaragua. Regarding the former, numerous exploratory interviews 
were conducted with ICCO-staff in the Netherlands which not only yielded a great deal 
of information but also vastly improved the interview guide. To test and improve upon 
the interview guides and questionnaire to be used with local organisations, pilot 
research was carried out in Zambia in February 2008 with the help of two students who 
were conducting fieldwork for their MA-theses.19 The fieldwork in Ghana took place 
from March to May 2008, while the fieldwork in India was conducted in the period from 
July to September 2008. Amongst other things, the short break between these two 
periods was used to provide detailed instructions to the researcher who collected the 
Nicaragua data in August 2008. In Ghana and India, local research assistants helped out 
with the complex and time-consuming task of planning and arranging large numbers 
of interviews in different parts of the country (see appendix 1.2). 
 The data collected through semi-structured interviews with staff of ICCO, CA and 
AA and representatives of local partners in Ghana, India and Nicaragua constitutes the 
backbone of this dissertation. A key feature of semi-structured interviews is that they 
combine structure with flexibility (Ritchie, 2003: 36). They not only enable a systematic 
collection of sensitive data but also allow respondents to share experiences and inter-
pretations based on their own perspectives and bring up issues not covered by the 
interview guide (Legard, 2003: 141-142). A total of 108 interviews were conducted for this 
dissertation, which includes 12 follow-up interviews. Regarding agency-staff, nearly all 
respondents consisted of project-officers responsible for managing partner relations 
although several high-ranking staff-members were also included. In total, nine staff 
members of ICCO, eight of CA and eleven of AA were interviewed. Representatives of 
local organisations were those responsible for managing the relations with funding 
agencies. This was usually the managing director or someone in an equivalent position. 
Interviews typically lasted two hours and were conducted face-to-face. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
 During all interviews the background and experience of the respondent, decision-
making procedures, (examples of) the relative influence of local counterparts and potential 
causes for their (lack of) influence were addressed. Agency-staff in particular were asked 
19 In 2007, the idea emerged of linking two Master-students, Lara van Kouterik and Wubke Willemsen, to this PhD-
project. This turned out to be worthwhile endeavour. When designing their own research proposals – which 
dealt with different aspects related to donor-NGO relations - the students came up with critical questions and 
ideas which helped to sharpen the ideas and assumptions underlying the PhD-project. Moreover, the extensive 
testing of the interview guide and questionnaire in Zambia yielded numerous improvements. 
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to explain what made some partners more influential than others, what the rationale was 
behind their partnership approach and how it had evolved over time. Specific questions 
asked to representatives of local organisations related to the differences between ICCO/
CA/AA and other funding agencies, how power asymmetries affected their organisation 
and how they strategically tried to manage funding conditions. Regarding the latter, the 
interviews also discussed experiences with funding agencies other than ICCO/CA/AA to 
increase the likelihood of finding different kinds of strategic responses. The interview 
guides were based on the existing literature on North-South NGO relations, power theory 
and neo-institutional theory. All respondents received information regarding the nature 
and purpose of the research prior to the interview. A number of follow-up interviews were 
conducted when the initial interview proved to be particularly rewarding. In addition to 
the individual interviews, several focus groups were conducted with staff of all three 
agencies. In each case, the group interaction proved to be extremely useful for refining 
existing findings, establishing shared ideas, beliefs and values and identifying diversity in 
viewpoints (see also Finch & Lewis, 2003: 170-198).
 In addition to the in-depth interviews, all partner-representatives of ICCO, CA and 
AA were asked to complete a questionnaire. While the interviews, amongst other things, 
served to explain the partners’ relative influence in decision-making, the survey 
systematically captured the extent of their influence. As such, both methods of data-
collection were complementary to each other. Given the absence of a ready-made 
measurement instrument for assessing partners’ relative influence, such an instrument 
had to be developed for this research. The result was a questionnaire which mapped 
the partners’ perceived influence on different topics in decision-making using a 
Likert-scale (see appendix 2.2). Theoretically, the questionnaire was based on the work 
of Dahl (1957) while the decision-making topics were identified through a literature 
review and interviews conducted during the pilot phase of the research. 
 In addition to the interviews and survey, the policy papers of ICCO, CA and AA and 
the contracts that they used for their partner-relations were also an important 
data-source. Documentary analysis involves the study of existing documents, either to 
understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be 
revealed by their style and coverage (Ritchie, 2003: 35). One of its key advantages over 
other data-sources is that documents are drawn up without their producers realizing 
that they will be used in a research project. This means that there is no provoked 
behaviour as is the case when questions are put to people (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 
1999: 121). For the study of organisations, policy papers – which are usually the outcome 
of a social process involving multiple people - often provide an excellent opportunity 
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to identify the (shared) goals, values and beliefs held by the organisation. For this 
dissertation, the policy papers of ICCO, CA and AA proved useful in understanding how 
these agencies (formally) understand their goals, (their role in) development and the 
relevance of partnership. Both documents that were intended for internal use only (e.g. 
partnership policy) and those open to the public (e.g. strategic plans) were collected. To 
understand the legal aspects of partnerships, including mutual rights and obligations, 
the standard contracts used by the agencies were included in the study. 
Data-analysis
In qualitative research, the analytic process is usually iterative whereby researchers move 
back and forth from data to sense-making or developing theory (Verschuren & 
Doorewaard, 1999: 22; Spencer et al., 2003: 213). For this dissertation, data-analysis already 
started during the fieldwork period when notes were taken to capture thoughts about 
the dynamics of interviews, ideas for including certain topics and questions in subsequent 
interviews as well preliminary conclusions. Not surprisingly, it was during this period that 
the ideas about the nature of the study’s four empirical chapters, which up until then had 
been rather abstract, began to take a more definitive form. While there are no fixed rules 
or procedures for analysing qualitative data, a common procedure is coding, in which 
‘codes’ are assigned to demarcated text segments. While these codes may be based on 
the language and terms of the research subjects, they may also be chosen by the 
researcher and may include commons sense terms, terms or concepts derived from the 
literature, or concepts devised by the researcher (Spencer et al., 2003: 203). 
 For this dissertation, a system of codes was constructed for each of the four 
empirical chapters. Besides searching for and retrieving chunks of labelled data, the 
coding system made it possible to establish patterns in the data, make comparisons and 
identify deviant cases (see also Ritchie et al., 2003: 221). The system of codes was 
informed by, but not limited to, the different bodies of theory underlying the four 
empirical chapters. To illustrate, chapter two builds upon the concept of ‘influence’ in 
the context of decision-making. As such, codes were applied to those segments of the 
interview transcripts that covered partners’ relative ability to set the agenda and make 
final decisions. Similarly, the coding system developed for chapter four, which builds 
upon the concept of ‘rules’, worked with codes that indicated different types of rules 
covered in text segments and how these shaped the partners’ room to manoeuvre. As 
the familiarity with the data-set increased over time, the emphasis shifted from 
descriptive to explanatory coding while existing codes were modified to create simpler, 
more robust codes that could be more clearly related to each other (see Strauss and 
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Corbin, 1998; Ritchie et al., 2003: 225). To handle the large amounts of data and ensure 
consistency, Atlas.ti software was used during the coding-process.
 The data collected from the survey of partners of ICCO, CA and AA was analysed 
using descriptive statistics (see Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 258-259). More specifically, 
box plots, which are often used in exploratory quantitative data analysis, were drawn to 
provide (visual) information about the samples’ range, average, normality of the 
distribution and skew of the distribution. Besides offering a concise and easily 
interpretable overview of the main characteristics of a data-set, box plots are particularly 
suitable for identifying outliers and extremes within the sample and comparing 
between different data-sets. In this study, they proved to be particularly useful for 
graphically depicting the relative influence of the partners of ICCO, CA and AA on key 
decision-making issues and identifying differences between the agencies. Unlike the 
approach followed in most quantitative studies, the analysis of the survey data was not 
done in a separate phase after the completion of data collection. Instead, the survey-data 
was already analysed during the fieldwork which made it possible to further examine 
the (causes underlying the) outcomes during the interviews. The survey data was 
entered in SPSS statistical software for analysis.
Validity 
The criteria for ‘good’ research vary across research traditions and methodologies. In 
particular, one’s epistemological standpoint (e.g. positivist, interpretivist) shapes how 
the criteria for ‘good’ research are viewed (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003: 273). In line with the 
epistemological perspective employed in this study, a number of methodological 
strategies have been used to achieve validity, insofar as this is possible. Several of these 
strategies have already been described above. These include the use of a comparative 
case study design, fieldwork conducted in multiple countries, samples selected to 
encompass sufficient diversity, extensive testing of both interview guides and 
questionnaire and consistent coding systems. In addition to these strategies, a number 
of other efforts were also undertaken to ensure validity. 
 First, much effort was put into making sure that the respondents understood the 
nature of the research and the content of the questions asked. Before each interview, all 
respondents received an e-mail explaining amongst other things the nature of the 
research and purpose of the interview. Each interview started by repeating the 
information provided earlier and providing additional clarifications. The researcher then 
deliberately tried to use the language and terminology of the respondent to prevent 
misunderstandings. Regarding the questionnaire, explicit instructions ensured that 
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respondents properly understood the Likert-scale as well as the decision-making topics 
on which they had to pinpoint their perceived influence. To ensure that respondents 
had properly completed the questionnaire, all questionnaire-results were verified 
through the interview-transcripts.20
 Second, to ensure as much as possible that respondents did not withhold (sensitive) 
information, they were granted confidentiality. Exploring issues related to power in 
partnerships is sensitive and respondents may be reluctant to criticise each other in 
ongoing partnerships (see Ashman, 2001). Moreover, despite communications from 
ICCO, Christian Aid and Action Aid that introduced the study as an independent 
academic endeavor, its nature was such that there was little time to genuinely get to 
know respondents and gain their trust. To limit concerns regarding the consequences 
of the disclosure of potentially sensitive information, all respondents were promised 
that the reporting would avoid direct attribution of comments to names or organisations 
(see Legard et al., 2003: 162). During the in-depth interviews, the representatives of most 
organisations seemed to speak openly without any inhibitions. In fact, several 
agency-staff and partner representatives took the opportunity to vent their frustration 
over certain issues in the relationship. On some occasions, respondents asked for the 
recorder to be switched off and in such situations notes were taken instead.
 Third, triangulation was used to both confirm and to improve the clarity, or precision, 
of research findings. Besides providing complementary ways of looking at the same 
phenomenon, triangulation is usually seen to contribute to the validity of research 
findings when different approaches lead to the same result (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003: 
275-276). Three types of triangulation were used for this dissertation: methods 
triangulation, triangulation of data-sources and theory triangulation (see also table 1.2). 
Regarding methods triangulation, the findings originating from different methods of 
data-collection (in-depth interviews, survey, gathering of documents) were compared 
and contrasted with each other. Concerning data-triangulation, the study draws upon 
different data-sources (respondents’ perceptions and experiences and documents). 
Moreover, the perceptions of partners regarding their relative influence were compared 
and contrasted with those of agency staff (ego versus alter-perception) (see Arts, 1998: 
80-83). Finally, different kinds of theoretical concepts (e.g. influence, rules) were 
employed to understand the partnership paradox to achieve theoretical triangulation.
Fourth, drafts of each empirical chapter were verified through respondent validation 
20 In a few cases the verification procedure actually raised doubts about whether a specific decision-making 
topic had been properly interpreted by the respondent. In those cases, the respective score was removed from 
analysis to ensure validity.
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(Lewis & Ritchie, 2003: 276). Agency-staff and representatives of local counterparts who 
demonstrated particular interest in the study during the interviews were invited to 
provide feedback on drafts. More specifically, they were asked to provide additional 
information, identify errors and challenge what are perceived as wrong interpretations. 
While each of the chapters benefited from the feedback through numerous (small) 
improvements, it did not result in any major changes.
1.8 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of three parts: a general introduction, four empirical chapters and a 
concluding chapter. The four sub-questions relate to the four empirical chapters. All the 
empirical chapters are separate studies intended for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals and can therefore be read independently from the rest of this book. This 
approach entails that parts of the introductions of the empirical chapters have some 
overlap. Furthermore, it implies that there is a degree of overlap between the theory 
discussed in this chapter and that presented in the empirical chapters. 
 Chapter 2 provides a systematic analysis of the (perceived) extent in which the 
partners of ICCO, CA and AA are able to influence the partnership decision-making. In 
addition, it examines why some partners are more influential than others. Chapter 3 
focuses on strategic responses, while also drawing upon the experiences of the partners 
of ICCO, CA and AA with other funding agencies. It identifies why Southern NGOs 
perceive some funding conditions as undesirable and captures the range of strategies 
they employ to deal with such conditions. Chapter 4 establishes the rules that make up 
the institutional design of the partnerships of ICCO, CA and AA. The analysis focuses on 
local partners’ room to manoeuvre as well as the norms, values and beliefs underlying 
these rules. Chapter 5 connects the ideal and practice of partnership to different sets of 
widely shared beliefs, norms and values in the private aid channel by using the concept 
of institutional logics. More specifically, it identifies those institutional logics that push 
towards and away from the ideal of partnership. Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions 
of this study. After having answered the main research question, it discusses the 
relevance of the findings in light of ongoing debates about the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of private aid agencies and identifies a number of policy implications.
46
Chapter 1
Appendix 1.1   Overview of the empirical literature on North-South NGO relations
Authors question Theory Main data Main findings
Ashman  
(2001)
What are the barriers to effective partnership? Grounded theory Interviews with  NGOs 
from the US, Kenya and 
Ethiopia
Northern NGOs’ (NNGOs) internal systems and (back) donor policies create 
problematic conditions for Southern partners.
Bornstein  
(2003)
How have management standards and practices associated 
with the aid chain affected South-African NGOs?
- Interviews with South-
African NGOs
The proliferation of donor requirements, both substantive and procedural, 
have created a gap between large professional NGOs and others.
Bornstein  
(2006)
How do requirements for monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting change the ways in which South-African NGOs 
work?
- Interviews with South-
African NGOs
Imposed requirements for planning, evaluation and reporting result in 
systemic distortions of information while benefits in terms of improved  
project implementation and impact are doubtful.
Daroca Oller 
(2006)
What are the main assets that each actor possesses [in 
partnerships] and which of these are susceptible to be 
mobilised and to become power?
- Interviews with two 
Ugandan NGOs and a 
British NGO
Financial dependence is the main characteristic of the relationship, which 
enabled the NNGO to enforce its own policies and financial procedures.
Ebrahim  
(2002)
How does information structure the relation between two 
Indian NGOs and their key international funders
Resource dependence Interviews with local 
NGOs in India and 
funding agencies, 
archival research and 
participant observation 
Information requirements promote positivist and easily quantifiable 
measures of success; NGOs resist their funders by symbolically complying 
with the requirements.
Fernando  
(2007)
How and why do relations between Dutch co-financing 
agencies and counterpart NGOs thrive, stagnate or decline?
Institutional theory, 
resource dependence, 
boundary spanning
Interviews with four 
Dutch and six Sri Lankan 
NGOs
Power plays a key role in the way in which relations between Dutch and Sri 
Lankan NGOs have developed over time. This is most evident when relations 
are terminated. Individuals have a profound impact on the (power) dynamics 
of the relationships.
Hudock  
(1995, 1999)
How are SNGOs affected by their dependence on the 
external environment?
Resource dependence Reflection on personal 
experiences (?)
SNGOs’ dependence on NNGOs and their inability to reduce the uncertainty 
created by this dependence, makes them highly vulnerable to external control.
Lister  
(2000)
How do power dynamics shape the partnerships between 
NGOs and donors?
Power as decision-
making
Interviews with an 
NNGO and NGOs from 
Guatemala
Inter-organisational relations between NGOs may be falsely categorised as 
partnerships; relationships are frequently based on personal relations.
Lister  
(2001)
How, why and to what extend do NNGOs consult their 
partners during policy development?
- Interviews with an 
NNGO and NGOs from 
Guatemala
While partners were consulted on country-specific issues, there was limited 
consultation on NNGOs’ broader programmes, strategies or advocacy work. 
Consultation practices relate to the need of NNGOs to show their ‘added 
value’.
Marsden  
(2004)
How does the relation between international NGOs and local 
NGOs affect the latter’s relations with local communities and 
the government?
- Reflection on personal 
experiences
Logical frameworks may end up excluding those people they aim to 
embrace; strong personal commitment of local NGO-staff can overcome 
some of these limitations.
Mawdsley  
et al. (2002)
Why are the ideas of Southern NGOs (SNGOs) marginalised 
in the knowledge economy of the global development NGO 
community?
- Interviews with SNGOs  
in Mexico, Ghana and 
India
Unequal  partnerships and the priority placed on tracking rather than 
achieving change restrict SNGOs from having a stronger voice in the global 
development NGO community.
Michael 
(2004)
Why do local African NGOs lack power? Power Interviews with NGOs 
from Senegal, Zimbabwe 
and Tanzania
Local NGOs will have to create their own development space, achieve 
a degree of financial independence from donors, build solid links to the 
international development community and be willing to engage with the 
political aspects of development work to gain power.
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Appendix 1.1   Overview of the empirical literature on North-South NGO relations
Authors question Theory Main data Main findings
Ashman  
(2001)
What are the barriers to effective partnership? Grounded theory Interviews with  NGOs 
from the US, Kenya and 
Ethiopia
Northern NGOs’ (NNGOs) internal systems and (back) donor policies create 
problematic conditions for Southern partners.
Bornstein  
(2003)
How have management standards and practices associated 
with the aid chain affected South-African NGOs?
- Interviews with South-
African NGOs
The proliferation of donor requirements, both substantive and procedural, 
have created a gap between large professional NGOs and others.
Bornstein  
(2006)
How do requirements for monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting change the ways in which South-African NGOs 
work?
- Interviews with South-
African NGOs
Imposed requirements for planning, evaluation and reporting result in 
systemic distortions of information while benefits in terms of improved  
project implementation and impact are doubtful.
Daroca Oller 
(2006)
What are the main assets that each actor possesses [in 
partnerships] and which of these are susceptible to be 
mobilised and to become power?
- Interviews with two 
Ugandan NGOs and a 
British NGO
Financial dependence is the main characteristic of the relationship, which 
enabled the NNGO to enforce its own policies and financial procedures.
Ebrahim  
(2002)
How does information structure the relation between two 
Indian NGOs and their key international funders
Resource dependence Interviews with local 
NGOs in India and 
funding agencies, 
archival research and 
participant observation 
Information requirements promote positivist and easily quantifiable 
measures of success; NGOs resist their funders by symbolically complying 
with the requirements.
Fernando  
(2007)
How and why do relations between Dutch co-financing 
agencies and counterpart NGOs thrive, stagnate or decline?
Institutional theory, 
resource dependence, 
boundary spanning
Interviews with four 
Dutch and six Sri Lankan 
NGOs
Power plays a key role in the way in which relations between Dutch and Sri 
Lankan NGOs have developed over time. This is most evident when relations 
are terminated. Individuals have a profound impact on the (power) dynamics 
of the relationships.
Hudock  
(1995, 1999)
How are SNGOs affected by their dependence on the 
external environment?
Resource dependence Reflection on personal 
experiences (?)
SNGOs’ dependence on NNGOs and their inability to reduce the uncertainty 
created by this dependence, makes them highly vulnerable to external control.
Lister  
(2000)
How do power dynamics shape the partnerships between 
NGOs and donors?
Power as decision-
making
Interviews with an 
NNGO and NGOs from 
Guatemala
Inter-organisational relations between NGOs may be falsely categorised as 
partnerships; relationships are frequently based on personal relations.
Lister  
(2001)
How, why and to what extend do NNGOs consult their 
partners during policy development?
- Interviews with an 
NNGO and NGOs from 
Guatemala
While partners were consulted on country-specific issues, there was limited 
consultation on NNGOs’ broader programmes, strategies or advocacy work. 
Consultation practices relate to the need of NNGOs to show their ‘added 
value’.
Marsden  
(2004)
How does the relation between international NGOs and local 
NGOs affect the latter’s relations with local communities and 
the government?
- Reflection on personal 
experiences
Logical frameworks may end up excluding those people they aim to 
embrace; strong personal commitment of local NGO-staff can overcome 
some of these limitations.
Mawdsley  
et al. (2002)
Why are the ideas of Southern NGOs (SNGOs) marginalised 
in the knowledge economy of the global development NGO 
community?
- Interviews with SNGOs  
in Mexico, Ghana and 
India
Unequal  partnerships and the priority placed on tracking rather than 
achieving change restrict SNGOs from having a stronger voice in the global 
development NGO community.
Michael 
(2004)
Why do local African NGOs lack power? Power Interviews with NGOs 
from Senegal, Zimbabwe 
and Tanzania
Local NGOs will have to create their own development space, achieve 
a degree of financial independence from donors, build solid links to the 
international development community and be willing to engage with the 
political aspects of development work to gain power.
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Appendix 1.1   Continued
Authors question Theory Main data Main findings
Morse & 
McNamara 
(2006)
Which concepts are useful for studying partnerships? Power, dependence, 
discourse, performance
Interviews with an 
NNGO and church-based 
Nigerian NGO
Each concept has its own strengths and weaknesses for analyzing 
partnerships. Research should take into account that partnerships have ‘ups’ 
and ‘downs’ over time.
Pickard 
(2007)
How do Mexican NGO-representatives experience their 
partnerships with NNGOs?
- Interviews with Mexican 
NGOs
NNGOs have replaced their transformational vision of development with 
one that reflects charity. Together with the pressure to demonstrate tangible 
results, this prevents partnerships from prospering.
Postma 
(1994)
What are the motivations of NNGOs and SNGOs to enter into 
partnerships and what are the contributions of both partners 
to the relationship?
- Interviews with NNGOs 
and NGOs from Mali and 
Niger
Partnership present many opportunities for solidarity, sharing and 
institutional development to take place.
Reith  
(2010)
How does power manifest itself in donor-NGO partnerships? - Review of 
correspondence 
between a UK-based 
NGO and (potential) 
donors
Power manifests itself through the control and flow of money; NGOs 
pursuing funding from donors face many challenges that reinforce the 
imbalance of power.
Wallace  
et al., (2006)
How far are local strategies and projects influenced by 
changing donor policies and how far by internal imperatives?
- Interviews with donors 
and NGOs from the UK,  
South-Africa and Uganda
Procedures based on controlled change and rational management clash 
with a commitment to participation, locally driven solutions and ownership.
Win  
(2004)
How do donor requirements affect the ability local NGOs to 
meet local needs?
- Reflection on personal 
experiences
Donor requirements have a range of undesirable consequences, particularly 
if meeting them becomes more important than the actual needs on the 
ground.
Townsend  
et al. (2004)
How do local NGOs respond to the neo-liberal agenda that is 
tied to donor funding?
- Interviews with agency-
staff and NGOs in Ghana, 
India and Mexico
While the majority of the local development NGOs have become 
‘instruments of the neo-liberal project’, some ‘independent thinking NGOs 
continue to offer resistance.
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Authors question Theory Main data Main findings
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partnerships. Research should take into account that partnerships have ‘ups’ 
and ‘downs’ over time.
Pickard 
(2007)
How do Mexican NGO-representatives experience their 
partnerships with NNGOs?
- Interviews with Mexican 
NGOs
NNGOs have replaced their transformational vision of development with 
one that reflects charity. Together with the pressure to demonstrate tangible 
results, this prevents partnerships from prospering.
Postma 
(1994)
What are the motivations of NNGOs and SNGOs to enter into 
partnerships and what are the contributions of both partners 
to the relationship?
- Interviews with NNGOs 
and NGOs from Mali and 
Niger
Partnership present many opportunities for solidarity, sharing and 
institutional development to take place.
Reith  
(2010)
How does power manifest itself in donor-NGO partnerships? - Review of 
correspondence 
between a UK-based 
NGO and (potential) 
donors
Power manifests itself through the control and flow of money; NGOs 
pursuing funding from donors face many challenges that reinforce the 
imbalance of power.
Wallace  
et al., (2006)
How far are local strategies and projects influenced by 
changing donor policies and how far by internal imperatives?
- Interviews with donors 
and NGOs from the UK,  
South-Africa and Uganda
Procedures based on controlled change and rational management clash 
with a commitment to participation, locally driven solutions and ownership.
Win  
(2004)
How do donor requirements affect the ability local NGOs to 
meet local needs?
- Reflection on personal 
experiences
Donor requirements have a range of undesirable consequences, particularly 
if meeting them becomes more important than the actual needs on the 
ground.
Townsend  
et al. (2004)
How do local NGOs respond to the neo-liberal agenda that is 
tied to donor funding?
- Interviews with agency-
staff and NGOs in Ghana, 
India and Mexico
While the majority of the local development NGOs have become 
‘instruments of the neo-liberal project’, some ‘independent thinking NGOs 
continue to offer resistance.
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explaining the influence of local partners 1
1  A version of this chapter is published as: Elbers W., & Schulpen L. (2011).  
Decision-making in partnerships for development: explaining the influence of local partners.  
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(5): 795-812.
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Chapter 2
Abstract: This study examines decision-making in the partnerships between three 
private aid agencies and their local partners in Ghana, India and Nicaragua. Drawing 
upon a mixed methodology, it maps the relative influence of these partners vis-à-vis the 
agencies and reveals the processes underlying decision-making outcomes. Three main 
findings are advanced: (1) rules regulate per topic the extent in which partners can 
participate in the decision-making, ranging from exclusion to full participation; (2) four 
clusters of decision-making topics were identified reflecting the different degrees to 
which partners are allowed to participate in the decision-making; (3) while partners’ 
ability to influence decisions is above all affected by the rules, some have more influence 
than others depending on their organisational capacity and their respective project-
officer.
Keywords: NGOs; partnership; power; decision-making; private aid agencies 
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2.1 Introduction
Partnership has been the preferred type of institutional relationship between Northern 
and Southern Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the field of international 
development since the 1970s. Emerging initially as an expression of solidarity between the 
global North and South (Fowler, 2000) it is now regarded as essential for ensuring local 
ownership of development activities, linking it directly to the effectiveness and sustainability 
of nongovernmental development aid (Ashman, 2001; Lister, 2000). In addition, the 
legitimacy of private aid agencies became intertwined with the notion of partnership due 
to the claim that they, as opposed to bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, are able to have 
high quality relationships with Southern counterparts (Fernando, 2007).
 Yet critics have stressed a gap between the prevailing rhetoric and reality of 
partnership. Since the 1990s, a range of studies have pointed out that North-South 
relationships in private development aid are characterised by power asymmetries 
(Ebrahim, 2002; Hudock, 1995; Fernando, 2007; Lister, 2000). As partnerships are based 
on resource transfer, they are said to invariably result in donor-recipient behaviour. 
Doubts can thus be raised about the enhanced performance that is often attributed to 
nongovernmental development assistance (Ashman, 2001; Fowler, 2000). Edwards and 
Fowler (2002) point out that those private aid agencies that are unable to maintain 
equitable relationships with their Southern partners risk losing their legitimacy.
 This study examines the power dynamics in the partnerships between three private 
aid agencies (Action Aid, Christian Aid and Interchurch Organisation for Development 
Cooperation) and their local partners in Ghana, India and Nicaragua. It poses two 
principal questions: (i) to what extent are the local partners of the three agencies able 
to influence decision-making and (ii) what explains their relative influence? Overall, this 
study aims to improve our understanding of the power inequalities present in 
partnerships while offering tangible starting-points for those private agencies wishing 
to enter into more equitable relationships.
2.2 Partnership and power asymmetries
Within private development cooperation, the term partnership usually refers to the 
relationship between Northern aid agencies and their Southern counterparts. While the 
former provide financial and technical support, the latter are responsible for 
implementing development programmes (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). Although 
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no generally accepted definition exists, most authors argue that partnerships differ 
from other types of institutional relationships due to their value-based nature. Qualities 
commonly associated with partnership include shared goals, mutual influence, trust 
and mutual respect (Fowler, 2000; Lister, 2000). Arguably, it is these values that are said 
to make partnerships more effective than other kind of relationships because they 
result in the creation of synergy. The latter, it is assumed, produces results that individual 
partners could not obtain (Fowler, 2000).
 Since the 1990s, a range of studies delved deeper into the power asymmetries 
characterizing partnerships. They found that the mutual dependence that is said to 
characterise partnership does not generate equal leverage in practice (Hudock, 1995). 
As private aid agencies often have tens or even hundreds of Southern partners, they do 
not depend on a single partner organisation to achieve their objectives. In contrast, for 
many Southern NGOs, the lack of local fundraising opportunities, the abundance of 
‘competitors’ and the relative scarcity of funding agencies means that there are major 
consequences if they lose their funding (Markowitz & Tice, 2002; Fernando, 2007; Lister, 
2000; Michael, 2004). The result is a power differential in which private aid agencies can 
do to their partners what their partners cannot do to them. Private aid agencies are 
known to unilaterally establish policy priorities (Lister, 2001), impose their preferences 
during project-design and implementation (Mawdsley, et al., 2002; Lister, 2000), 
unilaterally define accountability requirements (Ashman, 2001; Ebrahim, 2002) and 
funding arrangements (Ashman, 2001; Michael, 2004). 
 This study aims to further the existing literature on partnership power asymmetries 
by addressing two important gaps. First, it explicitly includes the institutional context of 
decision-making which has largely been overlooked in existing studies. Neo-institution-
al theory argues that the rules regulating actors’ participation in decision-making 
directly contribute to, and maintain, the power asymmetries in inter-organisational 
arrangements such as partnerships (Ostrom & Crawford, 2005; Scott, 2008). This insight 
is particularly important when identifying the barriers to more equitable relationships. 
Second, existing research on partnerships has not offered much clarity with regard to 
the mechanisms through which power is exercised, the topics over which power is 
exercised and the degree of power exercised. This study seeks to overcome these 
limitations by using a mixed methodology that is new to partnership research.
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2.3 Influence in decision-making
In analyzing power dynamics in partnership, this study draws on the classic work of Dahl 
(1957) and Bachrach & Baratz (1962).1 They conceptualise power in terms of influence in 
decision-making, but offer alternative insights into how influence is exercised. Although 
the power debate has undoubtedly progressed since these classical studies and some 
might have add another layer or dimension of power (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004; 
Clegg, 1989; Barnett & Duval, 2005), we believe that many modern power theorists 
reproduce these classical approaches in their own frameworks. Giddens (1984: 15), for 
example, feels Bachrach & Baratz are right when distinguishing ‘two faces of power’ 
which they represent ‘as the capability of actors to enact decisions which they favour on 
the one hand and the ‘mobilisation of bias’ that is built into institutions on the other’.
 For Dahl influence is the ability to prevail over another actor in decision-making. He 
suggests that ‘A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957: 202-203). In conceptualizing influence the 
focus is on observable conflict resulting from the diverging preferences and interests of 
the actors involved in decision-making. Dahl analyses influence by examining the 
outcomes of a series of concrete decisions in which participants have different 
preferences. The aim is to determine whose preferences eventually prevail or are turned 
down in the decision-making process (Lukes, 1974). 
 Bachrach & Baratz (1962) add that influence is not only exercised by prevailing in 
decision-making but also by affecting the process of agenda-setting. Influence then is 
also exercised by the exclusion of certain participants and issues from the decision-mak-
ing arena. Preferences which participants cannot express never reach the agenda and 
do not become part of decision-making. They thus add the importance of the decision 
making process to Dahl’s focus on outcomes. 
 Participants may deliberately keep certain issues from reaching the agenda. This 
may be achieved by making certain issues taboo, manipulating the norms, rules and 
procedures that regulate the agenda-setting or forbidding certain participants from 
entering the decision-making arena altogether. Bachrach & Baratz also draw attention 
to the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’ referring to situations where one participant is 
afraid to speak out against another for the fear that the latter will invoke sanctions 
1 Lukes refers to the work of Dahl and Bachrach & Baratz as the first and second face of power. Lukes’ added 
a famous third ‘face’ which focuses on the influence derived from shaping one’s thoughts. This study does 
not include Lukes’ third face in the analysis as it remains a conceptually disputed notion lacking an accepted 
methodology for its empirical assessment. See Clegg et al (2006) for a discussion.
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against him. What all these mechanisms have in common is the fact that they often 
remain hidden from outsiders who can only see the outcomes of decision-making 
(Lukes, 1974). 
 Bachrach & Baratz have proposed that decision-making in agenda-setting may be 
assessed empirically by establishing whether participants have (overt or covert) 
grievances. Participants have open grievances when they overtly express their dissatis-
faction with certain issues, but are unable to get these grievances on the decision-mak-
ing agenda. Covert grievances are those that have not been openly voiced and as such 
remain hidden. Once the grievances have been identified, the aim is to determine the 
specific mechanisms that keep them from reaching the agenda.
2.4 Methodology and topics
Three private aid agencies were selected for this multiple embedded case study (Yin, 
2003): Action Aid (AA), Christian Aid (CA) and Interchurch Organisation for Development 
Cooperation (ICCO). Table 2.1 below highlights some of their main characteristics. The 
selection of the agencies was based on the fact that all three agencies (i) work on an 
international scale on a variety of themes with local partners in developing countries; (ii) 
emphasise the importance of working in partnership in their policy papers; and (iii) 
differ in terms of their decision-making structures (centralised vs. decentralised). Young 
et al. (1999) suggest that private aid agencies using a decentralised decision-making 
structure are more likely to have democratic decision-making.2  To improve the external 
validity of the findings, fieldwork was conducted in Ghana, India and Nicaragua which 
are known to have very different civil society sectors (Heinrich, 2007).3
 To empirically assess partners’ influence in decision-making first requires the 
identification of those topics on which partners’ preferences differ from their agencies 
or on which grievances exist. An initial literature review (yielding surprisingly few results) 
was complemented by open interviews with Project-Officers (POs) of ICCO and Southern 
2 Decentralisation here refers to the extent to which the agencies have handed over decision-making authority 
to decentralised units of the organisation in developing countries. At the time of research, ICCO managed 
its partnerships centrally from its head office in the Netherlands, CA used country-offices and AA not only 
worked with country-offices but also with regional offices within countries.  By selecting multiple agencies 
with different decision-making structures, a wider range of experiences and practices could be included in the 
study.
3 In Nicaragua AA was not included. Despite numerous attempts over a six-month period, AA Nicaragua did not 
respond to the invitation to participate in the study. In order to maintain the deadline of the study, AA was left 
out of the Nicaragua study.
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NGO-representatives during a pilot phase of the research, making the identification of 
key topics an integral part of the study. After several iterations a level of saturation was 
reached resulting in a definitive list of 19 topics (see table 2.2 below). During the 
fieldwork, the respondents from the different case countries consistently confirmed the 
relevance of the identified topics. 
 These topics served as the starting-point of a survey conducted among partners 
(see appendix 2.2) and in-depth interviews with partners and agency-staff. While the 
survey mapped decision-making outcomes, the interviews captured the decision-mak-
ing process. Data-collection took place from November 2007 through September 2008. 
In total 96 respondents were interviewed, which includes 9 ICCO-staff, 8 CA-staff, 11 
AA-staff and 25 ICCO-partners, 21 AA-partners and 22 CA-partners. Questionnaires were 
administered among all the partner organisations that participated in the study. The 
partner representatives interviewed and surveyed were those responsible for managing 
the relations with the agencies. To ensure that the sample was as diverse as possible, the 
sampling aimed for heterogeneity in thematic focus, size in terms of budget and staff, 
and geographical spread. To strengthen the validity of the findings, confidentiality was 
guaranteed to all who participated in the research. 
Table 2.1   Partnership cases
Agency Country and 
identity
Annual 
income 
(euro’s)
Main funding sources Governance 
structure
# of 
staff 
Action  
Aid
International: 
human rights 
based
185.9 mln Child sponsorship 
(56%), donations (25%), 
institutional donors (15%)
Partnerships 
managed from 
multiple offices at 
country-level
2460
Christian  
Aid
UK: church-
based
109.3 mln Donations (76%), 
institutional donors (16%)
Partnerships 
managed from a 
single country-
office
745
ICCO Netherlands: 
church-based
174.7 mln Dutch government (77 %), 
donations (15 %)
Partnerships 
managed from HQ 
in Netherlands
233
Source: annual reports (2007) and websites
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2.5 The rules of decision-making
Using the concept of ‘rules of the game’ (Giddens, 1984; Cohen, 1989), this section 
analyses how decision-making processes and outcomes are affected by the partnerships’ 
decision-making rules. Within inter-organisational collaboration, actors usually depend 
upon each other for resources such as money, information or reputation to achieve their 
Table 2.2   Key topics in partnership decision-making
Issue area Description
Size of funding The total amount of funding that partners receive from  
an agency
Period of funding The time period over which partners receive funding from  
an agency
Funding core costs The use of agency funding for overhead costs
Theme The thematic focus of a project
Target Group The beneficiaries of a project
Strategy The plan used to reach project-objectives 
Project planning The implementation time table of a project 
Capacity building The activities aimed at strengthening a partner’s organisational 
capacity 
Cooperation stakeholders The stakeholders with which partners cooperate during project 
implementation.  
Format financial report The framework used for financial reporting to the agency
Format narrative report The framework used for narrative reporting to the agency
Frequency narrative reports The number of narrative reports that have to be submitted  
to the agency
Monitoring The methodology according to which a project is monitored 
Evaluation The terms of reference used for evaluating a project
Thematic areas of interest The themes in the agency’s policy framework that qualify for 
funding 
Partnership policy The policy regarding the mutual rights, roles and responsibilities 
within the relationship
Country strategy The action plan stating how the agency seeks to achieve its 
objectives with partners at the country level
Partner selection The choice of organisations at the country level with whom  
the agency cooperates
Allocation of funding The distribution of agency funding to its partners at the  
country level
Source: interviews
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goals and ensure their survival. Those actors controlling key resources tend to have the 
authority to set the rules that govern inter-organisational collaboration (Clegg, 1989: 
209-218). These rules, which deal with different aspects of actors’ (inter)action, provide 
stability by offering a framework within which concrete interactions can take place 
(Klijn, 2001). In this study, the focus is on the actual rules in use related to decision-
making, thereby bypassing the distinction between formal (i.e., fixed and authorised in 
legal texts or documents such as contracts) and informal rules (i.e., ‘routines’ of action 
established over time).
 The rules governing the partnerships were reconstructed on the basis of in-depth 
interviews with agency-staff and examined through the theoretical lenses of 
agenda-setting and prevailing in decision-making. This analysis yielded two key 
findings. First, the rules were found to be unilaterally set by the agencies. Second, with 
all three agencies, four clusters of topics were ascertained representing four different 
degrees of participation. The first three clusters represent increasing opportunities for 
partners to participate in the decision-making, starting with exclusion from decision-
making in cluster 1 to the capability to make final decisions in cluster 3. The fourth 
cluster consists of topics on which participation in decision-making is less consistent 
and varies from partner to partner. The clustering of AA appeared to differ somewhat 
from that of ICCO and CA (see tables 2.3 and 2.4).
Cluster 1: exclusion from decision-making
The rules in this cluster in principle do not allow partners to set the agenda, let alone 
give them the capability to make final decisions. Topics belonging to this cluster include 
the thematic areas of interest, partnership policy, partner selection and the allocation of 
funding. In the case of AA, it also includes the period of funding and frequency of 
narrative reporting.
 Although the processes used by the three agencies to select their overall thematic 
areas of interest may differ, they select their thematic areas without the involvement of 
their partners. Instead, their choice is based on such factors as the experience and input 
of agency staff at the country level, the existing thematic focus of partners and an 
analysis of new trends in the international development arena. As a PO of ICCO 
concludes: “It was an internal process. In the end we as ICCO took that decision without 
our partners” (interview, August 2, 2007).4 The same holds true for decisions about the 
allocation of funding to the different partners.
4 Overall, ICCO, CA and AA resist the idea of having their partners influence their strategic policy development 
because they want to stay in control of their organisational identity.
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 The three agencies also do not involve their partners in the decision-making related 
to their partnership policy. Although they may individually be allowed to comment on 
the contracts, partners cannot exert influence on the institutional policies dealing with 
mutual rights, roles and responsibilities during project-implementation. 
Table 2.4   Partners’ participation in decision-making within AA
Cluster Topics in partnership decision-making Agenda-
setting 
opportunity
Decision-
making 
capability
1 thematic areas of interest, partnership policy, 
partner selection, allocation of funding, period of 
funding, frequency of narrative reports
no / ad hoc no
2 size of funding, funding of core costs, format 
financial reports, country strategy
yes no
3 theme, target group, strategy, project planning, 
cooperation stakeholders
yes yes
4 formats narrative reports, capacity building yes / no yes / no
Source: interviews with agency staff
Table 2.3   Partners’ participation in decision-making within ICCO & CA
Cluster Topics in partnership decision-making Agenda-
setting 
opportunity
Decision-
making 
capability
1 thematic areas of interest, partnership policy, 
partner selection, allocation of funding  
no / ad hoc no
2 size of funding, period of funding, country 
strategy*
yes no
3 theme, target group, strategy, project planning, 
monitoring, cooperation stakeholders
yes yes
4 funding core costs, format financial report, format 
narrative report, frequency narrative reports, 
capacity building, evaluation
yes / no yes / no
*  ICCO does not work with country strategies  
Source: interviews with agency staff
65
Decision-making in partnerships for development: explaining the influence of local partners
2
 With none of the agencies is it standard practice to consult existing partners when 
selecting new ones, although ad hoc consultations do take place. On occasion, well- 
trusted partners may be consulted. It is up to agency staff, however, to make the final 
decision. A PO of CA explains: “If we don’t know about an organisation that seems 
interesting, we consult our partners. If we don’t get positive feedback we may not move 
ahead” (interview, August  12, 2008).
Cluster 2: opportunity to set the agenda
The second cluster covers those topics where the rules allow partners to set the agenda 
but deny them final decision-making capability. This includes the size of funding, period 
of funding and the country strategy. In the case of AA, it also includes the funding of 
core costs and the format of financial reports.
 Regarding the size of funding, the agencies authorise the budget. Partners, however, 
may have some room to negotiate if the agency feels “that the partner will really need the 
resources for doing the work” (interview PO CA, August 12, 2008). Partners of ICCO and CA 
also enjoy some room to negotiate the time period for which they receive funding, while 
with AA these periods are non-negotiable. While some partners of ICCO and CA have 
succeeded in getting four years of funding, their bargaining space is usually limited for 
periods longer than three years. In contrast, AA works with fixed funding time lines 
depending on activities. For example, partners involved in child sponsorship activities are 
awarded longer contracts than those that are not.
 In developing country strategies, both CA and AA take the input of their partners 
into account. Both agencies organise extensive consultations where partners provide 
input and act as a soundboard. Final decisions, however, remain with the agencies if 
only because “you cannot give your partner too much voting power because you will 
run the risk of going off track” (interview Head of Programmes AA, April 30, 2008). 
Although the country strategies have to fit within the overall policy, both CA and AA 
allow some flexibility at the country-level. In India, for example, the country strategies of 
CA and AA contain specific sub-themes not present in their overall frameworks. 
Cluster 3: decision-making capability
The rules of the third cluster allow partners to set the agenda and take final decisions. 
Principally this cluster relates to project-content: theme, target group, strategy, 
monitoring, project-planning and cooperation with stakeholders. All three agencies 
enable their partners to take the final decision on these topics as long as they stay 
within the boundaries of agency policy (e.g. thematic, target group, strategy-wise). 
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There is, however, a major difference between the agencies: AA’s working relationship 
with its partners is more ‘hands on’ compared to that of ICCO and CA. In practice, this 
implies that partners of ICCO and CA operate more autonomously than those of AA.5
 A clear manifestation of this difference are the institutional roles and responsibilities 
of the agencies’ POs. POs of AA play a (pro-)active role in the implementation of their 
partners’ projects and meet their partners several times a year to discuss planning, strategy 
and monitoring decisions. Besides, they are directly involved in the capacity building of 
partners and communities, and (co-)initiate and manage campaigns. In contrast, POs of 
ICCO and CA are excluded from direct participation in project-implementation. Their tasks 
are largely limited to disbursing funds and arranging technical assistance. Their contact 
with partners is less frequent and intensive, resulting in a more distant relation. 
 Finally, AA differs regarding monitoring. ICCO and CA leave it up to their partners to 
do their monitoring as they see fit, although their staff might offer suggestions. AA 
requires its partners to conduct a so-called a Participatory Reflection and Review 
Process (PRRP). During the annual PRRPs, which also function as an instrument for 
ensuring downwards accountability, people from the communities, staff from the 
partners and POs of AA participate. As long as partners follow the basic principles of the 
PRRP, they generally have a lot of influence on how and when to conduct them. 
Cluster 4: variable application of the rules
Finally, a cluster of topics was identified for which agency rules are flexible and some 
partners have more influence than others. Topics in this cluster include capacity 
building, the funding of core costs in the case of ICCO and CA, the formats of financial 
and narrative reports, the frequency of reporting and evaluation.
 In principle, all three agencies feel that partners are in the best position to identify 
their own capacity building needs. Occasionally, however, agency staff may decide 
to intervene and impose their capacity building preferences on partners. This happens 
when a partner’s PO perceives major shortcomings in a partner’s capacity, while the 
partner is either unwilling to address these issues at all or according to the PO’s preferences. 
5  This reflects the underlying differences in the agencies’ approach to partnership. While an elaborate analysis 
of these differences falls outside the scope of this study, it seems likely that they are related to the agencies’ 
different organisational histories. ICCO and CA are part of a group of private aid agencies for which partnership 
has been the modus operandi since the 1970s. In this approach, partnership is an expression of international 
solidarity, reflecting the desire to work together on the basis of such principles as equality, trust, respect and 
reciprocity (Fowler, 1998). For AA, however, partnership has only been central to its approach since the early 
2000s. Before that, it was a directly operational organisation involved in project-design and implementation 
(Owusu 2005). As such, AA has traditionally had a strong presence ‘on the ground’ and this is still clearly present 
in its partnership approach.
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 In contrast to AA, ICCO and CA do not have explicit policy guidelines for funding 
core costs. With them, proposed core funding budgets need to be ‘reasonable’ which 
means that some partners enjoy more flexibility than others. AA-partners’ influence on 
the funding of core costs is much more limited due to strict policy guidelines. 
 None of the three agencies have fixed formats for narrative and financial reporting. In 
practice, some partners receive explicit reporting instructions while others write their 
reports without ever receiving comments. Interventions in reporting largely depend on 
the perceived quality of the reports. In the area of narrative reporting, all three agencies 
have fixed requirements in principle. ICCO and CA, however, allow some room for 
negotiation, with some partners reporting bi-annually and others annually. AA’s 
requirements in this field are non-negotiable although there are differences between 
Ghana, where partners report quarterly, and India where bi-annual reporting is the norm.
 Evaluation practices differ substantially between AA and the other two agencies 
making a comparison on this topic impossible. For ICCO and CA, partners usually have a 
major influence on the terms of reference and the choice of evaluators, although the 
agencies occasionally assume more control even against the wishes of partners. A PO of 
ICCO explains: “[With evaluations] this differs a lot per partner and per programme. If 
there are not many problems, generally many things are left to the partner. If there are 
problems, then ICCO will take more initiative” (interview, August 5, 2008). With AA, the 
Participatory Reflection and Review Processes reduce the need for separate evaluations. 
In Ghana, evaluations are hardly conducted at all, while in India project-reviews are 
conducted every few years by AA-staff. 
2.6 Partners’ perceived influence
Figure 2.1 below presents the main outcomes of the survey that was conducted 
amongst partners. The box plots capture partners’ perceived influence on the 19 key 
topics in decision-making. The scale represents a continuum of the influence of partners 
vis-à-vis their agencies. At the lower extreme (1) the agency decides without any 
influence from the partner on decision-making outcomes, while at the higher extreme 
(7) partners decide without any agency influence. A score in the middle (4) means joint 
decision-making and equal influence of both partners and agency on its outcome. Each 
box plot contains the minimum and maximum, the 25th and 75th percentiles and the 
averages. Outliers and extremes are represented by circles and stars. The results from 
the different case countries are surprisingly similar, implying the agencies use the same 
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rules in different contexts (see appendix 2.1 for the findings at country level).
 The four clusters of topics identified in the previous section are clearly reflected in 
the box plots. With all three agencies clusters one to three represent increasing levels of 
influence in decision-making, while partners’ influence on topics associated with the 
fourth cluster varies considerably. Figure 1 also shows that the clustering of ICCO and CA 
is identical and differs from that of AA. Several topics belonging to the fourth cluster 
with ICCO and CA (funding core costs, format financial reports, frequency narrative 
reports) are part of the first and second cluster of AA. In addition, the period of funding 
falls under the second cluster with ICCO and CA but under the first cluster with AA.
 Topics belonging to the first cluster score a two or lower meaning that with these 
topics partners perceive the agencies to make the final decision while having little to no 
influence on the outcomes themselves. This is consistent with the fact that the rules 
restrict participation in decision-making to ad hoc agenda-setting at best. With all three 
agencies, the topics in this cluster thus relate to their policy (thematic areas of interest, 
partnership policy, partner selection and allocation of funding).
 Topics in the second cluster have an average score of around two with scores 
ranging typically from one to three and a few partners ranking their influence with a 
four. Partners’ influence here thus varies from no influence to equal influence. As the 
rules associated with the second cluster allow partners to set the agenda but deny 
 decision-making capability, these findings suggest that while some partners have less 
influence than is allowed by the rules, other have more. 
 Topics belonging to the third cluster score on average score around six with scores 
ranging from four to six. In principle, partners’ influence thus runs from joint-decision-
making to full autonomy. Again, a few partners appear to have less influence than 
allowed by the rules. With all three agencies, the topics in this cluster relate to the pro-
ject-content (theme, target group, strategy, project-planning and cooperation with 
stakeholders).
 As expected, topics in the fourth cluster vary considerably with scores ranging from 
one to seven on most topics. This implies that partners’ influence varies between 
partners. It makes sense that this cluster is much larger in the case of ICCO and CA 
considering that their rules are less strict and explicit than those of AA.
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Figure 2.1   Partners’ perceived influence
Note that ‘country strategy’ in the case of ICCO and ‘monitoring’ and ‘evaluation’ in the case of AA are not 
included in the figure. Source: survey among partners
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2.7  Towards explaining the differences: project-officers 
and organisational capacity 
The variations between and within clusters begs the question as to what determines 
these differences. Discussions with partners and agencies revealed two central forces at 
stake here: (1) the role of POs and (2) partners’ organisational capacity.
 POs act as mediators between agency prescribed rules and partners who are 
required to abide by them. They are responsible for interpreting institutional policies 
and ensuring proper translation into action, but they also have to deal with the demands 
and needs of their partners. Whereas rules should ensure uniform behaviour, POs’ 
actions are characterised by a degree of subjectivity as “you cannot eliminate the 
personal element” (interview PO AA, September 15, 2008).6 There are thus differences in 
POs’ willingness to hand over decision-making authority and bend the rules. The former 
then refers to POs displaying dominant behaviour and controlling decision-making, the 
latter to PO’s preparedness to allow for exceptions to the rules. Experiences range from 
POs pursuing their own agendas to POs demonstrating ‘solidarity’ when partners could 
not deliver or suffered financial difficulties. For POs themselves trust is the key factor 
affecting their behaviour towards partners. They are more inclined to interpreting rules 
flexibly when they trust a partner. Some of the well-trusted partners enjoy special 
privileges such as relaxed reporting requirements, more core-funding and more 
capacity building support.
 The above finding does not mean that partners are merely passive actors at the mercy 
of agency rules and POs. On the contrary, their leverage in decision-making in clusters two 
to four is also seen as related to their organisational capacity in which four types of resources 
are identified as crucial.7 The first critical resource is, not surprisingly, money (also see 
Ebrahim, 2002; Hudock, 1995; Lister, 2000). Agency-staff and partners not only express the 
latter’s relative dependence on their agency primarily in terms of money but interviews 
also clearly revealed (1) that partners able to raise funding from multiple sources are in a 
stronger position to negotiate, (2) that the fear of losing funding acts as a barrier for raising 
ideas, preferences or criticisms, and (3) that this funding-fear may lead some partners to 
reshape their organisational preferences to fall in line with agency priorities. 
6 This finding does not come at a surprise. March and Olsen (1989: 23-24) argue that the application of rules 
is always subject to interpretation. The more vague and abstract the rules are, the more room there is for 
alternative interpretations.
7 This is list is by no means meant to be exhaustive but it does contain those resources put forward most strongly 
by partners and agency-staff.
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 The second key resource is having a reputation of a credible organisation which 
improves partners’ attractiveness towards funding agencies and hence their ability to 
raise funding and to negotiate. Credibility is partly derived from organisational charac-
teristics commonly associated with enhanced organisational legitimacy (e.g. ideology, 
membership, board composition and linkages with the grassroots level). Furthermore, it 
is associated with the ability to deliver results and be accountable. In effect, in all three 
case countries partners with a strong reputation had funding agencies coming to them, 
instead of the other way around. The underlying idea of symbiotic relationships (see 
Michael, 2004; Sanyal 2006) was clearly explained by a CA-partner: “We do believe that 
Christian Aid needs us as badly as we need them. With our work we give them a lot of 
visibility, particularly compared to some of their other partners. This is what gives us 
power” (interview, September 24, 2008). 
 The third critical resource identified is knowledge and expertise. A partner without 
a well-defined vision and clear-cut ideas is not in a position to defend its organisational 
agenda. In addition, knowledge and expertise are needed for all operations and thus for 
reaching and sustaining a position in which one can have leverage in decision-making. 
Of particular importance then are, according to respondents, knowledge of donor 
trends, thematic knowledge, and skills in such fields as (report) writing, research, 
management and accounting. 
 Finally, the size of a partner is identified as the fourth critical resource.8 Large 
organisations are generally attractive to the agencies because their large outreach 
enables them to make a significant impact. In addition, being associated with a large 
partner improves the agencies’ own visibility. This coincides with the findings of Michael 
(2004: 24-25) who also points out that large organisations are attractive because of their 
ability to absorb large amount of funding while spending relatively low amounts on 
support, monitoring and evaluation.
 Looking more closely at these capacity issues as explanations for differences in 
partners’ influence, it is important to point again to the variation between AA and CA/
ICCO. The argument then is that AA-partners tend to have a weaker organisational 
capacity than those of ICCO and CA. This is mainly because AA has a community-cen-
tred approach and primarily works with grassroots organisations. In contrast, ICCO and 
CA prefer to work with larger and established NGOs.9  
8 The aspect of size seems to be less applicable to AA because of its explicit preference to work with grassroots 
organisations.
9 Grassroots organisations are known for their relative weakness in terms of organisational capacity.
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 While the finding that strong partners have more leverage than their weaker peers 
suggests that the country context is relevant (some countries are known to have 
stronger civil society sectors than others), this does not clearly emerge from the data. 
This discrepancy may be caused by the agencies’ explicit preference for specific 
partners. As these preferences are consistently applied in the different countries where 
the agencies work, they may further diminish the relevance of the country context.
2.8 Conclusions
The analysis shows that partners’ influence is determined above all by the rules that 
regulate decision-making. Four clusters of decision-making topics are identified reflecting 
different degrees of partners’ participation in decision-making. On some topics, partners 
have no influence at all while on others they have virtual autonomy. Overall, partners 
appear to have the least influence on topics related to agency policy and funding, and 
the most influence on topics related to project-content. Despite the uniformity brought 
about by the rules, some partners have more influence than others, depending on their 
organisational capacity and their respective project-officer.  At the policy level, however, 
the rules are all-determining, leaving little opportunity for project- officers to amend 
them and for partners (irrespective of their organisational capacity) to influence decision- 
making .
 The three agencies show remarkable consistency in these general conclusions. 
However, on a number of topics partners of AA have considerably less influence 
compared to those of ICCO and CA, implying that a more decentralised approach does 
not necessarily reduce power asymmetries. These differences can be attributed to: (1) 
the stricter nature of AA’s rules; (2) the relational approach of AA which is characterised 
by more PO-involvement; and (3) AA’s preference for grassroots partners as opposed to 
ICCO’s and CA’s preference for more established partners. The study finds few differences 
between the case countries in terms of partners’ influence underlining the importance 
and consistent application of the rules.
 This study makes two particular sets of contributions to our understanding of 
power asymmetries within partnerships while, at the same time, offering tangible start-
ing-points to those agencies wishing to enter into more equitable partnerships. First, it 
shows what partnership power asymmetries are about in practice by identifying 19 
actual topics that are crucial in partnership decision-making. By doing so, it offers a 
common frame for joint problem analysis and solution finding. Second, the findings 
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illustrate that institutional rules are of paramount importance by enabling and 
constraining partners’ influence in decision-making. As such, those agencies looking for 
more equitable partnerships should decide for each of the different topics in decision-
making whether a redesign of the rules is desirable.
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Appendix 2.1   Partners’ perceived influence per country
topic ICCO Christian  Aid Action Aid
Ind Gha Nic Ind Gha Nic Ind Gha
thematic areas of interest 1,00 1,14 1,63 1,86 1,25 1,17 1,63 1,1
partnership policy 1,00 1,00 1 1,13 1,00 1 1,10 1
choice of partners 1,40 1,29 1,14 1,22 1,50 1,14 1,60 1,10
allocation of funding 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
size of funding 2,67 1,67 2,14 2,44 1,8 2,17 1,88 1,70
period of funding 1,56 2,00 3,00 2,38 1,60 2,29 1,30 1,60
country strategy - - - 2,11 1,75 1,71 2,00 1,67
strategy 6,80 5,57 5,63 6,33 5,60 6,43 4,70 5,40
theme 6,60 4,80 5,20 6,11 6,00 6,00 5,90 5,60
project-planning 6,40 5,71 5,88 6,22 5,40 5,86 4,40 4,56
target group 6,90 5,60 5,83 6,22 6,00 6,43 6,50 6,10
cooperation stakeholders 6,40 5,67 6,13 6,78 6,00 5,86 6,30 6,78
format financial report 4,25 1,33 4,38 4,33 2,40 5,17 2,30 1,44
format narrative report 5,78 2,33 5,50 5,71 4,40 4,14 6,30 3,30
frequency narrative report 1,33 1,29 3,75 1,33 2,40 3,57 1,00 1,00
evaluation 4,50 3,29 4,57 4,17 2,50 4,71 - -
monitoring 6,50 4,67 4,63 5,43 6,00 5,57 - -
capacity building 6,43 5,00 5,13 5,80 3,75 5,57 6,13 2,80
funding core costs 5,40 1,86 4,71 4,89 2,00 5,14 1,86 1,67
Source: survey
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Keeping body and soul together: Southern NGOs’ 
strategic responses to donor constraints 1
1  A version of this chapter is published as: Elbers W., & Arts, B. (2011).  
Keeping Body and Soul Together: Southern NGOs' strategic responses to donor constraints.  
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77(4): 713-732.
78
Chapter 3
Abstract: Most Southern Non-Governmental Organisations (SNGOs) depend on donor 
agencies for their survival. To qualify for donor funding, SNGOs typically have to meet a 
range of funding conditions. Critics argue that donor requirements may have undesirable 
consequences. Based on qualitative research involving 53 SNGOs in India and Ghana, 
this study explores (1) the (potentially) adverse effects of donor conditions on SNGOs 
and (2) the strategies that SNGOs employ to deal with these conditions. We demonstrate 
that certain donor conditions are difficult to reconcile with a view of development that 
emphasises local ownership and a strong and autonomous civil society. We also show 
that SNGOs employ a multitude of strategies to deal with adverse donor conditions, 
highlighting that they are not powerless in their relations with donors. Yet, these 
strategies are not always available to all organisations and may have undesired 
consequences.
Keywords: accountability; donors; donor conditionality; Non-Governmental Organisations; 
strategic responses; power asymmetries; organisational behaviour
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3.1 Introduction
Relationships between donor agencies and SNGOs are characterised by resource 
dependence, often resulting in power asymmetries. Through their funding conditions, 
donors are known to exercise influence over SNGOs’ project-design and implementation 
(Lister, 2000; Michael 2004), set requirements for monitoring, reporting and evaluation 
(Bornstein, 2003; Ebrahim, 2002; Ashman, 2001; Elbers & Schulpen, 2011) and earmark 
funding to specific activities (Michael, 2004;  Bornstein, 2003). Critics suggest that donor 
conditions may have all kinds of undesirable consequences, including the invalidation 
of participatory approaches, reduced cultural sensitivity, weakened ties with the 
grassroots level and a dilution of core values (Hailey, 2000;  Wallace et al., 2006). Earlier 
research on the power asymmetries between donors and SNGOs has emphasised the 
former’s domination over the latter, painting a rather bleak picture of SNGOs’ ability to 
pursue their own preferences and neutralise adverse donor constraints.
 Drawing upon qualitative research involving 53 SNGOs in Ghana and India, this study 
asks two interrelated questions which thus far have not been systematically addressed in 
the literature: (i) What makes donor conditions problematic given the importance 
attached to local ownership and the strength and autonomy of SNGOs and (ii) how do 
SNGOs strategically try to manage those conditions they consider to be problematic? 
 We start by framing the research within the debate on the power asymmetries in 
donor-SNGO relations and the undesirable effects of donor conditionality. After having 
discussed issues related to methodology, we address our research questions. We rely for 
this on two separate analytical steps. First, we identify the range of donor conditions 
SNGOs are commonly confronted with and assess their consequences in light of the 
importance attached to a strong and autonomous civil society and local ownership. 
Second, based on an iteration process between the organisational institutionalist literature 
on the one hand and our empirical findings from the field on the other, we construct a 
typology of SNGOs’ strategic responses to donor conditions. The study concludes with a 
deliberation on the implications of the findings for SNGOs and donor agencies.
3.2 Donor conditions and power asymmetries
In the pursuit of their mission, most SNGOs depend on donor agencies for their survival 
(Tvedt, 2006; Riddell, 2007). Although there are variations between countries, local 
opportunities for fund-raising in developing countries are often limited or caught in 
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red-tapeism. Very few SNGOs can sustain themselves by membership or service fees 
(Fowler, 2000a). Moreover, local state authorities or corporate foundations do not allow 
their funding to be used in activities that could be perceived as political (Michael, 2004).
SNGOs’ financial dependence on donors is known to result in power asymmetries (see 
Ebrahim, 2002; Hudock, 1995; Fowler, 2000b; Fernando, 2007; Lister, 2000, Ashman, 2001; 
Morse & McNamara, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2002). Numerous studies have shown that the 
qualities that SNGOs bring to the relationship, such as local knowledge, grassroots 
linkages, implementation capacity and cultural understanding, do not yield the same 
leverage during negotiations as the funds which donors bring along. In addition, 
funding agencies are known to develop their policies with limited participation from 
Southern ‘partners’ (Lister, 2001; Elbers & Schulpen, 2011). Consequently, critics argue 
that development agendas are being dominated by donors (Mawdsley et al., 2002) and 
that SNGOs’ ability to elaborate and pursue alternative notions of development has 
largely disappeared (Townsend et al., 2004). As such, the literature on development 
NGOs consistently depicts SNGOs as wielding the shorter end of the power stick. 
 There are indications that the power imbalances - which have always existed in 
donor-SNGO relations - have worsened in recent years. Aid is not fulfilling its promise 
and public doubts about its legitimacy and effectiveness have increased. Fuelled by the 
ideas and practices of managerialism, donor agencies have tightened control and 
accountability measures to improve effectiveness, efficiency and transparency (Wallace 
et al., 2006; Roberts et al., 2005). This has resulted in the widespread adoption of 
‘professional’ standards in such areas as impact measurement, planning and 
accountability, more tightly defined programmatic policies and a shift towards more 
contractual relationships (Mawdsley et al., 2002; Hailey, 2000; Roberts et al., 2005, Desai 
& Snavely, 2007). In addition, donors are increasingly moving away from flexible core 
funding arrangements towards earmarked funding (Wallace et al., 2006). 
 There is a relative small but growing literature dealing with the negative impact of 
donor conditions on SNGOs. As donor requirements have become more demanding 
and relationships have become more formal, SNGOs are increasingly forced to operate 
as sub-contractors in a competitive environment (Hailey, 2000). The emphasis on 
demonstrating tangible results and accountability is said to depoliticise organisations 
and turn them into mere ‘implementers’ of donor policy (Bornstein, 2003). Markowitz & 
Tice (2002) observed, for example, how exposure to ‘professional’ requirements 
transformed a grassroots-oriented organisation with an activist outlook into a 
professional service delivery organisation. Not only did the organisation lose its 
grassroots linkages but its internal decision-making became highly hierarchical. Wallace 
81
Keeping body and soul together: Southern NGOs’ strategic responses to donor constraints
3
et al. (2006) showed that rational planning tools do not go well together with 
people-centred approaches to development. More specifically, they illustrated that the 
emphasis on control and planning for predictable outcomes is difficult to reconcile with 
approaches that are characterised by a considerable degree of unpredictability and 
emphasise process over product. Critics point out that it is increasingly difficult for 
SNGOs to retain those elements which made them different compared to companies or 
bi- and multilateral agencies in the first place: cultural sensitivities, participatory 
approaches, close grassroots linkages and a strong intrinsic motivation (Hailey, 2000).
 A common theme running through the above studies is that the increasingly 
‘professional’ nature of donor demands undermines the added value of SNGOs. In this 
study, we go beyond this perspective by examining the impact of donor conditions on 
two dimensions that have not yet been systematically assessed: (1) the strength and 
autonomy of SNGOs; and (2) SNGOs’ ownership of development interventions. In the 
literature, it is widely recognised that SNGOs have to be strong and autonomous if they 
are to effectively contribute to poverty reduction and democratic governance (Mercer, 
2002; Biekart, 1999; Edwards 2004; Fox, 1996). In a similar vein, development thinking 
generally recognises that local organisations are to assume control over the design and 
implementation of development interventions if these are to be effective and 
sustainable (Fowler, 1997; Chambers, 1997; Hoksbergen, 2005; OECD, 2005). As such, the 
choice of these two dimensions reflects a focus on those aspects that are perceived to 
be critical preconditions for effective private development aid. 
 We believe it is crucial to combine an analysis of the (negative) impact of donor 
conditions with an exploration of SNGOs’ ability to manage these conditions. Given the 
tendency in the literature to portray SNGOs as having little leverage to resist donor 
pressures, it is not surprising that, as of yet, no study has systematically assessed the 
range of strategies used by SNGOs to strategically manage their donors’ demands.  This 
has led to a somewhat caricaturised image of donor-SNGO relations, in which the former 
are (too much) depicted as the pull down partner in an asymmetrical power structure, 
based on financial dependence (Harrison, 2007). Although North-South power 
asymmetries cannot be denied in the field of development assistance, the question is 
whether they are as absolute as suggested. Giddens (1984) deploys the concept of 
dialectics of control to express that any partner in whatever relationship is always able to 
employ at least some countervailing power. He even dares to use the example of the 
executioner and his victim. Even the latter can always affect the former, however small 
these effects may be. Giddens uses this concept as a response to power theorists such 
as Lukes (1974) or Foucault (1994) who he believes tend to overvalue power structures 
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at the expense of agencies’ capabilities. In the second part of this study, we explore 
Gidden’s perspective empirically while drawing simultaneously upon organisational in-
stitutionalist theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) for conceptual 
guidance. By combining an examination of the adverse effects of donor conditions with 
an analysis of SNGOs’ ability to manage these conditions, we contribute to a more 
balanced power perspective of donor-SNGO relations.
3.3 Data and methods
For this study, we draw on interviews with NGOs in Ghana and India conducted over a 
period of eight months in 2008. Given the research aim of exploring the wide range of 
SNGOs’ experiences with - and responses to - adverse donor conditions, capturing as 
much variety as possible was the main consideration of our sampling strategy. By 
selecting NGOs from two countries known to have vastly different civil society sectors 
(Heinrich, 2007), a wider range of organisations, experiences and practices could be 
included in the study. To maximise the likelihood of finding different types of strategic 
behaviour, the sampling strategy aimed for variation. To ensure sufficient diversity, 
SNGOs were selected on their thematic focus, size in terms of budget and staff, and 
geographical spread. In total, 53 organisations participated in the study, 24 in Ghana 
and 29 in India.
 The data collected for this study consists of semi-structured interviews with NGO 
leaders. This enabled us to systematically collect sensitive data while allowing respondents 
to share experiences and interpretations based on their own perspectives and also bring 
up issues not covered by the interview guide. Respondents were those responsible for 
managing the relations with donor agencies. This was usually the managing director or 
equivalent. Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours and were all conducted 
face-to-face. In several cases SNGOs were interviewed twice when the initial interview was 
particularly rewarding. Data-collection continued until the point was reached that 
additional interviews merely confirmed earlier findings while not yielding any new 
information. All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis.
 Data analysis consisted of two stages: (1) coding of interview transcripts, and (2) 
analyzing the pattern of relationships among the codes. We first fractured the data into 
three broad main categories: donor conditions, problems associated with these 
conditions and strategic responses. While analysing the data belonging to each main 
category, we worked iteratively between the transcripts and relevant literature to 
83
Keeping body and soul together: Southern NGOs’ strategic responses to donor constraints
3
develop appropriate codes to further ‘open up’ the data. Only when analyzing SNGOs’ 
strategic responses, codes were explicitly derived from (institutional) theory. In the 
course of the analysis, we revised and elaborated our initial ideas by tracing patterns 
and (in)consistencies between the different interviews and codes. Existing codes were 
modified to create simpler, more robust codes that could be more clearly related to 
each other (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The results of our exercise allowed us to 
systematically explore, identify and illustrate (the problems associated with) donor 
conditions and SNGOs’ strategic responses to them. 
 We believe that our sample of 53 SNGOs was sufficient to capture the full range of 
(the problems associated with) donor conditions and SNGOs’ strategic responses to 
them. The fact that the donor conditions encountered in this study have become part 
and parcel of the field of international development (see also Mawdsley et al., 2002; 
Bornstein, 2003; Wallace et al., 2006; Michael, 2004) makes it likely that the experiences 
captured here are not unique to the SNGOs in our sample. Whether or not some 
problems associated with donor conditions are more common than others or some 
strategies are more frequently employed, however, remains beyond the scope of this 
study. To improve the validity of the research, confidentiality was promised to 
respondents. In addition, an earlier version of this chapter was shared with some of the 
SNGOs that participated in this study for feedback purposes. While this yielded several 
small refinements, it did not result in any major changes.
3.4 The undesirable consequences of donor conditions
In this study we define donor conditions as the requirements that SNGOs must adhere 
to in pre-finance, project, or post-project phases, to qualify for financial support from 
donor agencies (Wallace et al., 2006: 12). Donors in our analysis are those organisations 
that provide official private development funding. This definition includes bi- and 
multilateral agencies, private aid agencies and charitable foundations. Below, we first 
briefly outline the range of donor conditions we encountered in our fieldwork. We then 
continue examining the adverse effects of these conditions on (1) SNGOs’ strength and 
autonomy and (2) their ownership over development interventions.
The nature of donor conditions
We found that donor conditions cover three main areas: project-design and planning, 
accountability, and the structuring of funds (see table 3.1). While different donors each 
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have specific conditions attached to their funding, those listed in table 3.1 are all widely 
encountered by the SNGOs that participated in this study. 
The first set of conditions relates to project-design and planning. Virtually all donors 
work with requirements that outline the type of projects they seek to support (see also 
Elbers & Schulpen, 2011; Michael, 2004). Criteria usually include (sub-) themes, target 
groups, strategies and geographical areas. Most donors have ‘mainstreamed’ gender 
into their programmatic policies, meaning that all projects should take gender equality 
into account.1 In addition, many donors encourage the use of logical frameworks to 
articulate project goals and the means by which to achieve these using indicators for 
measuring and verifying progress (see also Wallace et al., 2006). While there are 
differences between donor agencies, the emphasis is usually on planning for predictable 
outcomes.
 A second set of requirements relates to SNGOs’ (upwards) accountability and 
addresses financial and project-performance. Most donors expect periodical narrative 
and financial reports which review the progress and performance of projects against 
the goals, intended results, indicators, time lines and budgets formulated in the original 
contracts (see also Ebrahim 2002, 2005). Donors also typically expect SNGOs to use 
specific reporting formats and require a separate bank account designated for the 
project they fund. Also, SNGOs are usually required to undergo evaluations and 
independent financial audits.
1  Other normative criteria - like good governance and sustainability - are also conditional, but not followed as 
strictly as gender, both for the SNGO itself and for its projects.
Table 3.1   The main areas of donor conditions
Project-design and 
planning
Accountability Funding arrangements
- theme
- target group
- strategy
- geography
- gender
- logical framework
- narrative and financial 
reporting
- reporting formats
- indicators for M&E
- evaluations
- separate bank accounts
- independent auditing
- project funding
- earmarking
- length of funding
- branding
Source: own analysis based on interviews
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 A third set of conditions deals with the funding arrangement itself. Most donors 
earmark their funds to particular expenses and many do not allow their grantees to use 
their funds to cover overhead costs (e.g. for capital costs, human resources and 
fundraising) (see also Michael, 2004). Furthermore, donors work with fixed time periods 
for which they provide funding, typically ranging from one to three years. Also, some 
donors require their grantees to display the donor’s name, for example, in public 
statements or on vehicles (branding). 
Consequences for SNGOs’ strength and autonomy  
Donors’ unwillingness to fund overhead costs has an enormous impact on SNGOs’ 
ability to sustain and strengthen themselves:
They just give you enough money to cover stationary costs…. But it creates huge 
problems. Because how do you function, how do you pay your rent, how do you 
keep your staff, how do you build and maintain your expertise? […] You can’t grow 
your organisation on that kind of funding (interview, 31 March, 2008).
Respondents in Ghana as well as India explained that they struggled to build and sustain 
their organisation. A range of problems were brought forward, including attracting and 
retaining quality staff, investing in research and staff development and devoting time 
and resources to learning. Several of the organisations claimed to be living from hand to 
mouth due the lack of core funding. Also, in the absence of core funds, respondents 
pointed out that they had a difficult time diversifying their resource base and finding 
the capital necessary to invest in opportunities for internal revenue generation.2  Several 
respondents pointed out that donors’ unwillingness to fund core costs actually creates 
perverse incentives: 
Then you start pushing you expenses under so many things [in the budget]. 
Because you know that if you don’t inflate the budget, you will surely get problems 
later (interview, 31 March, 2008). 
Such behaviour, as another respondent noted, breeds mistrust in the relationship. This 
is problematic as organisations are only transparent if they know that sharing problems 
or constraints will not result in the termination of the funding relationship.
2  Michael (2004: 134-139) and Bornstein (2003: 400-401) observed similar problems related to the unwillingness 
of donors to fund core costs, illustrating that those outlined here are not unique to the SNGOs in our sample.
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 The above outlined problems emerge from the lack of core funding, but they are 
amplified by the short funding periods and one-off contracts favoured by some donors. 
Such funding arrangements do not offer the stability needed to build and maintain 
expertise. In addition, they also undermine SNGOs’ ability to undertake long-term 
planning:
The length of the contract is crucial if you want to develop a vision for your 
organisation. To make long term plans, you need stability over a longer period of 
time. And this implies that you need to get a predictable amount per year (interview, 
19 March, 2008).
Respondents pointed out that they, due to short-term and one-off funding 
arrangements, had to spend a lot of time and resources chasing funds. Not surprisingly, 
they strongly prefer funding from donors known for favouring long-term relations.3 
 Many respondents shared experiences on how they were forced to divert considerable 
time and resources away from their core activities due to extensive accountability 
requirements (see Wallace et al., 2006 and Markowitz & Tice, 2002 for similar observations). 
While some donors are flexible in terms of formatting and request only one report per 
year, others demand monthly financial and narrative reports following specific formats. An 
Indian NGO, for example, had four donors which each required separate bank accounts, 
separate narrative and financial reports based on separate reporting formats. To meet 
these reporting requirements, the organisation recruited highly educated staff with the 
explicit purpose of collecting and processing data and writing the (English-language) 
reports. Only a few organisations were encountered that managed to negotiate one 
shared report to satisfy multiple donors simultaneously.4
 Finally, numerous SNGOs, due to the lack of core funding support, short-term and 
one-off contracts, met with huge problems in remaining consistent with their original 
mission. Ideally, a SNGOs’ mission is the fundamental expression of what the organisation 
stands for, capturing its identity and providing focus for action. While some SNGOs did 
not appear to attach too much attention to remaining consistent to their mission, many 
others felt it was crucial:
3 Respondents also argued that short-term and one-off funding arrangement are problematic because they do 
not allow trust-building and learning which they considered essential for effective relationships.
4 Several respondents considered the collection and processing of data and report-writing to be a major source 
of frustration and cynicism. Not only did they feel that the reports were of little use to their own organisation, 
but the lack of feedback also made them doubt whether the reports were actually used.
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When you start changing your mission, the nature of your organisation changes. 
You tend to forget your cause, or whatever it is you started fighting for. You start 
following the buzzwords, like HIV or climate change, you merely become a project 
holder. […] I’ve seen it happening with many organisations (interview, 28 August, 
2008).
Respondents explained that mission constancy is also crucial for building and 
maintaining expertise in a certain field. Furthermore, they pointed out that it largely 
determines whether an organisation is perceived as solid, trustworthy and having its 
constituents’ interest at heart. For SNGOs lacking core funding support and a stable 
inflow of funds, however, taking a principled stance or being too critical to donors is not 
always an option. 
Consequences for local ownership
Numerous respondents shared experiences of donors whose programmatic criteria 
were so tightly defined that the respective organisations had problems pursuing local 
priorities. A Ghanaian NGO-leader explains that in such cases “donors see you as an 
implementer of their ideas, not as the one who has to take the lead in transforming 
society” (interview, 28 April, 2008). While some SNGO-leaders did not appear to have 
any problems following donors’ preferences, many felt it undermined their work 
because it caused difficulties in tailoring projects to local realities and being responsive 
to locally defined needs. During the fieldwork, several organisations were encountered 
whose work had very little to do with being responsive to local needs.
 Donor conditions not only affect the orientation of projects, but also the way in 
which they are designed and planned. Where organisations are forced to work in a 
manner that goes against their own principles, priorities or learning practices, local 
ownership is undermined (see also Wallace et al., 2006; Mawdsley et al., 2002). Numerous 
organisations, for example, explained how they had been forced into ‘mainstreaming’ 
gender or HIV/AIDS components into their projects although they were not convinced 
of their relevance. Several SNGOs also pointed out that their project-design revolved 
around the necessity to demonstrate tangible outcomes, even though their own 
interest was in the process: “It seems to me that they are not interested in how you get 
there. How did it empower them? What can we learn? For us, these are the things that 
matter” (interview, 13 April, 2008). Other respondents explained that they, due to ‘tight’ 
funding arrangements, were refraining from experimentation and innovation. 
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 The rigidness of some donors when it comes to allowing SNGOs to deviate from 
the original planning of a project undermines the latter’s responsiveness to changes in 
the project-environment. SNGOs are usually required to submit detailed work plans 
which they are contractually compelled to follow during implementation. The 
commonly used logical framework, in itself, is known to be a rather rigid planning tool: 
“By the time you reach the third year [of the project] a lot of the context has changed 
and your own approaches have evolved. But you are stuck with a log frame that you 
wrote three years ago” (interview, 24 September, 2008). A degree of flexibility is 
considered to be essential for successful implementation because the original logic of a 
project often does not hold in practice and unexpected changes in the environment 
are common. Numerous experiences were shared, however, of donors that did not 
allow any deviation from the original project-documents even though local 
circumstances had completely changed due to unexpected events.5   
  The earmarking of funds to particular activities or causes, which makes it impossible 
to transfer funds earmarked for one purpose to another, further limits flexibility during 
implementation. A Ghanaian NGO-leader shares his experiences:
Through their reporting requirements donors have a lot of influence over what is 
happening on the ground. Many of them are involved in micro-management, 
everything has to be exactly according to what was written in the project-docu-
ment. […] It limits your flexibility. For example, if the project-document listed a four 
wheel drive, some donors do not allow you to change this into four motorbikes, 
even when these are cheaper (interview, 2 May, 2008).
Respondents emphasised that with complex long-term projects it is impossible to 
foresee everything in advance. 
 Many of the SNGO-leaders also pointed out that, due to the way funding is 
structured, they had great difficulties ensuring the sustainability of ongoing projects. 
For SNGOs having to work with short-term and one-off contracts, the sustainability of 
projects is often a constant cause of concern (see also Michael, 2004). Several 
respondents referred to perfectly successful projects that collapsed at the end of the 
contract-period, because they had not succeeded in finding a new donor on time:
5 Respondents also pointed out that some types of work are simply not compatible with planning for predictable 
outcomes. The leader of a Ghanaian NGO involved in peace and reconciliation, for example, explained how a 
donor required detailed outcome predications years in advance, while this is simply impossible with peace and 
reconciliation dynamics.
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We had a project in girls’ education which started to become very successful, but 
then just before the ending of the contract, they [donor] changed their policy. They 
said they changed to water and sanitation and stopped the funding. We couldn’t 
find a new donor on time and everything we had built up collapsed. […] It was a 
disaster that nearly caused the end of the organisation (interview, 13 April, 2008).
The leader of this NGO explained that due the collapse of the project, his organisation 
could no longer meet the expectations of local stakeholders resulting in tensions and a 
loss of credibility. Moreover, he was forced to fire skilled and experienced staff.
 In sum, our findings illustrate that donor conditions have a profound impact on 
SNGOs and the activities they undertake. Specific configurations of donor conditions 
were identified that do not go well together with the importance attached to local 
ownership and a strong and autonomous civil society. In that sense our findings reveal 
a certain paradox: while donor conditions are often motivated by improving 
effectiveness and efficiency, they may have the opposite effect in practice. The fact that 
several of our findings correspond with the outcomes of other studies (see Bornstein, 
2003; Markowitz & Tice, 2002; Mawdsley et al., 2002, Michael, 2004; Wallace et al., 2006) 
further illustrates how widespread the problems associated with donor conditions are. 
3.5 Strategic responses to conflicting donor conditions
Strategic responses are understood as conscious and active responses of SNGOs to (the 
opportunities or problems associated with) donor conditions. Given the complexity of 
organisational behaviour, conceptual guidance for systematically identifying SNGOs’ 
strategic responses to donor conditions is required. The development NGO literature 
offers very little guidance in this respect. Organisational institutionalist theory (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), however, offers a rich body of literature that sheds 
light on organisational behaviour. Most of the earlier institutional work focused on 
conformity to institutional pressures (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). By following 
accepted standards or procedures and engaging in activities considered to be relevant 
by key stakeholders, organisations secure their legitimacy in the eyes of those 
stakeholders. Organisations not in conformity with external rules or standards are often 
perceived to be illegitimate, thus undermining their ability to attract resources and 
affecting their survival (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2008). 
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 Since the 1990s, institutionalist scholars have shown that organisations do much 
more than passively complying with environmental pressures (see Ashfort & Gibbs, 
1990; Edelman, 1992; Suchman, 1995; Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio, 1988). Although a number 
of institutional scholars have explored organisational responses to adverse institutional 
pressures, a coherent typology in this field has not yet been developed.6 We therefore 
integrated existing literature on strategic responses with the findings from our own 
research to develop a new typology. Our typology distinguishes between organisational 
strategies on the basis of their aim. Based on an iteration process between the 
institutional literature on the one hand and our empirical findings on the other, we 
identify four major organisational strategies:
1. Organisations may try to avoid interaction with stakeholders (Oliver, 1991; Tschirhart, 
1996). By preventing exposure of the organisation to adverse institutional pressures, 
organisations may succeed in avoiding the need of having to compromise altogether. 
2. Organisations may try to influence the contents of institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Oliver, 1991; Alexander, 1998). By changing the very nature of the institutional 
pressures, organisations may succeed in eliminating or minimizing their problematic 
content.
3. Organisations may try to buffer themselves against unavoidable institutional pressures 
(Alexander, 1998; Thompson, 1967). When a degree of compliance is simply inevitable, 
organisations may take compensatory measures to minimise the negative effects of 
institutional pressures.
4. Organisations may try to portray themselves in a positive light towards stakeholders 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Ashfort & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Ebrahim, 2002). 
By manipulating the perceptions of their donors, organisations may improve their 
chances to qualify for, or secure the inflow of, funds while averting the necessity to 
change themselves or their activities.
SNGOs appeared to pursue the above strategies in different ways which we refer to in 
our typology as ‘tactics’. The tactics mentioned in table 3.2 were all identified from an 
analysis of our own data. Our analysis also showed that the different strategies and 
tactics do not exclude each other. In fact, most SNGOs employ multiple tactics 
simultaneously. 
6  Existing typologies, for example, Ashfort and Gibbs (1990), Oliver (1991) or Alexander (1998) do not classify 
strategic behaviour from the explicit perspective of mitigating conflicting institutional pressures.
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Avoiding
Avoiding refers to a set of tactics aimed at limiting or avoiding interaction with stakeholders 
whose conditions are considered problematic (see also Oliver, 1991; Tschirhart, 1996). 
The SNGOs in this study considered avoiding a superior strategy as its utilisation is 
completely independent from donors. Three avoiding tactics were identified: selecting, 
rejecting and exiting.
 Selecting is a pro-active tactic based on making sure that the organisation only 
enters into relations with donors known to have compatible conditions. The director of 
a Ghanaian NGO involved in lobby and advocacy illustrates:
Before we approach any new donors, we grade candidates on a number of criteria. 
We look at their mode of operation, their ideology, where they get their money 
from, that kind of thing, […] to make sure that we don’t have to compromise on our 
principles (interview, 28 April, 2008).
Many of SNGOs that participated in the study, especially the older more experienced 
ones, appeared to be very much familiar with the ‘market’ of donor agencies. SNGOs 
learn about the compatibility of donors from their own experiences, by scanning the 
websites and policy papers of donors and by sharing experiences with other SNGOs. At 
Table 3.2   SNGOs’ strategic responses to adverse donor conditions
Strategy Aim Tactic Description
Avoiding Prevent exposure 
to donor 
conditions
Selecting NGO limits contact to compatible donors
Rejecting NGO turns down funding-offers 
Exiting NGO terminates funding relations
Influencing Change content of 
donor conditions 
Negotiating NGO uses mutual dependence as 
leverage
Persuading NGO uses convincing arguments
Involving NGO personally engages donor-
representatives 
Buffering Mitigate impact of 
unavoidable donor 
conditions  
Shielding NGO insulates key parts from exposure
Compensating NGO offsets problems with discretionary 
funds 
Portraying Pretend 
compliance with 
donor conditions 
Window dressing NGO conforms superficially 
Withholding NGO selectively releases information
Misrepresenting NGO forwards inaccurate information
source: own analysis based on interviews
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the same time, however, respondents pointed out that being too selective is not always 
viable, especially when the organisation is in desperate need of funds.
 Rejecting is a reactive tactic which occurs when an SNGO turns down a funding 
offer due to conflictive conditions. The director of an Indian NGO involved in rural 
development shares his experiences:
We have been offered big money which would have made our life very comfortable 
but we rejected the offer because compromising on our principles would have led 
to a much deeper decay (interview, 6 September, 2008). 
Rejecting is a tactic that is not always viable, particularly when the organisation has its 
back to the wall financially. A positive side effect of rejecting is that it gets the message 
out that the SNGO refuses to be compromised, which in fact may increase its 
attractiveness to donors.
 Exiting is a tactic in which a SNGO terminates an existing relation with a donor to 
avoid exposure to newly imposed donor conditions. The leader of an Indian NGO 
involved in women’s empowerment illustrates this as follows:
We’ve always run our organisation with the idea of being able to walk away [from a 
financial relation with a donor] at any time. And we have done it once, when they [a 
donor] wanted us to do things we found unacceptable (interview, 18 September, 2008).
Like rejecting, exiting is not a tactic most NGOs will pursue easily. A Ghanaian NGO-leader 
explains how resource dependence made him decide not to terminate his relation with 
his main donor although he was forced to accept an approach he did not really support: 
‘I have my pride and I have my mission, but the way I look at it, it is better to keep my 
twenty staff working’ (interview, 25 April, 2008).
Influencing
Influencing refers to a set of tactics in which an SNGO attempts to eliminate or minimise 
the problematic content of donor conditions (see also DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; 
Alexander, 1998). Three different influence tactics were identified: negotiating, 
persuading and involving. What these tactics have in common is that they are almost 
always about ‘creating an exception to the rule’. In other words, very few SNGOs were 
encountered that claimed to have actually influenced the policies underlying conflicting 
donor conditions.
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 Negotiating is a tactic in which organisations derive their influence from the mutual 
dependence that exists between donors and SNGOs. While SNGOs need funding 
agencies for their financial survival, donor agencies need to be seen funding successful 
organisations that can communicate their successes to achieve their own goals. Due to 
the agencies’ need to demonstrate success, solid performance and credibility enhances 
SNGOs’ attractiveness towards funding agencies and hence increases their leverage in 
decision-making. As such, negotiating is a strategy which is usually only available to 
strong performing or otherwise attractive SNGOs. A Ghanaian organisation explains 
that ‘[with regard to funding] we have reached a point in which donors call us, we don’t 
call them. That completely changes the way you negotiate, because they need you 
more than you need them’ (interview, 28 March, 2008). Some of the more established 
SNGOs further improved their ability to negotiate by funding part of the project-budget 
themselves, or by bringing multiple donors to the negotiation table thus limiting the 
influence of individual funders. 
 Persuading is a tactic based on providing convincing arguments. Unlike negotiating, 
in which SNGOs use funding agencies’ need for success to enforce their preferences, 
persuading ultimately depends on the quality of the argumentation and the 
susceptibility of donor-representatives. As such, it usually implies a degree of personal 
contact and trust to be present. ‘Mostly you try to reason with them, providing 
arguments in the hope of convincing them, for example, that their new policy will hurt 
the sustainability of the project or cause problems with our constituents’ (interview, 28 
August, 2008). One way of making arguments more convincing is by backing them up 
with ‘proof’. An Indian NGO working in the field of HIV/Aids, for example, explained that 
its success in dealing with donor agencies was due to its research capacity: ‘Once you 
have the figures to show that your approach works, it is very difficult for them [donors] 
to push you in another direction’ (interview, 1 September, 2008). 
 Involving is a tactic based on influencing donor-representatives by engaging them 
on a personal level in the SNGOs’ work. Respondents explained that this creates an 
understanding, whether it is based on sympathy, flattery, guilt or pity, which goes 
beyond the ‘paper reality’ of narrative reports. As a result ‘it makes them understand our 
work better, also why we have certain expenses’ (interview Ghanaian NGO-leader, 3 
April, 2008). Similar to persuading, frequent face-to-face contact and the presence of 
trust were identified by respondents as preconditions. As such, it is not surprising that 
respondents considered the frequent changing of donor-representatives to be one of 
the most frustrating aspects in their relationships with donor agencies. 
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Buffering
Buffering refers to a set of tactics aimed at taking measures to neutralise, or at least 
minimise the negative effects of unavoidable donor conditions (see also Alexander, 
1996, 1998; Thompson, 1967). SNGOs were found to have two buffering tactics at their 
disposal: shielding and compensating.
 Shielding is a tactic aimed at insulating certain key parts or activities of the 
organisation from exposure. By complying only partially in certain areas, the organisation 
protects itself against the most adverse effects of donor conditions. For example, the 
director of an Indian NGO involved in disaster management explained how he managed 
the field visits of one of its donors:
We had experience with our team on the ground being seriously demoralised by 
these people [donor-representatives] making uninformed and negative comments. 
So what we do now is make sure that there is always someone from the office who 
deals with donor relations, who acts as a shield and literally tries to keep them apart 
(interview, 24 September, 2008).
Shielding is a tactic that only works to a limited extent, as overdoing it is likely to get 
noticed at a certain point in time.
 Compensating is a tactic in which SNGOs draw money from other sources to cover 
those parts which donor agencies are unwilling to fund. These parts may relate to, for 
example, overhead costs or less ‘sexy’ project-activities. A Ghanaian NGO involved in 
community development, for example, explains that ‘there are certain things that our 
donor will not fund, but we feel are crucial to the organisation, like our core costs and 
our social accountability process. We get these things covered with funding from other 
sources’ (interview, 13 April, 2008). As highlighted by this example, having alternative 
sources of funding is essential for the compensating tactic. Most organisations 
participating in the study therefore tried to diversify their resource base, for example, by 
means of consultancy work or renting out buildings. Two organisations were 
encountered that had established a separate consultancy unit, with the aim of providing 
its NGO counterpart with discretionary funds. 
Portraying
Portraying refers to a set of responses deliberately aimed at manipulating the 
perceptions of funders regarding SNGOs’ compliance with donor conditions (see also 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Ashfort & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Ebrahim, 2002). The 
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SNGOs in this study were found to use three tactics when portraying: window dressing, 
withholding and misrepresenting.
 Window-dressing is a tactic in which SNGOs conform only superficially to donor 
conditions without changing actual core tasks or procedures. It involves meeting the 
most highly visible donor demands in order to send a clear signal to funders. The SNGOs 
participating in this study gave many examples of window-dressing. Several 
organisations, for example, admitted that their board, gender policy or strategic plan 
had a mainly symbolic function. Several respondents pointed out that window-dress-
ing is a potentially dangerous strategy ‘because credibility is very key if you want to stay 
alive in the NGO-world. If you are caught, the results will be disastrous’ (interview, 31 
March, 2008).
 Withholding is a tactic which involves suppressing information regarding SNGOs’ 
organisation, activities or outcomes which would likely undermine their legitimacy in 
the eyes of donors. SNGOs may be concerned that openly sharing certain information 
might lead to misinterpretation or unwanted interference in their activities. As a result, 
they release information selectively, withholding information that could put the 
organisation at a disadvantage with a donor. Several respondents, for example, admitted 
they had emphasised successes and downplayed failures in their reporting. An 
SNGO-leader explained how he did not provide full disclosure about his organisation’s 
sources of funding in his financial reporting as he feared that this would result in reduced 
overhead contributions in the future.
 Misrepresenting is a tactic in which SNGOs intentionally forward inaccurate 
information to donors. It is a tactic that organisations might use when they think that 
providing accurate information would be harmful for them. There are degrees of mis-
representation. Several respondents admitted to routinely making ‘conservative’ 
estimates regarding their overhead costs when submitting a proposal, redirecting 
budgets already spent on other initiatives to a new project thus meeting ‘matching’ 
monies requirements, or redefining budget line items previously associated with pro-
ject-implementation as planning costs. As pointed out by the leader of a Ghanaian NGO 
‘when you work in an NGO you have to be clever, you have to be operating within the 
legal limits of accounting procedures to survive’ (interview, 1 April, 2008). 
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3.6 Conclusions and outlook
This study explores (1) the (potentially) adverse consequences of donor conditions on 
the strength and autonomy of SNGOs and their ownership over development 
interventions, and (2) the strategies used by SNGOs to manage donor constraints. It 
makes three contributions to the literature.
 First, it systematically captures the full range of conditions that donors attach to 
their funding as well as the problems associated with them from the perspective of 
SNGOs. Our findings demonstrate that certain configurations of donor conditions 
undermine SNGOs’ strength and autonomy and the local ownership of development 
interventions. We find that unwillingness to fund overhead costs, short funding periods, 
single contracts and excessive accountability requirements make it difficult for SNGOs 
to diversify and secure their resource base, to attract and retain high-quality staff, invest 
in research, long-term planning and organisational learning and remain consistent with 
their original mission. In a similar vein, tightly defined programmatic frameworks, the 
priority of outcomes over processes, tight funding arrangements, short-term funding 
periods and single contracts make it difficult for SNGOs to pursue local priorities, 
experiment and innovate, engage in process-oriented activities, respond to unexpected 
events and ensure sustainable outcomes
 Second, we show that SNGOs use a range of strategies to manage donor constraints, 
highlighting that they are not powerless in their relations with funders. More specifically, 
we have developed a coherent typology of SNGOs’ strategic responses to adverse 
donor conditions, which consists of four main strategies: portraying, avoiding, 
influencing and buffering. Our analysis shows that most of the available strategies 
require alternative sources of funding, (a track record of) strong performance, or 
personal contact with a degree of trust. When these are not present, SNGOs may have 
limited choice but resort to manipulating the perceptions of donors. 
 Third, this study implies a change agenda on the part of donors. Our findings urge 
donors to recognise that they themselves contribute to undesirable SNGO-behaviour. 
Unworkable donor conditions lie at the basis of SNGO-strategies aimed at manipulating 
donor-perceptions. As such, donors themselves are largely to blame for breeding 
mistrust, creating and maintaining a virtual reality and reducing the potential for 
learning. Ultimately, we demonstrate that major inconsistencies exist between what 
donors perceive to be critical preconditions for effective private development aid and 
their actual practices. This means that donors should either revise their starting-points 
regarding effective private development aid or change their behaviour towards SNGOs. 
97
Keeping body and soul together: Southern NGOs’ strategic responses to donor constraints
3

4
Corridors of power: the institutional design  
of NGO partnerships for development 1
1  A version of this chapter is under review in Third World Quarterly.
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Abstract: Power asymmetries within partnerships between private aid agencies and 
Southern NGOs are thought to be undesirable. Based on a comparative case study of 
the partnerships between three private aid agencies and their partners in Ghana, India 
and Nicaragua, this study examines how the partnerships’ institutional design affects 
local partners’ room to manoeuvre. It is demonstrated that (1) the agencies unilaterally 
set the rules that govern the partnerships, based on their own norms, values and beliefs, 
(2) similarities and differences between the rules of the three agencies can above all be 
attributed to the corresponding and diverging nature of their norms, values and beliefs; 
(3) informal rules allow more flexibility in their use. Whether this is beneficial for partners’ 
room to manoeuvre depends on individual project-officers, who are responsible for 
interpreting and applying the rules, and partners’ ability to conduct negotiations.
Keywords: partnership; NGOs; private aid agencies; rules; institutional design; power; 
room to manoeuvre
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4.1 Introduction
In their partnerships with private aid agencies, Southern NGOs (SNGOs) usually wield 
the shorter end of the power stick. This is considered problematic as equitable relations 
are thought to be of key importance for ensuring local ownership and private aid 
agencies’ added value in the aid system (Fowler, 2000: 1-13; Edwards & Fowler, 2002: 1-11; 
Malhotra, 2000: 655–668; Wallace et al., 2006). In this study we examine the power 
dynamics within NGO partnerships from an institutional perspective employing the 
concept of ‘rules of the game’. This perspective improves our understanding of the 
power dynamics within partnerships and offers tangible starting points for those private 
aid agencies wishing to enter into more equitable relationships. 
 Drawing upon qualitative research involving the partnerships between three private 
aid agencies (Action Aid, Christian Aid, and Interchurch Organisation for Development 
Cooperation) and their local partners in Ghana, India, and Nicaragua, this study asks the 
following questions: What are the institutional rules in the partnerships of the three 
agencies, what explains their main similarities and differences, and how do they affect 
local partners’ room to manoeuvre? To demarcate the study, the analysis focuses on the 
rules related to three areas: project-design and implementation, accountability and 
capacity building. All three areas are central to NGO partnerships and address long-existing 
debates regarding the donor-driven nature of aid interventions (Fowler, 2000;  Malhotra, 
2000), accountability (Ebrahim, 2003: 813-829; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006), and civil society 
building (Biekart, 1999; Lewis & Kanji, 2009: 130). 
 We start by reviewing the existing literature on partnership and power, highlighting 
the added value of our own contribution. Next, we discuss our theoretical framework 
which focuses on the concept of ‘rules of the game’. After a short discussion of our 
methodology, we continue analysing the rules related to project-design and 
implementation, accountability and capacity building and how these affect partners’ 
room to manoeuvre. Finally, we summarise our main findings and reflect upon their 
meaning in light of the debate on partnership.
4.2 Partnership and power
Partnerships are associated with a range of unique advantages and qualities not present in 
other types of institutional relationships. From a pragmatic perspective, partnerships are a 
response to complex problems in which partners can build on each other’s comparative 
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advantages through a rational division of labour. Through their complementary roles, 
partners can achieve goals they could never reach by themselves (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2004: 253-270). Most authors emphasise, however, that it is their value-based 
nature that makes partnerships so different from other types of institutional relationships. 
Qualities commonly associated with partnership include shared goals, balance of 
power, shared responsibilities, trust, mutual respect and accountability, reflecting the 
ideal of a mutually dependent relationship based on equality (Abrahamsen, 2004: 
1453–67; Fowler, 2000; Lister, 2000; 227–239; Johnson & Wilson, 2006: 71–80).
 In the NGO-literature at least two reasons can be found as to why equal relations are so 
important in the private aid channel. First, it is generally assumed that equal relations are a 
precondition for ensuring the necessary ownership for effective and sustainable 
development interventions (Ashman, 2001: 74-98; Fowler, 1997; Lister, 2000) and civil society 
strengthening (Brehm, 2004; Hoksbergen, 2005: 16-27;  Mawdsley et al., 2002). Second, 
private aid agencies derive part of their legitimacy from the claim that they – as opposed 
to bi- or multilateral aid agencies - are able to have high quality relationships with their 
partners. Edwards & Fowler (2002) point out that those private aid agencies that are unable 
to maintain equitable relationships risk losing their added value in the aid system.
 Much of what is written on partnerships is about the discrepancy between the ideal 
view on partnership and the reality which is characterised by inequality. Critics have 
termed partnership a ‘Trojan Horse’, disguising the reality of relationships characterised by 
power asymmetries (Fowler, 2000). Resource dependence is known to have a major 
impact on the power dynamics within partnerships, often resulting in donor-recipient 
behaviour (Ebrahim, 2002: 85-13; Hudock, 1995; Lister, 2000: 227–239; Michael, 2004). 
Private aid agencies have been reported to dominate partnership decision-making (Lister, 
2000; Michael, 2004) and enforce ‘rational’ management practices in such fields as 
planning, monitoring, financial management and performance measurement (Wallace et 
al., 2006; Mawdsley et al., 2002). Studies have shown how SNGOs were forced to re-align 
their orientation to match changing donor priorities, shifting their focus away from areas 
that were key to local beneficiaries and their original mission (Markowitz & Tice, 2002: 
941-958; Wallace et al., 2006). Such findings have cast doubts on the perceived benefits of 
NGO partnerships as well as the added value of private aid agencies. 
 As of yet, no study has offered tangible starting-points to those private aid agencies 
wishing to systematically redesign the way in which their partnerships are organised. 
Several authors have offered advice  for making partnerships more equitable, such as 
minimizing financial dependence (Hudock, 1995), providing capacity building support 
(Hudock, 1997: 589-596, 1999; Michael, 2004), improving access to decision-making 
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(Elbers & Schulpen, 2011), more flexible and long-term funding arrangements (Michael, 
2004), more frequent communication (Hoksbergen, 2005: 16-27; Mawdsley et al., 2005), 
embracing mutual transparency and accountability mechanisms (Malhotra, 2000) and 
building personal relations based on trust (Mawdsley et al., 2002, 2005). While the above 
suggestions are certainly useful, they remain at the level of general recommendations. 
This study addresses some of the limitations of existing literature by analysing the 
institutional design of partnerships from a neo-institutional perspective (Scott, 2008; 
March & Olsen, 1989). Such a perspective not only represents an original theoretical 
approach for analysing partnership power asymmetries, it also enables us to make 
theory- informed recommendations to those private aid agencies wishing to redesign 
their partnerships. 
4.3 Rules and rule-guided behaviour
We analyse partners’ room to manoeuvre within partnerships using the concept of 
‘rules of the game’. This concept, derived from new institutionalism in organisational 
sociology, departs from the idea that human behaviour takes place within socially 
constructed frameworks (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 936-957; Scott, 2008; Schmidt, 2008: 
303–326). These frameworks are conceptualised as ‘rules’ defining the structural 
possibilities and constraints regarding actors’ ability to act. The concept of rules is 
particularly suitable for our purpose because rules are known for playing a key role in 
consolidating and reproducing power imbalances within institutional arrangements 
(Klijn, 2001: 133-164; Clegg, 1989: 212; Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 52).
What are rules and what do they do?
Rules define which actions are allowed, required and forbidden within institutional 
arrangements. They clarify the rights, obligations, roles and responsibilities of actors, 
regulate interaction and standardise procedures (Ostrom & Crawford, 2005: 186-216). A 
distinction can be made between formal and informal rules. Formal rules are fixed and 
authorised in legal texts (e.g. policy papers, contracts) and focus on legal boundaries, 
particularly contractual rights and obligations. Actors adhere to formal rules because 
they are contractually compelled to do so while failure to comply often involves 
sanctions. Informal rules have a more tacit character and typically remain unspoken 
despite everybody knowing of their existence. Over time they often become internalised 
and achieve a ‘taken for granted’ status (Giddens, 1984; Cohen, 1989). 
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 Rules do not emerge from a vacuum. They are derived from and embedded in 
prevailing norms, values and beliefs (Scott, 2008). Norms are standards of appropriate-
ness that reflect prevailing ideals and priorities (values). In a society that attaches 
importance to gender equality, for example, one can expect the notion of gender 
equality to be reflected in formal legislation. Beliefs are cognitive frames which actors 
use to interpret problems and judge meaningful solutions. In the context of international 
development, for example, private aid agencies with a neo-liberal outlook will have 
completely different strategies to address poverty than those that are part of the trade 
justice movement. 
 Although rules serve to ensure uniform behaviour over longer time periods, they 
are not static. Giddens’ (1984) notion of ‘the duality of structures’ already pointed out 
that structures exhibit a dual role by being both the medium and the outcome of the 
practices they regulate. Likewise, in institutional arrangements, rules are formed, 
confirmed and changed over time in response to specific circumstances (Klijn, 2001; 
Klijn & Koppejan, 2004).
 While rules signify uniform behaviour, their application is not always uniform. Rules 
that exist on paper may be ignored in practice. Moreover, rules require interpretation 
and adaptation in light of particular situations before they can be applied or followed 
(March & Olsen, 1989). Particularly when rules are ambiguous, conflictive or when more 
than one rule is applicable, misunderstandings may occur. Overall, rules often show a 
degree of flexibility, depending on their interpretation and application (Klijn, 2001; 
Ostrom & Crawford, 2005: 186-216).
 Rules directly affect power dynamics within institutional arrangements (Giddens, 
1984; Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 39-75). Most importantly, they regulate actors’ rights and 
obligations, participation in decision-making, the distribution of resources and the 
ability to evoke sanctions. As rights and obligations tend to be unequally divided 
among actors, rules solidify existing power inequalities. This not only implies that rules 
tend to reflect prevailing power asymmetries within arrangements, but also that power 
dynamics often cannot be changed without addressing the rules (Klijn, 2001).
Classifying rules
Several authors have developed rule typologies to systematically analyse institutional 
arrangements (Burns & Flam, 1987; Klijn, 2001; Ostrom & Crawford, 2005). Since Ostrom’s 
typology is the most extensively documented and widely used in empirical research, 
this study uses her classification which identifies seven rules based on their aim: scope, 
position, aggregation, choice, boundary, information and payoff (see table 4.1 below). 
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1. Boundary rules define which actors qualify for entering or leaving institutional 
arrangements. In partnerships, the boundary rules determine how partners are 
selected and when they have to leave.
2. Scope rules determine the nature, or characteristics, of the outcomes aimed at in 
institutional arrangements. The scope rules of partnerships usually include focus 
areas and strategies. 
3. Position rules define the different positions in institutional arrangements and respon-
sibilities (roles) associated with each position. The position of a private aid agency is 
often connected to providing funds while that of local partner relates to project-im-
plementation.
4. Choice rules specify the rights and obligations associated with different positions in 
institutional arrangements. Partners, for example, have the right to implement 
projects as contractually agreed upon, but need to get permission before deviating 
from the contract.
5. Aggregation rules specify the extent to which actors can participate in decision-mak-
ing within institutional arrangements. These rules, for instance, determine partners’ 
ability to set agendas and take final decisions regarding project-design.
6. Information rules determine the exchange of information in institutional arrangements 
such as how (often) partners have to report to their agencies and vice versa.
7. Pay-off rules define the performance standards and determine the rewards and 
sanctions for (sub-standard) achievement. They determine, for example, how the 
agencies assess and reward their partners’ project-performance.
This study does not examine the full extent of each of the rules outlined above. Instead, 
it limits itself to those aspects most relevant for the areas of project-design and 
implementation, accountability and capacity building. Moreover, we focus only on those 
formal and informal rules actually in use. Given the overlap between different types of 
rules, this study explicitly takes their mutual interaction into account. Boundary rules are 
not included in the analysis, as the study focuses on already established partnerships. To 
understand the differences and similarities between the rules, we look at the norms, values 
and beliefs underlying them. Due to the interpretation rules require, the analysis explicitly 
allows for the role of those individuals responsible for interpreting and applying the rules. 
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4.4 Methodology
To gain a comprehensive understanding of how rules affect partners’ room to 
manoeuvre within partnerships and observe effects that otherwise would have 
remained unnoticed, we opted for a comparative case study (Yin, 2003). The selection 
of Action Aid (AA), Christian Aid (CA) and Interchurch Organisation for Development 
Cooperation (ICCO) is based on three criteria (see Table 4.2 for their main characteris-
tics). First, all three work internationally with local partners in developing countries. 
Second, they explicitly claim to attach importance to working in partnership. Third, their 
decision-making structures represent different degrees of decentralisation, increasing 
the likelihood of finding variation in the rules and enabling us to make optimal use of 
the comparative research design.1 To improve the external validity of the findings, 
1 At the time of writing, ICCO was transforming its governance structure into an international network 
organisation. When the fieldwork was conducted the new governance model was not yet operational, 
meaning that the findings presented here do not represent ICCO’s new model.
Table 4.1   Rules and their content
Type of rule Content Key questions
boundary entry and exit ·	 Which (type of ) actors may participate? 
·	 Who decides who is in and who is out? 
·	 Which criteria are used for selection? 
scope outcomes ·	 What are the outcomes to be achieved? 
·	 What characteristics should outcomes have?
position roles ·	 What positions exist?
·	 What responsibilities are associated with different 
positions? 
choice actions ·	 What are the rights and obligations of different actors?
aggregation decision-making ·	 What is the level of actors’ participation in decision-
making?
·	 On which topics do they participate and in which 
decision-making stage?
information information 
exchange
·	 What type of information do actors have to exchange 
and how frequently?
payoff performance ·	 How is performance defined and measured? 
·	 What are the consequences of excellent or poor 
performance?
Source: adapted from Ostrom and Crawford (2005: 193-210)
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fieldwork was conducted in Ghana, India and Nicaragua because they are known to 
have very different NGO-sectors.2
Data-collection took place  from November 2007 through September 2008, using both 
in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. In-depth interviewing is an appropriate 
method for reconstructing institutional rules (Klijn, 2001). A total of 96 respondents were 
interviewed, which was sufficient to reach the point of data-saturation. This included 25 
ICCO-partners, 21 AA partners and 22 CA partners. Interviewed partner-representatives 
consisted of those persons responsible for managing donor-relations, mostly the 
managing director or equivalent. Regarding the agencies, nearly all interviewees 
consisted of Project-Officers (POs) responsible for managing partner relations, although 
a few high-ranking staff-members were also included.3 In total, nine staff members of 
ICCO, eight of CA and eleven of AA were interviewed. To ensure that the participating 
partners were as diverse as possible, we used the following selection-criteria: thematic 
focus, size in terms of budget and staff, geographical location and partnership age. 
2 AA was not included in Nicaragua. Despite numerous attempts over a six-month period, AA Nicaragua did not 
respond to the invitation to participate in the study. To maintain the deadline of the study, it was left out of the 
Nicaragua study.
3 Project-Officers are also referred to as ‘desk officers’, ‘country officers’ or ‘program officers’ (Fernando, 2007).
Table 4.2   Partnership cases
Agency Country and 
identity
Annual 
income 
(million €)
Main funding 
sources
Governance 
structure
# of 
staff 
Action Aid International: 
human rights 
based
185.9 Child sponsorship 
(56%), Donations 
(25%), Institutional 
donors (15%)
Partnerships 
managed from 
multiple offices at 
country-level
2460
Christian Aid UK: church-
based
109.3 Donations (76%), 
Institutional donors 
(16%)
Partnerships 
managed from a 
single country-
office
745
ICCO Netherlands: 
church-based
174.7 Dutch government 
(77 %), Donations 
(15 %)
Partnerships 
managed from HQ 
in Netherlands
233
Source: annual reports (2007) and websites
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 In addition to the interviews, we analysed the agencies’ policy papers and contracts. 
The combination of interviewing and documentary analysis served three purposes. 
First, it enabled us to improve the validity of the findings by means of data-triangulation. 
Second, it enabled us to establish which rules were formally captured and which ones 
remained informal. Third, it enabled us to establish which of the formal rules were in 
actual use. Although rules typically evolve over time, they did not change during the 
period of our fieldwork. As such, our analysis does not take the temporal dimension of 
rules into account. To demarcate the study, data-collection and analysis was limited to 
those rules related to three areas: project-design and implementation, accountability 
and capacity building.
 All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Both documents and 
interview transcripts were analysed through selective coding utilizing Ostrom’s rule 
typology with the software package Atlas.ti (see Strauss & Corbain, 1998). While 
establishing patterns in the data, specific attention was paid to the impact of rules on 
the partners’ room to manoeuvre and the main differences and similarities between the 
agencies.  For explaining the latter, we explicitly looked at the norms, values and beliefs 
underlying the rules. Exploring issues related to equity in partnerships is sensitive as 
interviewees may be reluctant to criticise each other in ongoing relationships (Ashman, 
2001). To improve validity, confidentiality was promised to all respondents. 
4.5  Reconstructing institutional rules 
Project-design and implementation
Within project-design and implementation, the scope rules define the characteristics 
that project-outcomes should have to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the 
agencies. All three agencies work with strategic policy frameworks that formally capture 
the areas in which they seek to achieve outcomes (AA, 2004; CA, 2005; ICCO, 2007). In 
(unilaterally) determining these areas, ICCO, CA and AA use specified criteria adapted to 
the local and regional context (for example, related to theme, geographical focus, target 
group) (AA, 2005a; CA, 2006; ICCO, 2008a). For partners, these criteria are crucial as they 
determine funding possibilities.4
4 The agencies explained that they are reluctant to involve their partners when setting the rules. Not only do 
they feel that this touches upon their organisational identity, but there is also the risk of a conflict of interests. 
It is difficult to expect that partners will, for example, support policy changes that would disqualify them from 
future funding.
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 With all agencies, the scope rules allow a degree of flexibility to partners. Partly 
because “criteria are formulated in […] a broad manner”, but also because Project Officers 
(POs) might leave the specifics to their partners as long as they “stay in that broad theme” 
(interview PO Action Aid Ghana, 18 April, 2008). This flexibility is clearly described by a PO of 
ICCO, who successfully managed to re-label the thematic focus of several of her favourite 
partners within her department in order to keep them onboard when ICCO changed its 
policy priorities (Interview PO ICCO, 1 July, 2008). 
 Underlying the formal priority areas are the agencies’ beliefs regarding their own role 
in achieving outcomes. Here AA differs considerably from ICCO and CA. The latter agencies 
believe that sustainable and locally-owned outcomes can only be reached when they limit 
their support to providing the means which enable partners to do the work themselves. 
For them, the only legitimate outcomes are those that are fully owned by the partner. 
Partners are consequently granted a lot of autonomy in project-design and implementation. 
 In contrast, AA views strong staff involvement at the ground-level as a key strength. 
This legitimises AA to take a pro-active role in their partners’ work if only because the 
formulation of “policies and programs is impossible without solid interaction with […] 
people and partners on the ground on a day-to-day basis” (interview Head of Programmes 
AA India, 30 September, 2008). We will demonstrate below that the discrepancies between 
the agencies’ views regarding their own role in achieving social change are relevant 
because they form the basis of many other differences between their rules in project-design 
and implementation.
 In the partnerships of ICCO, CA and AA, mutual roles and accompanying responsibili-
ties (position rules) are formalised in the project-contracts (ICCO, 2008b; AA, 2008b; CA, 
2008b). Overall, the agencies identify the same roles when it comes to project-design and 
implementation: partners are supposed to develop and implement projects and the 
agencies provide the necessary support for partners to do their job. This division of roles is 
relevant as it authorises the partners of all three agencies to take the lead in designing and 
implementing projects. Agencies may give “feedback, share ideas or help out when there 
are problems but in the end [the partner has] to make it happen” (interview PO CA Ghana, 
5 May, 2008).
 The agencies differ, however, in that AA defines its supportive role more proactively. 
With a strong presence ‘on the ground’, AA-staff regularly meet with partners to discuss 
ongoing planning and strategizing and if necessary directly participates during 
implementation. In contrast, ICCO and CA’s supportive role is more distant with their staff 
having no direct involvement in implementation. Consequently, contact with partners is 
less frequent and intensive.
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 Once projects fit the requirements of the scope rules, the aggregation rules 
subsequently determine the partners’ influence in decision-making. Both similarities 
and differences are found between the agencies in this respect. While none of them has 
formalised aggregation rules for project-design and implementation, they all explicitly 
share the norm that agency-staff should refrain from abusing their power. They differ 
considerably, however, regarding the autonomy they give partners in decision-making. 
Within AA, the norm is that key decisions related to project-design and implementation 
are to be made jointly. With ICCO and CA, agency-involvement largely remains limited 
to assessing whether projects fit within the policy frameworks and meet quality-standards. 
 While these differences between the agencies are consistently reported by 
agency-staff and partners in the different case countries, several exceptions were 
encountered. Several AA partners operated largely autonomously, while some ICCO 
and CA partners worked closely with their PO. Overall, this seems directly related to the 
informal nature of the aggregation rules, which allows both partners and POs a degree 
of flexibility. Strong and trusted partners with multiple donors, a well-defined vision, 
clear-cut ideas on how to achieve results, an extensive track record, a large outreach and 
a good reputation are able to use their capabilities to increase their leverage in deci-
sion-making. “The influence that partners have [thus] also depends on whether they are 
a mature organisation” (interview PO CA, 5 May, 2008).
 Some POs are less dominant than others and the absence of clearly defined and 
formalised aggregation rules results in some POs handing over more decision-making 
authority than others. According to an AA partner in Ghana “in the end you deal with 
individuals and some allocate more power to themselves than others” (interview 
partner AA Ghana, 21 April, 2008). Long-term partners of all three agencies repeatedly 
refer to changes in their (power) relation when a new PO takes charge.
 Finally, the choice rules – which define mutual rights and obligations – are important 
for partners’ room to manoeuvre regarding project-design and implementation. The 
choice rules in this field, which have been drafted by the agencies, can be found in the 
project-contracts. Partners of each agency in all three case countries have the 
contractual right or obligation to implement their projects according to the action-plan 
outlined in the project-contract. Once agreement has been reached, agencies “cannot 
suddenly demand something completely different”. Equally, partners “need permission 
[to] change [the project themselves] when there is a significant change in [their] 
environment” (interview, partner CA Ghana, 28 April, 2008). As discussed in the next 
section, many of the rules related to accountability revolve around partners’ compliance 
with the choice rules in project-design and implementation.
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 In sum, the rules for scope, position, aggregation and choice are crucial for enabling 
and limiting partners’ room to manoeuvre in the field of project-design and 
implementation. Differences between the rules, which have been unilaterally 
established by the agencies, can be attributed to differences in the nature of the 
agencies’ norms, values and beliefs. Overall, the rules of ICCO and CA allow partners 
more autonomy than those of AA. In those cases where rules are broadly formulated 
(scope rules) or remain informal (aggregation rules), they allow a degree of flexibility. 
Whether partners’ can use this flexibility depends on their respective PO and their 
organisational capacity. 
Accountability
All agencies emphasise the importance of accountability in their policy papers (ICCO, 
2008a; CA, 2006; CA, 2005). Central to this is the partners’ accountability to their agencies. 
The latter not only want to know whether their funds are spent well, their own legitimacy 
also (partly) depends on such accountability. Besides legal requirements, the agencies 
have to satisfy various demands, including those of their back-donors and supporters. 
Project-outcomes thus need to be achieved in an accountable manner to be perceived 
as legitimate by the agencies. This ties accountability directly to the agencies’ scope 
rules and authorises them to ensure their partners’ accountability in practice. 
          A key difference between the agencies is that AA, unlike ICCO and CA, strongly 
emphasises downwards accountability. Its outlook and procedures regarding 
accountability are extensively (and formally) captured in its Accountability, Learning and 
Planning System (ALPS) which is used in all countries in which AA operates. The ALPS 
seeks to empower poor people by emphasizing community participation, downwards 
accountability to poor people and learning from successes and failures together with 
them (AA, 2006). As participation and downwards accountability are regarded essential 
for both project-performance and AA’s own legitimacy, the ALPS not only reflects AA’s 
norms and values but is also central to its belief of how social change occurs. The ALPS 
directly relates to AA’s scope rules because it only considers those outcomes legitimate 
that are achieved in a participatory and downwards accountable manner. This authorises 
AA to pro-actively ensure this downwards accountability. 
 ICCO and CA do mention the importance of community participation and 
downwards accountability (see ICCO, 2008a; CA, 2007) but these notions are neither 
explicitly defined nor translated into formalised requirements. In practice, and reflecting 
their belief of how change occurs, they feel that downward accountability is not 
something they should impose upon partners. On the contrary, partners are viewed as 
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“best placed to understand and represent the needs and interests of poor people’ and 
are thus the ones that ‘should decide how to be accountable to their target groups” 
(interview PO ICCO India, 1 February, 2008). 
 The contracts used by all three agencies explicitly outline the formal roles and re-
sponsibilities (position rules) regarding accountability. Partners are expected to be fully 
accountable to their agencies while the latter regard it as their role to ensure this in 
practice. Overall, the position rules are relevant because they authorise the agencies to 
define accountability requirements, monitor their compliance and impose rewards and 
sanctions based on the partners’ performance. Partners, on the other hand, are 
expected to comply with the accountability requirements associated with their position. 
In the case of AA, partners are also expected to be downwards accountable. 
 The information rules affect the nature of information exchange within the 
partnerships. They are detailed in the project-contracts and are largely similar between 
the agencies and case countries. The contracts include such information requirements 
as periodical narrative and financial reports, audits, evaluations, visits of agency-staff, 
and the obligation to inform about organisational changes, other donors, unexpected 
events affecting implementation and (suspected) misapplication of funds.
 In the case of AA, partners also have contractual obligations for ensuring downwards 
accountability. The most important instrument for this is the Participatory Reflection 
and Review Process (PRRP), which aims to assess what the partner has achieved, what 
has been learned and what needs to be done differently in the future (AA, 2006). 
Partners are compelled to conduct them at least annually. In these PRRPs not only the 
communities and the partner participate, but also a PO of AA. It provides the latter with 
firsthand knowledge and experience of the situation at the grassroots level.
 There are only few formal information requirements that hold for agencies 
themselves. In fact, accountability from agencies to partners is only mentioned at a high 
level of abstraction in the contracts. Consequently, the information going to partners 
does not follow fixed formats or periodical cycles but is largely informal and ad hoc. POs 
pass on information that they consider important to their partners, for example, about 
changes in agency policy or funding opportunities. Much, however, depends on 
individual POs as long-term partners of all three agencies refer to changes in the flow of 
information when a new PO takes charge.
 AA does differ from the other two agencies in the sense that it explicitly discloses 
financial information to its partners. Partners of ICCO and CA usually do not know how 
much funding is available when project proposals are negotiated. This knowledge-gap 
directly affects the power relation as partners feel it makes “desk officers very powerful” 
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and creates uncertainty whether changes proposed by POs are due to “real financial 
constraints or […] other considerations” (interview partner CA Ghana, 22 April, 2008). 
 Partners’ influence in negotiating the content of their accountability requirements 
are outlined in the aggregation rules. Although these requirements are primarily non-
negotiable, three aspects are not formally captured and therefore remain flexible. First, 
partners enjoy considerable flexibility in writing financial and narrative reports as none 
of the agencies works with fixed reporting formats. Whether POs intervene usually 
depends on the quality of reports and the strictness of the respective PO. Second, some 
partners of ICCO and CA manage to negotiate relaxed reporting requirements as they 
are allowed to deviate from the bi-annual norm. POs of these agencies dedicate this 
divergence to the fact that the partners in question are long-standing, well-trusted and 
high performing. In the case of AA where quarterly reporting is the norm in Ghana and 
bi-annual reporting in India, no partners with reduced reporting requirements were 
encountered. Third, in preparing evaluations, some partners have more influence than 
others. While partners of all three agencies are contractually compelled to conduct 
evaluations, the prevailing norm is that they have considerable autonomy in determining 
their content. In all case countries, however, exceptions to this norm are encountered. 
POs may assume more control over evaluations when they have “reason to believe that 
the partner is not performing well or something is wrong” (interview PO CA India, 5 
August, 2008).
 Given the agencies’ role of defining accountability requirements, monitoring their 
compliance and awarding rewards and sanctions based on performance, the issue of 
accountability is directly related to the payoff rules. Staff of all three agencies use the 
goals, intended results, budgets and time lines as formulated in the project contracts as 
a benchmark to assess project and financial performance. If partners perform as 
planned, they receive funding according to the stipulations in the contracts. Although 
not contractually captured, agency-staff may award excellent performance by renewing 
contracts, increasing budgets, providing more overhead funding, linking the partner up 
with other donors and providing support in financially difficult times. When partners fail 
to meet their contractual obligations and are unable to offer convincing explanations, 
agencies have the legal right to delay transferring funds, reduce budgets or even 
terminate the relationship (AA, 2008b; ICCO, 2008b; CA, 2008a). Although performance-
targets are contractually captured, there are no formal guidelines specifying the 
conditions under which POs are to apply certain rewards or sanctions. Consequently, 
both rewarding and sanctioning by POs are characterised by a degree of subjectivity.
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 As partners of all three agencies’ depend on donor funding for their operations and 
survival, sanctions have a major organisational impact. As sanctions are only used as a 
last resort, the majority of the partners interviewed never experienced their effects in 
practice. However, “rocking the boat a little bit [may] cause the donor to become 
unhappy [and lead] to a delay in disbursements of funds or drive a donor into deciding 
to terminate funding” (interview, partner ICCO Ghana, 4 April, 2008). The fear of sanctions 
thus seems as effective as the actual sanctions themselves, particularly when partners 
are resource dependent.5
 In sum, the rules for scope, position, information, aggregation and payoff appear to 
be most important for enabling and limiting partners’ room to manoeuvre in the field 
of accountability. Again the rules are established by the agencies while differences 
between the rules can be attributed to the diverging nature of their norms, values and 
beliefs. The major dissimilarity between the agencies is that AA has not only made 
downwards accountability to communities one of its key norms, but also translated this 
into contractual obligations for partners. AA-partners thus have more accountability 
requirements to satisfy than their ICCO or CA peers. Overall, and apart from their 
one-sidedness, most accountability rules consist of contractually captured requirements. 
While this limits flexibility, strong and trusted partners may still succeed in negotiating 
exceptions to the rules.
Capacity building
The agencies attach different priorities to capacity building. For ICCO and CA, which 
identify civil society to be at the core of social transformation, the strengthened capacity 
and autonomy of their partners is a formal objective of their work (ICCO, 2007; CA, 2005). 
The idea that “social transformation not only requires organisations that can achieve 
results, but also organisations that are actors in their own right” (interview PO CA Ghana, 
5 May, 2008) reflects the notion of civil society building as the underlying belief of how 
social change occurs. Building their partners’ capacity is thus desirable in the scope rules 
of ICCO and CA.  Nevertheless, these ‘capacity’ scope rules do allow considerable room 
for interpretation as “there is no common standard for capacity building”, which means 
that “you’ll see different country managers putting a different emphasis on organisational 
development” (interview PO CA, 5 May, 2008).
 For AA, not organisations but poor people and civic action are central to its belief 
5 In the study, resource dependence was particularly prevalent under AA-partners. Of the 21 AA-partners 
participating in the study, 10 were fully dependent on AA. In contrast, only one out of the 25 ICCO-partners and 
two out of the 22 CA-partners were financially dependent on these agencies.
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of how change occurs. In its understanding of poverty and (under)development, AA 
seeks to achieve progress by empowering people so that they can secure basic human 
rights (AA, 2005:a). Although AA does fund activities aimed at strengthening its partners’ 
capacity, it considers these to be a means to an end. In contrast to ICCO and CA, AA 
emphasises the importance of keeping their partners’ overhead costs low and ensuring 
that as much money as possible reaches the communities.  
 These different scope rules regarding capacity building have key consequences for 
partners’ room to manoeuvre. Those of ICCO and CA create opportunities for partners 
to request capacity building support, even if it is not directly tied to project-implemen-
tation. This is particularly relevant because such capacity building not only enables 
partners to improve their implementation capacity, but also allows them to invest in 
their overall growth and sustainability. For partners of AA, however, the possibilities for 
receiving capacity building support are more limited.
 The differences between these scope rules regarding capacity building are clearly 
reflected in the position rules. Contracts of ICCO and CA in all three case countries 
explicitly mention capacity building as a formal agency role. This authorises their POs to 
offer and spend considerable time and resources on their partners’ capacity building 
while at the same time authorizing the partners of these agencies to ask for capacity 
building support. In contrast, the more fixed guidelines of AA – which do not have an 
explicit focus on their partners’ capacity building – allow only a limited percentage of 
the project-budget to be spent on capacity building costs. AA’s partners are aware of 
these guidelines and therefore “don’t ask because they don’t have much chance for 
success” (interview PO AA Ghana, 26 March, 2008). 
 In terms of the influence that partners have in determining the content of their own 
capacity building, the aggregation rules are of importance. None of the three agencies 
has formalised aggregation rules. Consequently, the influence of partners varies from 
case to case and depends on several factors including whether their PO is convinced of 
its relevance, whether a partner is trusted and whether it is in a position to negotiate. 
Besides, in the case of AA, capacity building has to fit within the funding guidelines and 
is tied to project-implementation. 
 Agency-staff in the different case countries also take the initiative in suggesting 
capacity building activities to their partners. POs of all three agencies explain that such 
suggestions are voluntary as long as they are convinced partners are doing a good job. In 
these cases, “the final call will be that of the partner” (Interview PO CA India, 12 August, 
2008). Sometimes, however, capacity building activities are forced upon their partners. This 
happens when a PO perceives major shortcomings in its partner’s capacity, while the 
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partner is unwilling to address these issues. Providing a choice to partners between 
undergoing “an organisational development trajectory or [terminating] the relationship” is 
then certainly a possibility (interview PO ICCO, 2 August, 2007). 
 The rights and obligations of partners and agencies regarding capacity building are 
captured in the choice rules which are largely similar between agencies. When capacity 
building is taken up in the project-contract, the agencies are contractually compelled to 
provide support for the activities outlined in the action plan. The contracts, however, do 
not address mutual rights and obligations should partners identify the need for 
(additional) capacity building after the contract has been signed. Whenever this occurs, 
the judgment of the PO and the availability of funding as explained above are decisive.
 In sum, the rules for scope, position, aggregation and choice are key to enabling 
and limiting partners’ room to manoeuvre in the field of capacity building. Differences 
between the agencies’ rules can be traced to the diverging nature of their beliefs, 
norms and values, which creates more opportunities to receive capacity building 
support for partners of ICCO and CA than for those of AA. The application of the rules is 
somewhat flexible on those aspects where the rules remain informal. Whether this is 
beneficial to partners depends on the nature of their respective PO, whether they are in 
a position to negotiate and whether they are trusted.
4.6 Conclusions and outlook
This study examined how the institutional rules of the partnerships of Action Aid (AA), 
ICCO and Christian Aid (CA) affect local partners’ room to manoeuvre. It showed that the 
agencies unilaterally set the rules, based on their own norms and beliefs regarding the 
nature of social change. Partners thus operate within the frameworks established by the 
agencies, which both enable and limit the range of actions partners can undertake. 
While most rules are ultimately fixed in formal regulations, some remain informal. In 
such cases, the rules tend to allow more flexibility. Whether this flexibility is beneficial to 
partners’ room to manoeuvre depends on whether they are in a position to negotiate, 
the nature of their respective project-officer and whether they are trusted.
 The rules of the ICCO and CA provide more room to manoeuvre to partners than 
those of AA. This difference between the rules relates directly to the diverging nature of 
the agencies’ norms, values and beliefs. Regarding project-design and implementation, 
AA views strong staff involvement at the ground-level as a key strength while ICCO and 
CA believe that sustainable and effective outcomes require their partners to have a 
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large degree of autonomy. Consequently, AA works closely with its partners while the 
other two agencies maintain more distant relationships. Concerning accountability, AA 
regards downwards accountability as essential for successful participation and learning 
from successes and mistakes. In contrast, ICCO and CA – consistent with their belief of 
how change occurs – feel they are not in a position to interfere with their partners’ 
downwards accountability. The result is that AA-partners are obliged to satisfy more 
accountability requirements than their peers from ICCO and CA. Finally, AA perceives 
poor people and civic action to be central to social change, while the other two 
agencies view strong and autonomous civil society organisations as central to their 
theory of change. The consequence is that ICCO and CA attach much more importance 
to capacity building than AA, resulting in more room to manoeuvre for ICCO/CA-partners 
in this field.
 For those agencies wishing to institutionally redesign their partnerships, this study 
offers three key insights. First, it shows that the rules are overlapping, intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing, implying that institutional redesign can only succeed if multiple 
rules are addressed simultaneously. The rule typology and its empirical application offer 
starting-points to systematically think over what kind of consequences changes in one 
rule could have for the other rules. Second, the finding that the nature of the rules is 
inseparably related to the nature of norms, values and beliefs of private aid agencies 
implies that institutional redesign should be about realizing alignment between belief 
systems and the formal rules governing behaviour. The concreteness of the rule 
typology offers clear starting-points for agencies to get to grips with their partnerships’ 
institutional design by looking at the (dis)connections between (formal) rules and belief 
systems. Third, the fact that the agencies have the ability to unilaterally set the rules is 
the ultimate manifestation of their power. This implies that those agencies striving for 
equal relations should not only consider making the rules more equal, but also enabling 
their partners to co-decide on the nature of (new) rules. This raises a new dilemma, 
however, as the agencies’ organisational identity is located at the level of beliefs, norms 
and values. Once partners have the authority to co-decide on the rules, then agencies 
risk losing sight of their organisational identity. Furthermore, partner-involvement at the 
level of strategic decision-making brings with it the risk of a conflict of interests. Partners 
can hardly be expected to support policy changes that go against the (financial) 
interests of their own organisation.

5
Trust or control? Private development  
cooperation at the crossroads 1
1  A version of this chapter is under review in World Development.
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Abstract: Private aid agencies are under growing pressure to adopt managerialist 
working methods. This study explores the changing belief systems and practices of 
private aid agencies as well as the strains arising from this pressure. We draw upon a 
literature review and case studies of two private aid agencies and their counterparts in 
Ghana, India and Nicaragua. Our findings show that managerialist ideas and practices 
fundamentally clash with the ‘traditional’ values, assumptions and goals of private aid 
agencies. Those agencies have to make tough choices to silence growing criticism that 
they are ‘losing their heart and identity’.
Keywords: private development cooperation; institutional logics; social transformation; 
managerialism; private aid agencies; partnership;
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5.1 Introduction
In the 1980s, a set of values and visions about development emerged that came to be 
widely shared and adopted by (particularly European and Canadian) private aid agencies 
(Tvedt, 2002 : 369).1 Bottom up approaches, grassroots perspectives, gender equality, 
empowerment and participation were key principles while the root causes of poverty 
were attributed to unequal power relations. Development was primarily seen in terms 
of social and political transformation through empowerment at the individual, 
household and societal level (Mitlin et al., 2007; Pearce, 1993: 226;. Lewis & Kanji, 2009: 
56-60; Korten, 1990). Within this social transformation agenda, private aid agencies saw 
themselves as catalysts for social change in the South and they emphasised 
empowerment strategies for the poor and the need to support organisations linked to 
democratic movements (Biekart, 1999: 72). Values such as trust, equality and respect 
emerged as the defining principles of the relationships between private aid agencies 
and their Southern allies (Fowler, 2000; Lister, 2000; Johnson & Wilson, 2006). There was 
broad political and societal consensus about the necessity of (private) development 
co-operation and the need for international solidarity. Few critical questions were asked.
 In the late 1990s, the assumed support for development cooperation started to 
dissipate and a new approach to development entered the private aid channel that 
revolved around a particular kind of management based on principles that originated 
from the business sector. The public and political attitudes in many Western societies 
towards the performance of governmental and non-profit service providers had 
become increasingly critical (O’Neill, 2002; Power, 1999; Pollit, 1993: 1) and development 
cooperation was no exception. The inability of (private) aid agencies to specify their 
impact only intensified a call for tangible results. Coupled with the already ongoing 
professionalisation of private aid agencies, this contributed to the diffusion of ideas and 
practices originating from the world of business which represented a specific kind of 
management based on ‘scientific’ principles, technical problem solving and the 
application of rational tools for planning and measurement. It was the start of a period 
of so-called development managerialism, i.e. the adoption of the idea that improved 
management is the best way to overcome the limitations of previous approaches to 
development cooperation (Dar & Cooke, 2008; Mowles, 2007: 409; Mowles, 2010: 151; 
1 Private aid agencies are independent development actors that exist apart from governments and businesses, 
originate from Northern countries, operate on a non-profit basis and pursue a mandate of promoting 
development in Southern countries on the basis of a set of humanitarian values. In the literature, they are often 
also referred to as ‘international NGOs’ or ‘Northern NGOs’.
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Dichter, 1999). Effectiveness, efficiency and transparency became key principles within 
the private aid channel, backed up by practices like independent financial auditing, 
strategic planning, logical framework analysis, risk management and quantitative im-
pact-evaluations (Wallace et al., 2006: 164; Roberts et al., 2005; Mawdsley et al., 2002; 
Ebrahim, 2003).
 Through their funding conditions, governmental donor agencies played a key role 
in the diffusion of managerialist principles in the private aid channel. Since the 1980s, 
many OECD countries have adopted the principles of New Public Management (NPM) 
to reform their public sectors. The main idea underlying NPM is that more market 
orientation in the public sector through the adoption of managerialist ideas and 
practices will lead to better performance.  Amongst other things, NPM emphasises cost 
control, the creation of (quasi-)market mechanisms, the outsourcing of governmental 
services, reducing risk and enhancing accountability to consumers via the use of 
quantitative performance indicators (Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gabler, 1992). Over the 
years, governments of countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have 
increasingly embraced the principles and practices of NPM to manage their (funding) 
relations with private aid agencies (Wallace et al., 2006; Mawdsley et al., 2005; Schulpen 
& Ruben, 2009). As many private aid agencies depend on official funding for their 
operations and survival, governmental donor agencies have contributed directly to the 
widespread adoption of managerialism in the private aid channel.
 While the adoption of managerialist principles and practices was intended as a 
means to improve performance and restore public and political support for (private) 
development cooperation, it increasingly attracted criticism for being at odds with the 
social transformation approach. Several critics have argued that the idea of development 
based on participation, equality and ownership is not compatible with rigorous top 
down ‘rational’ planning, monitoring and evaluation (Bornstein, 2003; Wallace et al., 
2006). Others fear that private aid agencies are losing their ability to challenge 
‘mainstream’ models, practices and ideas as they lose their independence due to the 
increasingly demanding criteria and procedures of their back donors (Bebbington et al, 
2008: 4; Edwards, 2008: 47; Mitlin et al., 2007). Overall, there is a growing concern that 
private aid agencies are abandoning their original mission, vision and values (Hailey, 
2000; Dichter, 1999: 54; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). 
 In this study we explore the consequences of the adoption of managerialist 
principles by private aid agencies for their original belief systems and practices. In doing 
so, we want to contribute to the ongoing academic discussion on development 
managerialism, and uphold a critical mirror to private aid agencies wishing to reflect 
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upon their current practices. We do this by (1) investigating the degree to which 
managerialism is ideologically neutral, by looking by looking at its underlying values, 
assumptions and associated practices. (2) We examine the possibility of an irreconcilable 
conflict between managerialist ideas and practices on the one hand, and the goals, 
values and assumptions related to the social transformation approach on the other 
hand. This study addresses the following research questions: How does the adoption of 
managerialist principles in the private development cooperation affect the belief 
systems and practices of private aid agencies; and to what extent is the managerialist 
approach consonant with their traditional values, assumptions and goals? 
 Our analysis is based upon a literature review and case studies of two private aid 
agencies and their partners in Ghana, India and Nicaragua.  We start by expounding our 
theoretical framework, which focuses on the concept of ‘institutional logic’. Then, we 
address our research questions in three steps: 
1. We typify, by means of so-called ideal types, the main characteristics of two ‘opposite’ 
styles, i.e. ‘old style’ participatory and bottom up social transformation and ‘new 
style’ tangible effects and control oriented managerialist development cooperation. 
2. We apply these ideal types to the current belief systems and practices of Christian Aid 
(CA) and Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO). 
3. We explore the compatibility of the beliefs and practices of the two development 
approaches. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings and their implications for 
private aid agencies’ (added) value, future relevance and identity.
5.2 Institutional logics and institutional change
A major problem associated with much of the development NGO-literature is its implicit 
normative bias and a lack of conceptual clarity (Lewis, 2006: 370; Tvedt, 2006).2 Thus, we 
start our analysis by making our own analytical framework explicit. In this study we draw 
upon the concept of ‘institutional logic’. This concept, derived from organisational insti-
tutionalism, departs from the premise that organisations are embedded in collectively 
shared rules and belief systems – the institutional context - that provide stability and 
meaning (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). It is this context 
that, often unconsciously, has a major influence on organisational behaviour. The 
2 We agree with Mitlin et al. (2007: 1715) that a normative perspective in itself does not necessarily undermine 
the quality of analyses as long as one makes its normative position explicit.
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concept of institutional logic has proven successful for understanding how the 
introduction of a ‘managerial’ logic has transformed such fields as healthcare (Kitchener, 
2002; Scott et al., 2000; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009), university education (Townley, 1997) 
and federal and state administration (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). In our study, we 
examine how the main ideas and practices in the private aid channel are changing due 
to the widespread adoption of a managerial logic.
 Institutional logics are organizing principles that guide the behaviour of 
organisations grouped around a set of issues central to their interests and objectives 
(Hoffman, 1999: 352). Such a group of organisations, in the aggregate referred to as an 
organisational field, share a common meaning system and interact more frequently 
with one another than with actors outside the field (Scott, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 
1991). Institutional logics create a sense of common purpose and unity within an 
organisational field and consist of (1) belief systems and (2) associated practices. Belief 
systems define what goals or values are to be pursued within an organisational field and 
what the underlying assumptions are. Associated practices are the actual decisions that 
organisations make and the actions they undertake to pursue their goals and values 
(Treay & Hinings, 2005: 354; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804). In this study, we analyse the 
belief systems and associated practices of the private aid channel, which is an 
organisational field consisting of development NGOs in the North and South and their 
back donors (Tvedt, 1998, 2002, 2006).3 We limit our analysis to those aspects associated 
with the relation between private aid agencies and their Southern counterparts as this 
has been identified as key to the distinctiveness, credibility and quality of private 
development cooperation (Fowler, 1998; Ashman, 2001; Edwards & Fowler, 2002). 
 Organisational actors draw upon institutional logics for guidance, meaning and 
legitimacy. They offer the implicit rules which provide organisations with collective 
identities, motives and vocabularies, instil values, determine which problems get 
attended to, which solutions get considered, what outcomes are to be achieved, what 
practices are considered appropriate in particular circumstances and what suitable 
types of relationships are between organisations (Townley, 1997: 263; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008: 111-114; Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). Both as a medium and an outcome of the 
behaviour they regulate (Giddens, 1984), institutional logics mature and solidify over 
time into specified roles, behaviours and interaction-patterns between organisations. 
3 The actors in the private aid channel are structurally integrated due to resource transfers, a common meaning 
system and shared practices. Ideas and practices are diffused through several mechanisms including a 
continuous exchange of personnel between the channel’s main actors, the widespread use of consultants, 
funding conditions and international conferences (Tvedt, 1998).
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These are often reinforced by regulatory processes involving governmental agencies 
and professional bodies, which normatively and/or coercively press conformity upon 
organisations that are part of a specific field (Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). The practices 
of development NGOs, for example, are profoundly shaped (and standardised) by the 
(funding) requirements of ‘official’ donors (Wallace, 1997; Wallace et al., 2006; Tvedt, 
2006).
 Institutional logics are not static, however, but evolve over time in response to 
specific circumstances or more general societal changes in political and economic 
values and beliefs (Treay & Hinings, 2005: 354). Most institutional theorists perceive 
institutional change as a transition from one dominant logic to another (Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Hoffman, 1999). The introduction of a new dominant logic can create enormous 
ambiguity in a given organisational field as actors struggle to reconcile conflicting belief 
systems and practices. Conflicting logics co-exist during transition times until one side 
or the other wins and the field reforms around the winning dominant logic, or a new 
logic emerges that is a hybrid version of the two previous logics (Treay & Hinings, 2009: 
631). From this perspective, our study analyses the shift in the private aid channel from 
the social transformation logic to the managerial logic, and questions whether and to 
what extent the two logics are compatible with the each other.
5.3  Social transformation and managerial: comparing 
institutional logics  
In order to identify the main institutional differences between the social transformation 
and managerial logics, we construct ideal types based on a review of the literature. It is 
important to recognise that ideal types are analytical constructs meaning they do not 
exist in pure form in reality. The method of ideal types was first developed by classic 
social theorists, notably Weber (1978), and is nowadays widely used in institutional 
theory in order to understand and compare the values and practices of organisations 
(Thorton & Ocasio, 2008: 110). Table 5.1 below summarises and contrasts the key charac-
teristics of the two logics, focusing particularly on the relationship between private aid 
agencies and their Southern counterparts. 
Social transformation logic
The social transformation logic sees development (cooperation) as a political process, 
aimed at changing unequal power relations. Poverty is not inevitable or ‘natural’, but a 
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result of human-made social, economic and political structures favouring certain groups 
of people at the expense of others. As poverty results from power structures that 
discriminate against, exclude or exploit certain groups of people, development is viewed 
as a process in which these structures are transformed, and marginalised people are 
empowered (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Emphasizing power, whether in social, economic or 
political life, implies an inherently political perspective on development (cooperation) 
(MacDonald, 1994: 283; Wallace et al., 2006: 43). While development cooperation can 
facilitate social transformation, the latter is explicitly thought to be an indigenous process. 
More specifically, it is believed that empowerment of marginalised groups can only be 
ensured when it is locally owned and driven (Pearce, 1993: 226; Wallace et al., 2006: 31).
 In the social transformation logic, a multiform and autonomous civil society is 
considered essential for development. Civil society is viewed as a realm where grassroots 
movements, social organisations and change-oriented NGOs can speak up for the 
interests of people who are either ignored or are done an injustice by the state or 
market (Bebbington et al, 2008: 3; Howell & Pearce 2002: 36). Given the large number of 
social groups in society that each have different interests, problems and values, the 
social transformation logic attaches much importance to the diversity of actors in civil 
society. As development is perceived as a political act against vested interests, civil 
society usually does not operate in close harmony with the state and the market as 
these are seen to represent these interests (Mitlin, et al., 2007: 1702). Similarly, the social 
transformation logic is generally sceptical about the willingness and ability of 
governmental development aid to leverage deep changes in systems and structures 
that perpetuate poverty and the abuse of human rights (Fisher, 1997: 445; Mitlin et al, 
2007: 1704). Autonomy from the state and donors is thus perceived as a pre-condition 
for civil society’s contribution to social transformation because it enables people to 
participate in change processes in ways not possible under the ‘official’ programmes 
(Howell & Pearce 2002: 37). 
 The consolidation of equal relationships between private aid agencies and their 
Southern counterparts is seen as both a means and an end in itself. Such relations are 
essential for achieving locally owned and initiated change (Clinton, 1991: 62; Brehm, 
2004). Starting from the idea that local organisations have the best understanding of 
their own reality, the actions and processes of structural change have to be indigenous 
to be effective and sustainable. North-South relations - referred to as partnerships - are 
also explicitly viewed as an expression of values such as trust, equality, mutuality and 
mutual respect (Fowler, 2000: 4; Lister, 2000; Elbers & Schulpen, 2011). These values 
reflect an ideological aspiration of international solidarity, a shared desire to challenge 
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injustice in the developing world and a need to overcome paternalism (Fowler, 1998; 
Murphy, 2000: 343-346). This value-base is the key to ensuring the autonomy of local 
partners. In particular, the emphasis on trust as the starting-point of relations implies 
that local organisations have the freedom to determine their own strategic direction 
(Mawdsley et al., 2002).
Table 5.1   Comparison of institutional logics
Social transformation Managerial
Beliefs Development ·	 development is a political 
process to change unequal 
power relations 
·	 development requires local 
ownership by marginalised 
groups
·	 development is a process to  
be planned and controlled 
aimed at realizing tangible and 
assessable results
·	 development requires the ‘right’ 
set of management tools 
Civil society ·	 civil society needs to be 
autonomous to contribute to 
development 
·	 civil society’s value is  
expressed in terms of its 
intrinsic worth and its diversity
·	 civil society is complementary 
to the state and  donors in 
achieving development 
·	 civil society’s value is expressed 
in terms of value for money 
Relationships ·	 relations with local 
organisations are both a means 
and an end
·	 value-based relations ensure 
local organisational autonomy
·	 relations with local  
organisations are a means to  
an end
·	 formalised relations prevent 
the misuse of funds and ensure 
compliance with agreed upon 
results 
Practices Roles ·	 private aid agencies provide 
financial,  institutional and 
moral support 
·	 local organisations take the  
lead in development work
·	 private aid agencies ensure  
value for money
·	 local organisations implement 
contractually specified activities 
and comply with accountability 
requirements
Selection ·	 local organisations have to be 
locally rooted to qualify for a 
relationship
·	 local organisations have to 
be professional to qualify for 
funding
Governance ·	 private aid agencies refrain  
from interfering in  
development interventions  
and internal affairs
·	 private aid agencies establish 
the nature of development 
interventions and accountability 
requirements 
Source: own analysis based on a literature review
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 In terms of the actual practices, the social transformation logic discerns specific 
roles for private aid agencies and their Southern counterparts. Given the emphasis on 
local ownership and organisational autonomy, local organisations play the lead role in 
designing activities and doing the actual work ‘on the ground’ which means that aid 
agencies should refrain from direct involvement in implementation. Their contribution 
is primarily defined in terms of facilitation (Lewis, 1998). As engaged outsiders, they are 
to provide financial, institutional and moral support enabling their partner organisations 
to take control of their own destiny and development, based on local priorities (Eade, 
2007). What is required, then, is long-term support by means of flexible funding 
arrangements, non-imposed capacity building and (financial) solidarity in times of 
difficulty (Brehm, 2004: 24; Hoksbergen, 2005: 18).
 Private aid agencies are supposed to work with indigenous local organisations as 
they, in the eyes of their communities, governments and other stakeholders, enjoy 
greater legitimacy than those set up by overseas donors (Hoksbergen, 2005: 22-23). To 
ensure local partners’ autonomy, aid agencies have to minimise the power distortion 
arising from the transfer of resources (Brehm, 2004; Fowler, 1998). They are thus to refrain 
from interference in their partners’ internal affairs and operations (Harrison, 2007; 
Clinton, 1991: 63-64). Overall, local partners are to have a considerable degree of 
discretion over the use of funds while accountability requirements are mutual and 
meaningful to both parties (Hudock, 1999). 
Managerial logic
The managerialist logic perceives development as a process than can be planned and 
controlled, that revolves around realizing demonstrable and quantifiable outcomes and 
is based on an identification of constraints that need removing, or gaps that need filling, 
between existing conditions and what is perceived as desirable (Mowles, 2008: 806). 
Improving effectiveness and efficiency are key objectives to be reached through 
applying sophisticated tools in such fields as financial management, risk assessment, 
planning, monitoring and evaluation (Roberts et al., 2005: 1853). These tools are thought 
to be ‘infinitely reprogrammable’, to suit all contexts, irrespective of setting and 
circumstances (Hood, 1991). Using such tools, then, is a rational and neutral exercise 
based on scientific principles (Mowles, 2010: 152), aimed at predictability, reflecting a 
linear perspective on development (Wallace et al., 2006: 36). Measuring results is 
considered to contribute to better tracking of implementation, enhanced accountability, 
and early identification of both the problems and the successes of projects (Bornstein, 
2006). 
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 Civil society also fulfils a crucial function in this logic, although a different and less 
pivotal one than in social transformation logic. By complementing, and as such also 
endorsing, the development efforts of the state and donors, civil society can make 
important contributions to development. The underlying idea is that state, market and 
civil society each have to fulfil their own specific but complementary role in development 
(Howell & Pearce, 2000: 76). They are seen as working towards a common global cause 
in a way that emphasises results and favours consensus and cooperation above 
difference and deliberation (Mowles, 2010: 156; White, 1999: 308). The situation of less 
privileged groups is improved through gradual readjustments of existing policies 
(Hashemi, 1995: 109). Civil society is not perceived to have an intrinsic worth. Instead its 
value is seen to lie its in its effects or results, or put differently, the value (for money) it 
offers to its ‘users’ (Thomas, 2008: 101). This implies a ‘contract-culture’ in which civil 
society organisations are mainly viewed instrumentally as flexible agents of service 
delivery, although there is also recognition for their advocacy roles in making national 
policies more responsive to citizens in developing countries (Lewis & Kanji, 2009: 43). 
 Relationships with local organisations are seen as fee-for-service exchanges that 
serve to achieve tangible development outcomes. They enable private aid agencies to 
access crucial resources such as technical expertise, on-the-ground contacts and a 
thorough understanding of the social-political and cultural context. As organisations 
are viewed as rational entities seeking to maximise their self-interest (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2004: 106), relations with local organisations represent a risk as these may undertake 
strategic behaviour out of narrow self-interest or incomplete information. Clear 
contracts and strict accountability are then necessary to prevent abuse and to realise 
effective and efficient use of funds (O’Neill, 2002). Contracts clarify and formalise 
agreements, provide clear prescriptions of conduct and outline sanctions and incentives 
to ensure desired behaviour. Detailed accountability requirements are regarded as 
crucial to achieving transparency and making results tangible (Roberts et al., 2005: 1851; 
Power, 1999: 124).
 The goals, values and underlying assumptions of the managerial logic are clearly 
reflected in its actual practices. Local organisations are viewed as implementers of 
contractually specified activities. They are hired for a definite time period to implement 
a specific, well-defined activity and realise pre-defined and measurable outcomes. In 
principle there is no expectation by either party that the relationship will extend beyond 
the term of the contract (Leach, 1995). Private aid agencies’ main role is to purchase 
services from local organisations, ensure value for money and monitor performance. As 
the notion of efficiency implies that as much money as possible should be spent on 
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reaching project-beneficiaries (Lewis & Kanji, 2009: 178), there is no specific expectation 
of institutional strengthening. Nevertheless, exceptions may be possible when such 
support clearly enhances the ability of local counterparts to ‘deliver’ the targets (Mowles 
et al., 2008: 806).
 To qualify for funding, local organisations need to be professional in the sense of 
being capable to operate according to managerialist principles (Mawdsley et al., 2005: 
78). The managerial logic implies a very specific form of professionalism, in which 
organisations have to be legally recognised, keep standardised accounts and comply 
with national (tax) laws. Moreover, they need to have a formal mission and vision, work 
with strategic plans and logical frameworks, undergo periodical independent financial 
audits and organise their activities to be measurable (Roberts et al., 2005: 1851-52). 
Selection of local organisations takes place through competitive tendering in which 
applications are objectively ranked by score (Wallace et al., 2006: 62-65). The activities 
that qualify for funding, reporting requirements and methodologies used for outcome 
measurement are specified in detail in advance (Leach, 1995). Overall, private aid 
agencies are largely in control of how their funds are spent and how local organisations 
have to account for their actions.
5.4  Institutional logics in practice: the cases of Christian 
Aid and ICCO 
This section empirically examines the degree to which private aid agencies have shifted 
from the social transformation to the managerial logic based on the key characteristics 
outlined in table 5.1. Our analysis is based on two cases: Christian Aid (CA) and Interchurch 
Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO).4 These organisations have been 
selected for a specific reason. Since the early 1980s, both private aid agencies are well 
4 Data for this study was collected over a period of eight months in 2008. To improve external validity, fieldwork 
was conducted in Ghana, India and Nicaragua whose civil society sectors are known to differ considerably in 
terms of strength (Heinrich, 2007). In total 64 respondents were interviewed consisting of 25 ICCO-partners, 22 
CA partners, nine staff of ICCO and eight of CA. The partner representatives interviewed were those responsible 
for managing the relations with donor agencies, usually the managing director or equivalent. Interviewed 
agency-staff consisted primarily of those managing the relations with the interviewed partners. To ensure a 
diversified sample, partners were selected on the basis of their thematic focus, size in terms of budget and staff, 
geographical location and the length of the relationship. Meetings typically lasted between one and two hours 
and were all conducted face-to-face. The analysis of the agencies’ belief systems was based on interviews with 
agency-staff and a review of policy papers that applied at the time of the fieldwork. Associated practices were 
analysed on the basis of interviews with agency-staff and partner-representatives as well project-contracts.
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known in their countries of origin (UK and Netherlands) for being what  Donini et al. 
(2008) refer to as ‘solidarists’: private aid agencies that place a strong emphasis on 
addressing the root causes of poverty and social transformation. Their longstanding 
and strong solidarist tradition improves the likelihood of them sticking to their ‘original’ 
principles. Christian Aid and ICCO thus represent excellent cases for shedding light on 
the degree to which the managerial logic has penetrated the private aid channel.
Belief systems
A review of the agencies’ policy papers at the level of belief systems unmistakably 
reveals the language and thinking of the social transformation logic while (elements of) 
the managerialist logic appeared to be absent.5 In explaining their mission and vision, 
both agencies observe that the world is characterised by enormous wealth existing 
alongside extreme poverty. CA’s conclusion is that “poverty is a condition created by an 
unjust society, denying people access to, and control over, the resources they need to 
live a full life” (CA, 2006: 4). Similarly, ICCO emphasises that “poverty is not a natural 
phenomenon, but the result of human intervention. Working towards solutions means 
a change in economic, social and political power structures” (ICCO, 2007: 17). In 
emphasising the political nature of poverty, both agencies view development as a 
struggle “to challenge and change the systems which favour the rich and powerful over 
the poor and marginalised” (CA, 2008a: 1) towards “the empowerment of poor and 
excluded people” (ICCO, 2003: 8). Because development is perceived as an indigenous 
process, any “outside contributions to establish the pre-conditions that allow poor 
people to determine their own development must be rooted in the local social fabric” 
(CA, 2004a: 3).
 In line with the social transformation logic, ICCO and CA also identify a vibrant and 
autonomous civil society to be at the core of social transformation. Civil society 
organisations are first of all perceived as understanding and representing the local 
needs and interests of poor and marginalised people, while being dedicated to those 
people for the long term. Moreover, the agencies explicitly share the idea that civil 
society organisations have a major role to play in addressing the structures and systems 
that keep people poor (CA, 2004b: 1; ICCO, 2007: 16). To fulfil this role, these Southern 
organisations “cannot and should not be seen or treated as channels for aid-delivery but 
as autonomous organisations” (ICCO, 2003: 5). Both agencies make it very clear that 
5 Interviews with agency-staff not only confirmed this finding, but respondents explicitly referred to their 
organisations’ principles to explain what made them unique compared to corporate foundations or 
governmental aid agencies.
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development cooperation is principally about supporting the development of vibrant 
and multiform civil societies consisting of organisations that are actors within their own 
right (ICCO, 2003: 5; CA, 2004b: 1).
 Finally, there is no doubt that the agencies’ views on their relationships with local 
counterparts fit the social transformation logic. With partnerships being viewed as 
central to their development approach (ICCO, 2003: 5; CA 2004: 3), these counterparts 
are seen as having “the benefit of local know-how and a local presence; they understand 
the culture and norms of the people they are working with as well as the socio-political 
context” (ICCO, 2003: 5). Underlying the partnership approach is “the firm belief that 
working with local partners, rather than directly through our own staff, is more likely to 
ensure lasting, locally owned, development and the eradication of poverty and 
injustice”. As such, “this approach refuses to do things for people or over their heads, but 
works with them, and at best enables them to do the work for themselves” (CA 2004: 1).
ICCO and CA identify key values such as solidarity, equality, mutual respect, mutuality, 
trust and shared ideals as the foundation of their relationships with Southern partners 
(ICCO, 2003: 5; CA, 2004a: 5). They also realise that high quality relations do not come 
naturally in relations characterised by the transfer of funds. Consequently, they 
emphasise the necessity for taking steps to reduce the prevailing asymmetries in power 
(CA, 2004a: 3; ICCO, 2003: 6). Therefore, they set out to be flexible in terms of the 
operational space they give to partners while allowing them to determine and control 
their own direction and development (CA, 2004a: 5; ICCO, 2003: 8).
 
Practices
At first sight, the practices of ICCO and CA also seem to match the social transformation 
logic. Partners take the lead in project-design and implementation while both agencies 
provide the pre-conditions that allow their partners to do their work. Project-Officers 
(POs) of ICCO and CA may give “feedback, share ideas or help out when there are 
problems but in the end [the partner has] to make it happen” (interview PO CA Ghana, 
5 May, 2008). Capacity building is an explicit part of the responsibilities of ICCO and CA 
that authorises POs to offer and spend considerable time and resources on their 
partners’ capacity building. Other forms of support include the funding of core costs, 
long-term funding commitments and maintaining support when other funders 
withdraw. 
 At the same time, the managerial logic is also clearly present in the division of roles 
in the partnerships of ICCO and CA. POs explained that expectations towards partners 
in terms of demonstrating results and accountability have increased over the years 
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while the management information systems of both agencies have become more 
sophisticated and demanding. There has been a shift from input-based towards 
outcome-based reporting and there is increasing emphasis on ’correct’ financial 
reporting and handling of funds. This shift illustrates that matters of organisational 
survival have become more manifest in the agencies’ behaviour. As a PO of ICCO 
explains, “we really need the reports and audits, because we are audited ourselves. If we 
don’t receive them on time, we get problems with our own auditor” (interview, 1 July, 
2008). Consequently, agency-tasks increasingly revolve around assessing risk, monitoring 
performance and ensuring that reports sufficiently address agreed upon results. 
Similarly, satisfying (increasingly demanding) accountability requirements has become 
a more explicit role for partners. 
 Looking at criteria for selecting partners, table 5.2 below shows both logics to be 
present, although the managerial logic manifests itself more prominently. The social 
transformation logic is reflected in the agencies’ preference for organisations that are 
locally rooted and compatible in terms of identity.6 Their main criteria to select a 
‘suitable’ partner, however, are programmatic focus and organisational capacity. The 
nature of the organisational capacity of the intended partner is extensively assessed by 
means of several procedural criteria that are clearly managerialist in nature: track record, 
financial position and management, planning, monitoring and evaluation systems and 
organisational structure and governance. 
 For ICCO and CA the use of programmatic criteria – a manifestation of the managerialist 
emphasis on targeting - is still a relatively new practice. Until the early 2000s, neither of the 
two agencies had an explicit programmatic focus. It was only after ICCO and CA adopted 
strategic planning that they started to formulate explicit policy goals and restricted their 
programmatic focus to certain key-areas. The criteria used for assessing organisational 
capacity show how the agencies have adopted prevailing ‘professional’ standards in such 
fields as finances (standard account keeping, independent financial auditing), planning 
(use of logical framework, strategic plans) and governance (formalised operating principles 
and procedures). POs explained that their criteria for assessing capacity have become 
more explicit, systematic and refined in recent years.7 Moreover, they pointed out that this 
development should be seen in the context of the growing emphasis on tangible results 
6 Interviews suggested that for Christian Aid the Christian identity of organisations was more important than for 
ICCO.
7 At the time of fieldwork in late 2008, ICCO was about to introduce a new partner-selection tool which, according 
to POs, would further formalise the selection of partners by means of an elaborate and ‘objective’ rating system 
of strengths and weaknesses.
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and accountability, with the agencies themselves being judged on their ‘business plan’ 
and passing on requirements to their partners (interview PO ICCO, 7 January, 2008; 
interview PO CA, 10 September, 2008). 
 In the area of governance, the social transformation logic is clearly reflected in the 
agencies’ practices. Regarding project-design and implementation, partners can pursue 
their own preferences when designing and implementing projects provided that they 
meet the agencies’ programmatic requirements. When it comes to capacity building, 
partners of ICCO and CA repeatedly emphasised the flexibility of both agencies. In 
principle, activities related to organisational strengthening  follow the partners’ own 
agenda and partners are stimulated to ask for institutional support. While partners are 
contractually obliged to submit periodical narrative and financial reports, they do not 
Table 5.2   Main partner selection criteria of ICCO and CA
Criteria Indicators
Local rootedness ·	 Membership networks
·	 Grassroots linkages
·	 Participation beneficiaries
·	 Downwards accountability
Identity ·	 Shared (Christian) value-base
·	 Compatible mission & vision
Programmatic focus ·	 Theme
·	 Strategy
·	 Target group
·	 Geographical focus
Track record ·	 Past achievements
·	 Past relations with stakeholders
·	 Publications
Financial position and 
management
·	 Income, liquidity and solvency
·	 Accounting system  
·	 Independent audits
Planning, monitoring and 
evaluation system
·	 Strategic planning 
·	 Use M&E indicators
·	 Learning
Organisational structure and 
governance 
·	 Compliance with national laws
·	 Formal mission & vision
·	 Board presence & composition
Source: policy documents and interviews with POs
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have to work with pre-defined formats.8 Instead – and this was confirmed by partners 
– the starting-point of both agencies is that reporting-procedures and formats, 
wherever feasible, are adapted to the partners’ own internal planning, monitoring and 
evaluation-systems. 
 At the same time, elements of the managerial logic are clearly visible in the agencies’ 
governance practices. Project-contracts have become legally valid in recent years while 
containing explicit results-agreements at the outcome-level. This offers the agencies 
better possibilities to mitigate risks in the case of serious mismanagement of funds or 
fraud, and limits their liability if funds are not used for intended purposes. The managerial 
logic is also visible in the project-plans that partners have to submit. These plans have 
become more detailed and contain clear targets and milestones to be achieved during 
different phases of the project-cycle. To some extent, this has limited the autonomy of 
partners during implementation as they have become more dependent on the willingness 
and flexibility of POs to allow deviations from the original project-plan. This has increased 
the role of POs and with it, paradoxically enough, also the danger of arbitrariness. “While 
we mostly have most good experiences in this respect, we have also had a desk-officer 
that was not so forthcoming” (interview partner CA, 24 September, 2008).
5.5 The feasibility of hybridisation
Our analysis of ICCO and CA shows that the agencies’ belief systems still primarily follow 
the social transformation logic, while their associated practices have become hybrids, 
combining elements of both the social transformation logic and managerial logics, with 
a growing accent on the latter. As both logics hold different goals, values and 
assumptions, this raises the question whether a full merger of the two logics in practice 
is a sustainable option for private aid agencies in the long run. Below we identify six 
fundamental differences between the two logics which together raise serious doubts 
about the feasibility of merging the two logics, both in theory and practice.9 
 First, the managerial emphasis on technical problem solving and management 
solutions conflicts with the view that development (cooperation) is inherently political. 
8  POs emphasised that this flexibility is also something that partners have to ‘earn’. It is only granted to those 
partners that have gained POs’ trust and whose (past) reporting has been satisfactory.
9  As our analysis takes place at the level of logics, the contradictions we find are in the first instance analytical. 
However, the more profoundly private aid agencies embrace the managerial logic while continuing to stick to 
the goals, values and assumptions of the social transformation agenda, the more these analytical contradictions 
are likely to become actual contradictions.
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The latter implies that development by definition entails talking about and working 
through questions related to politics and justice. From the perspective of the social 
transformation logic, however, the managerial logic takes existing patterns of political 
and economic development as a given and separates them from questions of politics, 
power and distribution (Bebbington, 2005: 940; Hickey & Bracking, 2005: 855; Edwards, 
2010). In other words, “potentially explosive political questions about rights, entitlements, 
how one should live and who should decide, [are transformed] into technical questions 
of efficiency and sustainability” (Mosse, 2005: 12), resulting in the ‘depoliticisation’ of 
development (Ferguson, 1994). In a similar sense, the managerial logic also takes the 
ideology on which the official aid system is based as a given and views donors as neutral 
actors engaged in a joint effort to combat poverty. Proponents of the social 
transformation logic would argue that this view falsely presents donors as though they 
have no interests of their own, no ideological preferences, no intrinsic values and goals 
(Howell & Pearce, 2001: 83; White, 1999; Bebbington, 2008).
 Second, the emphasis on predictability, control and measurement clashes with the 
nature of ‘political’ interventions. Rational planning tools start from the idea that a 
desired end-state can be planned in logical, rational and causal steps. Consequently, 
actors are presented as being able to control and direct change by pulling the right 
‘levers’ (Mowles et al., 2008: 806; Mowles, 2010: 153). This kind of planning and the 
thinking underlying it, however, is limited in its ability to handle interventions that are 
unpredictable, process-oriented and difficult to measure. These characteristics, however, 
are precisely those of interventions seeking to realise changes in prevailing relationships 
of power and inequality (Bornstein, 2006: 53; Wallace et al., 2006). As a result, ‘politicised’ 
interventions are discouraged in the managerial logic as they represent huge risks and 
offer little demonstrable value for money. Consequently, the requirements of rational 
planning tools run the risk of confining the scope of interventions to precisely those 
that – according to the social transformation logic – do not address the root causes of 
poverty (Bebbington, 2005; Pickard, 2007; Biggs & Neame, 1995: 37).
 Third, the view that civil society should serve and validate the goals of the state and 
official aid clashes with the idea that autonomy is central to its significance. The social 
transformation logic generally has a critical attitude towards the development 
(cooperation) agendas of official donors. While more moderate proponents would 
argue that they do not do enough to address the root causes of poverty, those with a 
more radical view would point out that official donors are primarily interested in 
maintaining the status quo and serving the interests of ‘selected’ players (Mosse, 2005: 
7-12; Murphy, 2000: 331-338). The social transformation logic rejects the idea of 
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development (cooperation) as a joint-plan in which NGOs, donors and states work 
together to achieve human progress (White, 1999: 308; Howell & Pearce, 2001: 17). 
Instead, civil society’s relevance is perceived to lie in its ability to think independently 
about development and attend to the interests of people not served by governmental 
policies. Having to work within the policy frameworks of the state and official donors is 
therefore seen as blunting civil society’s critical edge and eroding its ability to offer 
alternative perspectives and practices to development (Mitlin et al., 2007: 1709; Smillie, 
1995: 179; Fowler, 2005: 1; Wallace, 2004: 216).
 Fourth, the viewpoint that relations with local partner organisations are fee-for-
service exchanges clashes with the idea that these relations also have an intrinsic value. 
To proponents of the social transformation logic, the intrinsic value of their relations 
with partners matters. It reflects the idea that development cooperation is neither 
about fighting somebody else’s battle nor about pity or charity (Manji & O’Coill, 2002). 
Contrary to the managerial logic which assumes a low-trust environment and views 
people as primarily driven by a desire to maximise personal advantage, it is rooted in the 
idea that people in different parts of the world are driven by solidarity and the ethics of 
a common cause to take a stand against injustice. As such, the importance attached to 
partnership reflects the underlying idea that private aid agencies are part of a global 
movement of citizens seeking to strengthen the capacity of marginalised people in 
their fight against injustice (Murphy, 2000: 344-345). 
 Fifth, the emphasis on control conflicts with the idea that local ownership, based on 
trust and equality, is the pivot of development and development cooperation. Under 
the managerial logic there is less space for local priorities and preferences. As agency-
objectives form the starting-point of interventions, the nature of programmes and 
services are essentially established top-down (Leach, 1995). For proponents of the social 
transformation logic, this approach fundamentally contradicts the idea that 
development is an indigenous process. Moreover, it is inconsistent with a perspective of 
development cooperation that seeks to enable people living in poverty to find their 
own solutions to the problems they face (Howell & Pearce 2001: 37). Furthermore, the 
emphasis on control reinforces the already existing power asymmetries in North-South 
NGO relationships (Bornstein, 2003). 
 Sixth, the importance attached to professionalisation, defined in terms of being 
able to work according to managerialist principles, clashes with the view that challenging 
prevailing power structures requires a multiform civil society with strong local roots. 
Specific knowledge and expertise is required to prepare and write reports and proposals, 
manage large sums of money, provide detailed records of expenses, carry out or 
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organise monitoring and evaluations and stay tuned to international aid flows and 
trends. This requires organisations to take on ‘professionals’ who typically come from 
privileged backgrounds and have enjoyed high levels of formal education (Markowitz & 
Tice 2002: 950; Roberts et al., 2005: 1850). The incorporation of professionals means that 
dynamics related to careers, jobs and status come into play (Dichter, 1999: 49). 
Consequently, tensions between institutional imperatives – what an organisation has to 
do to survive – and developmental imperatives – what it thinks it has to do to fulfil its 
mission statement – tend to become more profound when organisations  professionalise 
(Biekart, 1999: 77; Dichter, 1999: 51-52). As such, professionalisation is associated with 
groups becoming ‘tamed’ as they are channelled toward more moderate and cautious 
goals, ideas and tactics and their radical energies dissipate (Lewis, 2006: 83; Kaldor, 2003; 
Feldman, 2003; Eade, 2007; Jad, 2007; Pearce, 1993).
 Professionalisation also increases the risk that links between local organisations and 
the grassroots level become weaker. On the one hand, funding is becoming increasingly 
restrictive with organisational capacity lying at the core of the division between those 
who can satisfy requirements and those who can not (Bornstein, 2006: 56). Precisely 
those organisations that tend to have strong grassroots connections, such as smaller 
NGO’s, grassroots organisations and social movements, lack the capacity to qualify for 
funding (Gideon, 1998: 317). Furthermore, professionalisation is often associated with 
local organisations losing their responsiveness to, and linkages with, local communities 
(Markowitz & Tice 2002: 944; Edwards, 2004: 35; Hailey, 2000: 403-404). As organisations 
become increasingly distanced from the grassroots, their ability to articulate and 
address grassroots needs and their credibility in terms of being representatives of the 
marginalised are undermined (Hudson, 2000: 91).
 Finally, the widespread adoption of ‘professional’ standards conflicts with the value 
attached to the multiformity of civil society. From the perspective of the social 
transformation logic, the diversity of civil society is crucial because of the wide variety 
of interests to be represented, different goals and values to be pursued and different 
roles to be performed (Edwards, 2004: 32). Characteristic for the managerial logic is the 
emphasis on standardisation as a means to enhance performance. Consequently, 
organisations increasingly adopt similar organisational forms and assume similar ideas 
and practices (Lewis & Kanji, 2009: 160; Tvedt, 2002: 373). In this sense, the managerial 
logic promotes a move away from the notion of ‘letting a thousand flowers bloom’ 
towards one of homogenisation (Wallace, 1997; Wallace et al., 2006: 42). Moreover, it 
reduces civil society to a set of professional NGOs mirroring the very characteristics of 
those organisations that fund them (Edwards, 2004: 35). 
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5.6 Conclusion
This study examined (1) how the belief systems and practices of private aid agencies are 
changing due to the diffusion of managerialist ideas and methods and (2) whether the 
managerialist approach is compatible with the goals, values and assumptions related to 
social transformation. To answer these questions, we reconstructed ideal-types of the 
‘old’ social transformation logic and the ‘new’ managerial logic. Our analysis showed 
that the introduction of the managerial logic contains a set of goals, values and 
assumptions that represents a fundamentally different perspective about (the way to 
achieve) development, the role and value of civil society, relations with local counterpart 
organisations, the governance of such relations and the required characteristics of local 
counterparts. Our analysis of Christian Aid and ICCO demonstrated that these agencies 
have so far remained ‘loyal’ to their original belief systems, although political and 
societal pressures have forced them to adopt a range of managerial practices. Because 
the agencies thus far have only embraced a ‘light’ version of the managerial logic, they 
are not yet forced to fundamentally revaluate the alignment between their belief 
systems and their actual practices. 
 With continuing societal and political pressure to deliver ‘tangible’ results, the need 
for such a revaluation at some point seems inevitable. Our study made clear that the 
managerial logic is fundamentally at odds with the goals, values and underlying 
assumptions of the social transformation logic on at least six key areas. These findings 
cast serious doubt on one of the key premises underlying the managerial logic, namely 
the assumption that it offers a universally applicable approach to enhance performance 
in the field of development, irrespective of the underlying assumptions, beliefs or 
convictions of the persons, groups or organisations involved. This makes it highly 
questionable whether the two logics can truly be merged or whether they can even 
co-exist in some hybrid way. This is problematic because the pressures for accountability 
and tangible results are more likely to increase than to decrease in the near future. 
Private aid agencies run the risk of organisational schizophrenia, the more so if they 
continue to embrace managerialist practices while sticking to their ‘solidarist’ beliefs, 
qua conviction or internal legitimisation. These findings do not mean that private aid 
agencies should bluntly reject or refrain from managerialist practices. They do imply, 
however, that private aid agencies should be aware of the difficulties, tensions and 
sometimes even impossibilities that emerge from combining the managerialist and 
social transformation logics in their daily practice. 
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 The main challenge for private aid agencies is to clarify where they stand in terms 
of what kind of change they want to bring about and what their underlying values and 
assumptions are. Only by making their own position explicit it become possibles for 
them to see where they (want to) stand in relation to the goals, values and assumption 
of both the social transformation and managerial logics. The contradictions between 
both logics will increasingly challenge and even force private aid agencies to make such 
choices about their future direction. We envision two basic future directions, although 
variants are certainly possible. One direction represents a future in which private aid 
agencies increasingly come to rely on managerialist principles and the maximisation of 
effectiveness and efficiency to generate (added) value. It is a direction which implies a 
welfare approach to development with heavy emphasis on technical problem solving. 
While it is an attractive direction in the sense that it – at least in the short term - allows 
private aid agencies to continue to draw upon governmental funding sources, it also 
implies reduced autonomy from official donors and the risk of becoming increasingly 
interchangeable with governmental and business actors. Another direction stands for a 
future in which private aid agencies raison d’être is based on civic values and a more 
politicised role in development. While this direction implies reduced access to official 
funding with consequences for their current status in terms of income, staffing and size, 
it offers more organisational autonomy, a developmental approach that is distinctive 
from what the governmental and business actors can offer and (added) value in terms 
that go beyond effectiveness and efficiency. Whatever they decide to do, private aid 
agencies stand at a crossroads and the choices they make will have key consequences 
for their future relevance and identity.
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6.1 Introduction
Partnerships between private aid agencies and Southern counterparts are seen as the 
foundation of private development cooperation. Ideally, such partnerships are 
associated with shared goals, mutual roles and responsibilities, an equitable distribution 
of costs and benefits, a shared responsibility for agreed outcomes, shared governance, 
open dialogue, and mutual accountability. Furthermore, partnerships are thought to be 
rooted in solidarity and characterised by values such as equality, trust, reciprocity and 
mutual respect. At the heart of these partnerships is an emphasis upon enabling and 
fostering the autonomy and capacity of local partners. This implies that partners are 
able to set the final agenda for their own work while private aid agencies refrain from 
interfering in their internal affairs. In addition, it means that partnerships are to be based 
on flexible and long-term funding arrangements and the provision of capacity building 
support if needed.
 There has been much criticism of private aid agencies’ ability to live up to these 
principles for ideal partnership. Existing research on North-South NGO relations has 
shown that private aid agencies’ control over funding inevitably results in inequality. 
While partnerships are mutually dependent relationships in the sense that both parties 
need each other to achieve their objectives, this mutual dependence does not generate 
equal leverage in practice. Due to the funding involved, partnerships are said to 
ultimately reproduce the characteristics of donor-recipient relations in which private aid 
agencies have the capacity to enforce their preferences upon their partners. Various 
studies have found that private aid agencies have used their control over funds to 
impose programmatic objectives, management practices, accountability requirements 
and rigid funding arrangements. As a consequence, the picture of partnerships that has 
emerged in the literature is one of relations that in reality are top-down rather than 
bottom-up and characterised by conditionality instead of ownership, control rather 
than trust and dependence rather than autonomy. 
 This study is about the partnership paradox, the contradiction between the 
principles associated with partnerships and the actual practice of North-South NGO 
relations. This partnership paradox matters as it has major implications for private aid 
agencies’ relevance and legitimacy. First, it raises doubts about whether they allow their 
partners sufficient operational space to ‘own’ their interventions and tailor development 
projects to local priorities and context. Such ownership is widely perceived as a key 
condition for achieving aid effectiveness and sustainability. Second, the partnership 
paradox undermines the assertion that private aid agencies are better able to have high 
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quality relations with Southern NGOs than their governmental counterparts. This has 
ramifications for their added value in the international aid system, which is partly based 
on their (perceived) unique ability to have ‘genuine’ partnerships. Third, by failing to 
realise such partnerships, private aid agencies’ actions conflict with their own 
organisational values. This is problematic because they, as value-driven organisations, 
have to align their organisational structures and inter-organisational relations with their 
core values to maintain their identity and legitimacy.
 As of yet, the existing literature on North-South NGO relations has been struggling 
to explain the partnership paradox. The primary objective of this study is therefore to 
provide such an explanation. Overall, it poses the following central research question: 
What explains the discrepancy between the principles and practices of partnerships 
within private development cooperation?
Answering this question requires knowledge about (1) the gap between the principles 
and practice of partnership and (2) the countervailing forces that push towards and pull 
away from the ideal of partnership. The principles of partnership have already been 
clearly outlined in the literature. As such, this study must clarify the practice of 
partnership to establish the gap with its principles. While the literature clearly shows 
that the practice of partnership is unequal due to the funding involved, it suffers from 
three main shortcomings. First, thus far the emphasis has largely been on private aid 
agencies’ failure to live up to the ideal of partnership as opposed to their efforts to live 
up to it. Second, existing research has tended to emphasise the greater power of private 
aid agencies while depicting Southern NGOs as having little room to manoeuvre. Third, 
prevailing studies have not systematically identified the mechanisms through which 
private aid agencies exercise their greater power. To add to our knowledge on the gap 
between the principles and practices of partnership, this study must first tackle these 
limitations. 
 The existing literature also fails to properly explain those forces pushing towards 
and pulling away from the ideal of partnership. While partnership has achieved the 
status of a norm for North-South NGO relations, this norm has been largely taken for 
granted by existing research. As this is the case, it remains rather unclear why private aid 
agencies attach so much importance to the ideal of partnership. The same applies to 
the premises and ideas underlying the forces pulling away from this ideal. Several 
studies have linked private aid agencies’ inability to live up to the ideal of partnership to 
their dependence on back donor funding. Due to an increased emphasis on tangible 
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results and transparency, official funding conditions are said to have become increasingly 
tight and demanding. Yet, the (implicit) thinking underlying this ever greater emphasis 
on accountability and how it relates to the ideal and practice of partnership has not yet 
been systematically examined.
 To explain the partnership paradox, this study used a comparative case study 
design, which included the partnership approaches of three private aid agencies – 
Christian Aid (CA), Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and 
Action Aid (AA) - and their local partner organisations in India, Ghana and Nicaragua. For 
its analyses, it drew upon in-depth interviews with agency-staff and partner-represent-
atives, a survey amongst partner-organisations and relevant documents (e.g. policy 
papers, contracts). The core of this thesis consists of four empirical chapters, which 
address the existing limitations of the literature and shed light on different aspects of 
the partnership paradox from different theoretical lenses. 
 For conceptual guidance in answering the main research question and addressing 
the limitations of the literature, this study used a power framework that consists of an 
episodic and a systemic perspective (Lawrence, 2008). Episodic power refers to strategic 
acts by actors in the context of social relations to get others to do what they otherwise 
would not do. This mode of power has been the traditional focus of organisational 
research and theory, with its emphasis on examining which actors are most able to 
influence organisational decision making (Clegg, 1989). This power perspective was 
used to clarify the (in)equalities present in the practice of partnership and establish the 
discrepancy with the ideal. In particular, it was used to shed light on the mechanisms 
through which power is exercised in the relationship between agency and partner, to 
determine the influence and room to manoeuvre of partners and to clarify how private 
aid agencies try to live up to the ideal of partnership.
 The systemic perspective of power was employed to gain an understanding of the 
broader forces pushing towards and pulling away from the ideal of partnership. This 
perspective views power as something that is inherent to the systems of meaning and 
signification that shape the identity, motives and interests of actors. By determining 
what thoughts and actions are normal, appropriate or meaningful, prevailing norms, 
values and beliefs render some types of behaviour as legitimate and others illegitimate, 
which leads to self-regulation and internalised constraints (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). 
Contrary to the episodic perspective, which views power as a commodity, something to 
be acquired and used for a specific purpose, systemic power cannot be attributed to 
the strategic behaviour of actors. In this study, the systemic perspective has been used 
to understand the forces that push towards and pull away from the ideal of partnership.
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The remainder of this concluding chapter is structured into three parts. Section 6.2 
presents the main findings of this dissertation and the answer to the main research 
question. Section 6.3 identifies the main contributions of this study to the literature on 
North-South NGO relations. Section 6.4 discusses the implications of the findings in the 
light of the ongoing debates about the (future) legitimacy and relevance of private aid 
agencies.  
6.2 Main findings
To explain the partnership paradox, section 6.2.1 starts by identifying the gap between 
the principles and practices of partnership using the episodic perspective of power. As 
the principles are already known from the literature, the emphasis lies on clarifying the 
nature of its practice. Once the gap between the ideal and practice is established, 
sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 seek to explain its underlying causes from the perspective of 
systemic power. While the former identifies the shared beliefs, norms and values from 
the institutional environment that push private aid agencies towards the ideal of 
partnership, the latter establishes those that pull them away from this ideal.  
6.2.1 The practice of partnership
Regarding the mechanisms through which private aid agencies exercise their greater 
power, the influence of local partners was found to depend above all on the rules that 
regulate the decision-making within the partnerships. Chapter 2 showed that the 
partnerships of CA, ICCO and AA are governed by rules that consistently determine the 
extent to which their partners may participate in the decision-making process specific 
to a given topic. These topics include areas such as funding, project-design and 
implementation, accountability, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building and the 
policy of ICCO, CA and AA. Three degrees of participation were identified, reflecting 
three levels of influence. At the first level, partners are fully excluded from the decision-
making and denied the opportunity to set the agenda. At the second level, partners are 
allowed to set the agenda, but the final decision remains with agency-staff. At the third 
level, partners can set the agenda and make final decisions themselves. Overall, partners 
of all three agencies have the most influence on topics associated with project-design 
and implementation and the least influence in topics related to agency-policy. Chapter 
2 also demonstrated that for some topics, the decision-making rules are not applied 
consistently. These ‘flexible’ decision-making rules allow  CA, ICCO and AA to determine 
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on a case-by-case basis how much influence to grant their partners (more about this 
below).
 Although the rules of all three agencies permit their partners considerable 
influence, partners of ICCO and CA are allowed more influence than those of AA. In the 
case of ICCO and CA, this study showed that these agencies put much effort in trying to 
live up to the ideal of partnership as the decision-making rules largely reflect this ideal. 
In the area of project-design and implementation, partners of these two agencies tend 
to enjoy a lot of autonomy as long as they stay within the boundaries of the agencies’ 
programmatic policies (e.g. theme, strategy, target group). Furthermore, once ICCO and 
CA get to know an organisation and feel it can be trusted, partners have generally no 
problems in securing long-term and flexible funding arrangements. Also, it is standard-
practice for both agencies to make funds available for capacity building support which, 
under normal conditions, is done on the basis of their partners’ own priorities. In the 
area of accountability, partners mostly can tailor the agencies’ reporting procedures 
and formats to their own planning, monitoring and evaluation system. The one main 
area where there is clearly a gap between the rules of ICCO and CA and the principles of 
partnership relates to agency-policy. While partnerships ideally are characterised by 
shared governance, the agencies develop their policies largely without involvement of 
their partners. One partial exception is country and/or regional policy for which partners 
are asked to provide feedback on policy proposals.
 The decision-making rules of the partnerships of AA are more rigid than those of 
CA or ICCO and allow less autonomy to partners. In the area of project-design and 
implementation, the rules of AA ascribe a ‘hands on’ role to its Project-Officers (POs), 
who are closely involved in local decision-making and actively participate in their 
partners’ operations. The rules of AA offer few opportunities to partners for negotiating 
core funding and capacity building support. Its rules in the area of accountability are 
more demanding than those of ICCO and CA. In addition to its upwards accountability 
requirements, AA also obliges its partners to be downwards accountable to the 
communities with whom they work. Finally, in common with the other two agencies, 
AA largely develops its policies without the participation of its partners. As with CA and 
ICCO, the exception is its country policy for which AA organises consultations with its 
partners.
 For ICCO, CA and AA, some partners exert more influence than others within the 
space offered by the decision-making rules. Hence, while all three agencies have rules 
that under normal conditions ensure a high degree of constancy in decision-making, 
they do allow for some variation between partners, particularly in the case of topics 
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governed by ‘flexible’ decision-making rules. Chapters 2 and 4 showed, for example, 
that CA, ICCO and AA have partners that enjoy virtual autonomy while designing and 
implementing projects, while others work with (much) more involvement from their 
respective PO. Similarly, some partners decide themselves on the formatting of their 
financial and narrative reports, while others are compelled to work according to a 
specific template. As a consequence of the variations in the application of the rules, the 
differences between ICCO and CA on the one hand and AA on the other hand as 
explained above are not always clear cut. 
 Variations in the application of the rules were traced to differences between POs as 
well as partners. Regarding the first, chapters 2 and 4 demonstrated that POs play a 
pivotal role in the partnerships as they are responsible for interpreting and applying the 
rules. Because POs have considerably autonomy in their day-to-day affairs and the rules 
allow for some elasticity in their application, there are noticeable differences between 
how different POs apply the rules. Considerable variation was identified between the 
willingness of individual POs’ to refrain from interfering in decision-making and to 
‘bend’ the rules should the situation require it. Long-time partners explained how the 
change of their PO had major consequences for the relationship. Partners shared 
experiences of POs who pursued their own agendas or rigidly adhered to the rules, as 
well as experiences with POs who were prepared to be flexible and demonstrate 
‘solidarity’ in times of need. One thing stands out: POs are more inclined to interpret the 
rules flexibly when they trust a partner. Some well-trusted partners of ICCO and CA were 
even found to enjoy special privileges, such as relaxed reporting requirements or more 
flexible funding.
 In addition to POs, differences between partners also explain for variations in how 
the rules are applied. Chapter 2 and 3 identified several tactics that partners use to 
influence the decision-making process. The first tactic is negotiating on the basis of the 
mutual dependence that underlies the partnerships. Chapter 2 demonstrated that large 
partners with multiple sources of funding, a reputation of being credible and high 
performing, and a strong knowledge/expertise base are generally more attractive, and 
therefore in a better position to negotiate, than organisations lacking these characteris-
tics. Partners of ICCO and CA typically appeared to be better negotiators than those of 
AA. This difference was traced to the fact that ICCO and CA tend to work with established 
(and therefore ‘stronger’) NGOs whereas AA primarily works with (‘weaker’) community-
based organisations (more about this below). In particular, the fact that many 
AA-partners have no other sources of funding was found to limit their negotiation 
position. Chapter 3 shows that even if partners lack a strong negotiating position, they 
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can still exert influence by trying to connect with their PO on a personal level or by 
means of persuasion. These tactics share a common feature insofar as their success 
largely depends on a degree of trust being present in the relationship.
 Even when partners are unable to exert any influence on the decision-making 
process, they still have a number of strategies at their disposal to maintain their room to 
manoeuvre. Chapter 3, which also looked at the experiences of the partners with 
funding agencies other than CA, ICCO and CA, identifies three of such strategies. First, 
Southern NGOs generally try to avoid entering into a situation where they have to deal 
with undesirable funding conditions in the first place. Avoidance tactics include being 
selective when looking for new donors, turning down funding offers if undesirable 
strings are attached or exiting from an existing relation when newly imposed conditions 
are perceived as unacceptable. Second, organisations may take measures to minimise 
negative effects when a degree of compliance is inevitable. For example, by using funds 
generated from consultancies or renting out buildings, they can finance overhead costs 
or parts of projects that donors are unwilling to fund. Third, organisations may try to 
manipulate the perceptions of donors by portraying themselves in a more positive light. 
They might, for example, emphasise successes and downplay failures in their reporting 
or adopt a gender policy not necessarily because they are convinced of its relevance, 
but because it sends a positive signal to their donors. Overall, this study demonstrated 
that partners are far from powerless in their relations with private aid agencies and have 
various strategies at their disposal to increase their influence and maintain their room to 
manoeuvre.
 While CA, ICCO and AA normally act in line with their policy intentions, they can 
always deviate from these intentions. Chapters 2 and 4 showed that the agencies’ 
control over funding enables them to unilaterally establish the rules that regulate their 
partnerships. Because they want to stay in control of their organisational identity and 
prevent possible conflict of interests, they resist the idea of letting their partners 
influence their policy. As a consequence, partners have no opportunity to influence the 
rules as they are denied the opportunity to participate in the decision-making in which 
the rules are set. The fact that the rules offer considerable room and opportunities to 
partners - particularly in the cases of ICCO and CA - therefore ultimately depends on the 
agencies’ continued willingness to act according to their own intentions. There are no 
sanctions if the agencies do not ‘practice what they preach’. Agency-staff always have 
the opportunity to deviate from the rules to the extent that they can even act against 
the will of their partners. This implies that, in the last analysis, the latter do not have any 
guarantees within the relationship beyond what is captured contractually. Partners of 
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ICCO and CA, for example, do not have the right to receive core funding, it is given to 
them on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, although it is the intention of all three agencies 
to communicate well in advance that they want to stop funding, they can nevertheless 
decide at the very last moment that they are not going to renew a contract. This shows 
that even the partner-relations of ICCO and CA, who largely live up to the ideal of 
partnership, at their core remain fundamentally unequal.
 In sum, all three agencies above all exercise their power through the rules that 
regulate the decision-making within the partnerships. While the rules of CA and ICCO 
clearly reflect the ideal of partnership, this is less the case with AA. Although the rules of 
AA still allow considerable room to partners, they are more rigid and offer less autonomy. 
What all three agencies have in common is that their partnerships are ultimately based 
on goodwill. There are no sanctions if the agencies deviate from their own (partnership) 
policy intentions. While this illustrates that the partnerships at their core remain 
structurally unequal, this does not mean that partners are powerless. They have various 
strategies at their disposal to increase their influence or maintain their room to 
manoeuvre. Whether they succeed in exercising influence, however, for an important 
part depends on their (relation with their) respective POs, who assume a pivotal role in 
the relationship as mediators between rules and partners.
6.2.2 Pushing towards partnership
The second step in explaining the partnership paradox is shedding light on the 
underlying forces that push towards the ideal of partnership. Chapters 4 and 5 showed 
that the importance that ICCO and CA attach to partnership is inseparably related to 
their organisational values and development (cooperation) philosophy. For these 
agencies, the solidarity between people in different parts of the world fighting together 
against injustice is a major source of inspiration, which means that values such as 
equality and trust are guiding principles for partner-relations. ICCO and CA perceive 
their added value and strategic relevance to lie in their commitment to supporting the 
local partner organisations that they consider best placed to understand and represent 
the needs and interests of marginalised people. Their underlying premise is that any 
contribution to addressing the root causes of poverty must be anchored in the local 
social fabric. As such, they are to limit interference in their partners’ operations. 
Furthermore, as ICCO and CA identify civil society to be at the core of social 
transformation, one of their goals is to strengthen the capacity of their partners. In 
contrast, AA believes it can best contribute to development processes by being closely 
involved at the ground level. For AA, it is not organisations but poor people and civic 
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action that are central to achieving change. This implies a more instrumental approach 
to partnership, which emphasises community participation and empowerment rather 
than the autonomy of partners. It is because of its community-centred philosophy that 
AA compels its partners to be downwards accountable while keeping their overheads 
as low as possible. 
 This sub-section expands upon these findings and shows that the ideal of 
partnership should be understood as part of a broader set of beliefs, values and 
practices dealing with (the role of civil society in) development, which became adopted 
widely by private aid agencies in the 1980s. Chapter 5 demonstrated that ICCO and CA 
are clear examples of private aid agencies that have embraced this set of beliefs, values 
and practices, which is referred to in this study as the ‘social transformation logic’. In 
order to identify the reasons why private aid agencies tend to attach so much 
importance to the ideal of partnership, the main components of the social transformation 
logic are elaborated below. It is important to note that the social transformation logic, 
like any theoretical construct, does not necessarily relate to what organisations think or 
do in practice. 
 Central to the social transformation logic is the premise that development is an 
indigenous process that is ultimately about changing the unequal power relations that 
shape society. Poverty is not viewed as something that is inevitable or ‘natural’, but as 
the result of human-made social, economic and political structures that favour certain 
groups of people at the expense of others. Consequently, development is viewed in 
terms of the empowerment of marginalised groups, resulting in a transformation of the 
status quo. While development cooperation can perhaps facilitate the process of social 
transformation, the latter is explicitly viewed as an indigenous process. As such, the 
social transformation logic begins with the idea that the root causes of poverty can only 
be addressed in a sustainable and effective manner when local people are in control of 
their own development. 
 In the social transformation logic, civil society’s strength is seen to lie in its 
autonomy. Civil society is seen as a realm where grassroots movements, social 
organisations and change-oriented NGOs can speak up for the interests of people who 
are either ignored or done injustice by the state or market. Plurality of civil society is 
considered crucial because of the wide variety of interests to be represented and 
different goals and values to be pursued. Its autonomy from the state and from official 
donors is thought to be crucial for its ability to challenge vested interests and address 
prevailing unequal power relations. The state is typically seen as either unable or 
unwilling to address the needs and rights of marginalised people or playing an active 
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role in the abuse of human rights. In a similar sense, the social transformation logic is 
generally critical towards official donors as these are seen as having their own political 
agendas, which are believed to undermine their ability and willingness to initiate deeper 
changes to the structures that marginalise people. As such, the social transformation 
logic strongly rejects a view of civil society as implementers of state or official donor 
policy.
 Partnership is the effective translation of the above ideas into the actual practice of 
North-South NGO relations. As development is viewed as an indigenous process that 
should be locally owned, private aid agencies cannot be operational in the South 
themselves. When taken together with the emphasis on organisational autonomy, this 
implies that private aid agencies’ role is to provide support and enable their partners to 
do the actual work ‘on the ground’. They are to refrain from becoming overly involved 
in the work of their partners, let alone interfere in their internal affairs. Capacity building 
support, flexible funding arrangements and long-term relations are considered essential 
for fostering the autonomy and strength of their partners. Given the inevitable inequality 
arising from the transfer of funds, private aid agencies are required to take steps to 
minimise power asymmetries and help partners to reduce financial dependence. 
 Within the social transformation logic, partnership is also an end in itself. To many 
private aid agencies, partnership is more than the most effective and sustainable way to 
contribute to development. It is also an expression of the solidarity that is the driving 
force behind their work. From this perspective, partnership represents the aspiration for 
cooperation between people in different parts of the world to challenge injustice on 
the basis of equality, trust and reciprocity, and a common vision and goals. As such, it 
reflects the desire to have relationships with others that are neither unilateral nor purely 
economic. This implies that partnership is inextricably linked to private aid agencies’ 
organisational values and identity.
 In sum, the ideal of partnership must be understood as part of a widely shared set 
of beliefs, values and practices in the private aid channel with regard to (the role of civil 
society in) development. Within this set of beliefs, values and practices, the importance 
of partnership rests on two pillars that are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, it is 
rooted in a set of premises pertaining to the conditions under which private aid agencies 
can contribute to development in an effective and sustainable manner. On the other 
hand, partnership is inseparably related to private aid agencies’ values and identity. For 
private aid agencies, partnership is therefore a meaningful, appropriate and morally 
correct way of relating to Southern NGOs. 
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6.2.3 Pulling away from partnership
The third and last step in explaining the partnership paradox is identifying the forces 
that represent a pull away from the ideal of partnership. Chapter 5 showed that in recent 
years the practices of ICCO and CA have been changing due to growing demands for 
greater accountability. These pressures not only originate from back donors, which have 
become ever more demanding in terms tangible results and transparency, but also 
from an increasingly critical public attitude towards development cooperation. While 
ICCO and CA continue to hold on to the social transformation logic in terms of their 
values and beliefs, their practices reflect a growing emphasis on accountability. 
Achieving organisational objectives has become much more important for the agencies, 
which, amongst other things, is reflected in an increased preference for highly 
professional partners that can deliver results. Partner-contracts have become legally 
valid in recent years and include increasingly detailed project-plans, which set out the 
targets and milestones to be achieved. There has also been a shift from input-based to 
outcome-based reporting, with agency-tasks revolving to a greater extent around 
assessing risk, monitoring performance and ensuring that reports sufficiently address 
the agreed upon results.
 While ICCO and CA have been able to stick to their ‘solidarist’ beliefs, this is 
becoming increasingly difficult. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the increasing emphasis 
on achieving agency-objectives, delivering measurable and predictable results, 
monitoring performance and minimizing risk clashes with the ideal of partnership. 
Moreover, it identified these ideas and practices to be part of a broader set of beliefs, 
values and practices referred to as the ‘managerial logic’. The remainder of this 
sub-section identifies the main components of the managerial logic and establishes 
how they conflict with the principles of partnership.
 The managerial logic entered the private aid channel in the 1990s and has its roots 
in private aid agencies’ ongoing professionalisation coupled with increased calls for 
tangible results from governmental donors and the general public. The managerial 
logic represents a specific kind of management based on ‘scientific’ principles, technical 
problem solving and the application of tools for planning and quantitative performance 
measurement. With its emphasis on promoting effectiveness, efficiency and value-for-
money, it ultimately represents an attempt to restore trust in private development 
cooperation as something worthy of (financial) support. The underlying assumption is 
that this can be achieved by heightened control and predictability and reduced risk. 
While the managerial logic is strongly promoted by official donors and enforced 
through their funding conditions, it is also (partly) voluntarily adopted by private aid 
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agencies as a means to improve effectiveness and demonstrate their relevance. While 
the managerial logic is presented as ideologically neutral, chapter 5 demonstrated that 
it is based on a set of interconnected goals, beliefs, values and norms.
 Unlike the social transformation logic which emphasises the need for political 
change, the managerial logic begins from the idea that improved management and 
technical solutions are the optimum route to development. The latter logic views 
development as a process than can be planned and controlled in rational steps with the 
aim of realizing tangible outcomes in the most cost-effective way possible. Central to 
this logic is the application of sophisticated tools in such fields as financial management, 
risk assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation. The emphasis on technical 
solutions is contrary to the social transformation logic’s emphasis on changing unequal 
power relations. Moreover, the tools associated with the managerial logic are based on 
causality and the quantification of information and as such are limited in their ability to 
handle interventions that are unpredictable, process-oriented and difficult to measure. 
As these are precisely the characteristics of most ‘politicised’ interventions, the tools 
associated with the managerial logic run the risk of limiting the scope of intervention to 
precisely those interventions that – according to the social transformation logic – fail to 
address the root causes of poverty.
  In contrast to the importance that the social transformation logic attaches to 
organisational autonomy, the managerial logic has an instrumental perspective of civil 
society. The latter logic begins from a consensual perspective on state, civil society and 
official donors and views these as working towards a common global cause. Civil 
society’s role and relevance is seen to lie in its ability to contribute to internationally 
established objectives (e.g. Millennium Development Goals) as well as the policy goals 
of official donors. While civil society organisations are viewed as implementers of policy 
objectives established by others, their value is seen to lie in the direct utility offered to 
their ‘users’. This perspective contradicts the social transformation logic’s emphasis on 
autonomy as a pre-condition for civil society to challenge vested interests and to stand 
for marginalised people. In addition, it leaves little room for supporting interventions 
aimed at strengthening the capacity and autonomy of civil society organisations. By 
becoming implementers of state and official donor policies, proponents of the social 
transformation logic would argue that civil society not only loses its critical edge, but 
ultimately loses its ability to address the root causes of poverty. 
 While the social transformation logic recognises the intrinsic value of North-South 
relations and begins with trust as the basis of interaction, the managerial logic views 
such relations as fee-for-service exchanges requiring control measures to prevent abuse. 
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The latter implies a contract-culture in which North-South NGO relations are ultimately 
reframed as economic transactions in which Southern NGOs offer their services to the 
highest bidder. As the managerial logic sets out from the assumption that people are 
primarily driven by a desire to maximise personal advantage, it perceives independent 
and objective surveillance mechanisms as key to preventing abuse. The underlying idea 
is that by formalizing and objectifying relations by means of quantitative verification, it 
becomes possible to minimise the chance of incompetence, arbitrariness and fraud 
while maximizing effectiveness and efficiency. This directly contradicts the social 
transformation logic, which assumes trust to be the basis of any relationship and views 
people as driven by a personal commitment to take a stand against injustice. In addition, 
the very notion that civil society organisations primarily serve to implement policy 
objectives set elsewhere conflicts with the premise that Southern NGOs should be able 
to set their own agenda. Furthermore, the imposition of management standards 
contradicts with the idea that private aid agencies should not interfere in the internal 
affairs of their partners. 
 In sum, the managerial logic plays an important role in private aid agencies’ inability 
to live up to the ideal of partnership. While presented as a neutral way to enhance 
effectiveness and efficiency, it contains a particular set of goals, beliefs, values and 
practices that has profound implications far beyond the domain of management. The 
managerial logic represents a specific perspective on development, the role of civil 
society in it and the nature of North-South NGO relations. Moreover, it contains a 
number of premises about the manner in which private aid agencies can best contribute 
to development that are contrary to the social transformation logic. These premises are 
contradictory to the principles of partnership as they imply utility rather than solidarity, 
control instead of autonomy and distrust in place of trust. As such, the managerial logic 
reinforces the existing inequality that is inherent to relations characterised by resource 
dependence. By combining both the managerial and social transformation logics, 
private aid agencies run the risk of organisational schizophrenia as they are trying to 
unite conflicting belief systems and practices.
6.3 Contributions to the literature
In its quest to explain the partnership paradox, this dissertation addressed several gaps 
and limitations of the prevailing literature on North-South NGO relations. In particular, it 
has made the following contributions:
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·	 This study showed that in their relations with funding agencies, Southern NGOs have 
a range of strategies at their disposal to maintain their room to manoeuvre and 
increase their influence. It is the first to systematically examine and categorise the 
range of strategies they use to manage undesirable funding conditions. In doing so 
it adds to our understanding of Southern NGOs’ organisational behaviour while 
addressing a tendency in the literature to overlook their countervailing power. 
·	 This research has been the first to shed light on the institutional design of partnerships. 
It showed that in establishing the rules that govern their partnerships, private aid 
agencies draw upon a set of premises and values regarding the conditions under 
which they can best contribute to development. This implies that any institutional 
redesign of their partnerships should be about achieving alignment between (new) 
premises and values and the actual rules governing behaviour.
·	 This thesis demonstrated the existence of two competing institutional logics within 
the private aid channel which have contrary implications for the practice of 
partnership. While ‘social transformation logic’ pushes private aid agencies towards 
the ideal of partnership, the ‘managerial logic’ pulls them away from this ideal. The 
existence of both logics is problematic in the sense that private aid agencies seeking 
to comply with both logics simultaneously run the risk of organisational schizophrenia 
due to contradictory belief systems and practices.
·	 Whereas the tendency in the literature has been to focus on funding when discussing 
the power asymmetries that characterise partnerships, this study shows that these 
power asymmetries are in fact institutionalised in the rules that govern the relation. 
Partners do not have any guarantees within the relationship beyond what is captured 
contractually. Furthermore, by determining the extent to which partners are allowed 
to participate in the decision-making processes, the agencies effectively control the 
decision-making in the partnerships. This implies that as long as private aid agencies 
do not allow their partners to co-determine the rules, their partnerships at their core 
remain fundamentally unequal.
6.4 Private development cooperation at the crossroads
Now that the main research question has been answered and the contributions to the 
literature have been made explicit, the question remains what the policy implications of 
the findings are. The remainder of this chapter therefore seeks to deliberate upon these 
findings. As such, it is not based on the evidence gathered for this study but represents 
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an exploration of their ramifications in view of the ongoing debates about the legitimacy 
and relevance of private aid agencies. 
 To prevent ending up in a situation where they can no longer reconcile conflicting 
logics, private aid agencies have to make a choice about their future direction based on 
the type of organisation they want to be. In the current political climate, it is likely that 
the pressures on private aid agencies to adopt the managerial logic will continue to 
increase. As such, it seems inevitable that a point will be reached in which it is no longer 
possible to bridge the social transformation and managerial logics. To ensure that they 
do not end up in such a situation unprepared, private aid agencies need to provide 
clarity about what they perceive as their purpose and identity. Only then they will be 
able to decide upon their future direction and think through the implications of different 
future scenarios. Inevitably this brings up such questions as to whether or not they 
construe development from the perspective of social transformation, attach importance 
to their autonomy and consider ‘genuine’ partnership central to their approach. 
 For those private agencies that are strongly committed to the social transformation 
logic and thus attach importance to the ideal of partnership, the finding of this study 
first of all imply that they must let their partners co-decide on the rules that govern the 
relationship. Even though their rules already might be largely aligned with the ideal of 
partnership, the relationship will remain fundamentally unequal as long as they continue 
to set the rules unilaterally. The authority to set the rules is where the real power in the 
relationship lies. If private aid agencies really want to practice what they preach, this is 
the area where they can make the biggest difference. This means that they have to 
move beyond ad hoc partner-consultations and explore different ways of opening up 
the decision-making process in which the rules are set. Obviously, shared rule-setting 
would bring about all kinds of difficulties and dilemmas. Amongst other things, private 
aid agencies would have to deal with practical constraints regarding the sheer number 
of partners, conflict of interest and maintaining their organisational identity. Yet, if they 
truly have the aspiration of international solidarity, they cannot avoid adopting a more 
international profile and give up a degree of control over their own organisation. 
 The findings from this study also imply that a future direction based on the social 
transformation logic is likely to present various difficulties. Private aid agencies that 
continue to hold on to the social transformation logic are apt to have increasing 
difficulties in acquiring official funding. As more and more organisations look for funding 
sources outside the official aid system, it is likely that a fierce competition for such 
sources will emerge. Furthermore, even a future direction (largely) outside the official 
aid system still means that they have to deal with increasing pressures to demonstrate 
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results. Private aid agencies must take into account that these pressures do not solely 
come from the government but are part of a much larger societal trend in which levels 
of trust in public institutions is declining. The main advantage of operating outside of 
the official aid system is, however, that private aid agencies can deal with these 
accountability pressures on their own terms. Overall, it seems inevitable that many 
private aid agencies will have to cope with the organisational consequences of a 
diminished income (e.g. staffing, size).
 Choosing for the managerial logic is fairly likely to ensure continued future access 
to funding from the official aid system. At the same time, the findings of this study imply 
that by embracing the managerial logic, private aid agencies run the risk of losing their 
distinctive properties at three levels: (1) their ability to challenge prevailing power 
relations, (2) their ability to have (more) equal relations with Southern NGOs, and (3) 
their value-driven nature and civic identity.
 First, by embracing the managerial logic, private aid agencies risk giving up doing 
precisely that which no other actor in the field of international development is able to 
do: challenging prevailing power relations. The managerial logic implies a sub-contract-
ing role for private aid agencies in relation to official donors. As private aid agencies lose 
their autonomy, they will have a hard time engaging in activist activities and holding 
governments and businesses accountable for their actions. The difficulty to assume an 
activist role is strengthened by the use of rational tools for planning and measurement 
which are ill-equipped to deal with the nature of politicised interventions. The 
consequence is that private aid agencies’ goals and activities would become increasingly 
interchangeable with other development actors offering ‘development goods and 
services’.
 Second, with adopting the managerial logic private aid agencies risk losing their 
unique ability to have (more) equitable relations with Southern NGOs on the basis of 
trust and local ownership. The managerial logic implies a relational approach based on 
constant monitoring of performance on the basis of ‘objective’ indicators. Furthermore, 
it holds an instrumental perspective on North-South NGO relations in which the 
purpose of the recipient organisation is to contribute to the policy objectives of the 
donor organisation. This means that it will be difficult for private aid agencies to take the 
priorities of local people and their organisations as the starting-point of relations. 
Moreover, it seems to contradict with the prevailing picture that Southern NGOs in the 
last decades have grown more capable to work independently. In addition, the emphasis 
on tangible results and efficiency makes it hard to justify funds to be spent on capacity 
building support and their partners’ overheads. Overall, private aid agencies will face 
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difficulties maintaining the relational approach that makes them distinctive compared 
to other development actors.
 Third, by adopting a managerial belief system and its associated practices, private 
aid agencies risk undermining the value-base that defines their civic identity. In the 
managerial logic those elements which cannot be ‘objectively’ measured and have no 
direct utility in principle do not count. For private aid agencies this ultimately means 
that what the organisation inspires and represents is de facto irrelevant. Because 
organisations are evaluated on the basis of indicators for effectiveness and efficiency, 
the risk is that making sure that they score well on these indicators becomes a goal in 
itself. This would imply that organisations lose sight of their original mission. Moreover, 
any starting point that assumes that people cannot be trusted is in danger of 
undermining motivation and engendering cynicism. In the most extreme situation, 
employees of private aid agencies would no longer be people with a sense of personal 
vocation but people who sell their qualities to the highest bidder. When private aid 
agencies would replace values such as solidarity, equality, trust and reciprocity with 
effectiveness and efficiency, they not only risk losing their civic identity, but also 
becoming interchangeable with official donors and businesses.
 Furthermore, private aid agencies should be aware of the fact that the managerial 
logic, once adopted, has self-reinforcing properties. First, with distrust as the underlying 
starting-point of relations, the need for increasingly strict rules and extensive monitoring 
seems inevitable. The need for such rules and monitoring is, in the first place, based on 
the implicit assumption that individuals have a tendency to pursue their own 
self-interest. This could create an environment of suspicion in which the fear of fraud is 
further exacerbated by the large distance between donor and recipient. If funding 
conditions are of such a nature that unworkable situations are created, however, it also 
seems to be unavoidable that organisations at some point will engage in undesirable 
behaviour. Chapter 3 demonstrates that Southern NGOs confronted with such 
conditions (e.g. refusal to pay overhead costs, unrealistic information requirements) may 
at some point have resort to the manipulation of proposals and reports in order to 
ensure their survival. Sooner or later, however, such deception is likely to come out and 
confirm that the already existing distrust was well-founded. Consequently, it will signal 
the need for even stricter rules and more extensive monitoring. With distrust becoming 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, it seems inevitable that a paper reality is created. Although 
more and more information is produced, it increasingly says less about what is actually 
happening on the ground.
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 Second, because the managerial logic produces competition, the risk is that 
organisations become trapped in an endless cycle to adopt the latest standards of 
performance and excellence. The managerial logic seeks to establish organisations’ 
effectiveness and efficiency on the basis of ‘objective’ quantitative indicators. This 
makes it possible to compare organisations and establish rankings of their perceived 
quality. Because the reputation and funding base of organisations depend on these 
rankings, they contribute to an environment of competition. To excel or at the very least 
not end up at the bottom of the list, organisations are under constant pressure to 
comply with the standards on which they are ranked. Due to this type of competition, 
individual organisations cannot afford to ignore the latest managerial trends as this 
implies a deteriorating position on the ranking list. In such an environment, however, it 
seems unavoidable that compliance with standards becomes a goal in itself. Moreover, 
it implies that ‘doing things right’, may become more important than ‘doing the right 
things’.
 Given the profound manner in which the managerial logic affects the nature of 
private development cooperation, any debate about its future direction must discuss 
the desirability of the managerial logic itself. For such a debate, the following questions 
cannot be avoided:
·	 What is the evidence that the managerial logic has restored public trust in private 
development cooperation? Ultimately the managerial logic represents an effort to 
counter the declining levels of trust in private development cooperation. The implicit 
assumption is that by showing tangible results, trust is restored. Yet it remains unclear 
whether the production of information about effectiveness and efficiency has 
contributed to higher levels of trust. The underlying question is whether a system 
that commences from a position of distrust can restore trust.
·	 What is the ultimate purpose of accountability: learning or assessing? The decisive factor 
here is whether private aid agencies perceive accountability as an opportunity or as 
a threat. Only when accountability results in learning can it contribute to effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, an accountability regime that rewards success while punishing failure 
is unlikely to engender learning since it encourages organisations to exaggerate 
successes, while discouraging scrutiny of mistakes. An underlying question is whether 
it is possible to come up with an accountability regime that is conducive to the kind 
of social change that private development cooperation seeks to achieve.
·	 How do the benefits of the managerial logic relate to the undesirable effects it produces? 
Much has been written about the undesirable consequences of managerialist 
accountability arrangements. Amongst other things, means tend to become ends 
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and there is a tendency to avoid risk and   on easily measurable activities. Furthermore, 
the managerial logic runs the risk of undermining trust, promoting deception and 
creating a paper reality. Finally, there are high costs associated with producing 
information and monitoring compliance. Yet it remains unclear what the returns are 
in light of the goal(s) of private development cooperation. 
As a future direction for private aid agencies based on either the social transformation 
logic or managerial logic brings about major limitations and drawbacks, there is an 
urgent need for a new logic for private development cooperation. As shown in chapter 5, 
the current approach of simply trying to combine the social transformation and 
managerial logics in their entirety is ultimately not possible and desirable. Organisations 
that continue to do so run the risk of organisational schizophrenia due to conflicting 
premises and values. Private aid agencies therefore have to think through whether it is 
possible to combine elements of the two logics given their envisaged purpose and 
identity in creating a new logic. This entails greater understanding of what specific 
elements of both logics they consider important and useful. Moreover, private aid 
agencies need to rethink where their added value lies. This requires them to reconsider 
the basic premises underlying their work at present which, amongst other things, start 
from the distinction between the rich North and poor South, that civil society in the 
South is weak and needs to be strengthened and that private aid agencies can best 
contribute to development by means of providing financial and capacity building 
support to Southern NGOs. In doing so, private aid agencies will need to make some 
basic judgments about the probable evolution of how the field of international 
development is changing due to, amongst other things, the increase of direct funding 
and the increased capacity of Southern NGOs in many countries. In reinventing 
themselves, they can also learn from the experiences outside the development 
cooperation sector. What are the lessons learned in other sectors where more or less 
similar changes have occurred as in the private aid channel? How did or do organisations 
in such sectors reinvent themselves? What solutions have been found which regard to 
the increasing pressures for accountability? 
 Overall, it is clear that any meaningful deliberation regarding the future of private 
development cooperation in general must be rooted in substance rather than form. In 
the past years, this debate – at least in the Netherlands – has been dominated by a focus 
on means rather than ends. By focusing on regulations and instruments or the 
(perceived) inefficiency and effectiveness of private aid agencies, the essence or core 
purpose of private development cooperation has been too much ignored. Also, such a 
perspective makes it impossible to discuss the desirability of the managerial logic itself. 
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Therefore, if a debate about the future of private development cooperation is to be 
meaningful, it should be focussed on the kind of change private development 
cooperation aspires to achieve, the values on which it is based, the conditions under 
which civil society organisations can best contribute to the processes of development 
and the role that North-South NGO relations can play in it.  
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Introduction
This dissertation explores the principles and practice of partnership between Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) from industrialised countries in the ‘North’ and 
developing countries in the ‘South’. Most Northern NGOs involved in development 
cooperation, also called private aid agencies, work together with Southern NGOs to 
achieve their goals. In such relations, private aid agencies typically provide financial and 
technical support while their Southern counterparts are responsible for implementing 
development projects. There has been a long tradition of referring to North-South NGO 
relations as partnerships, which reflects a desire to work together on the basis of 
principles such as equality, trust, mutual respect and reciprocity. In a more operational 
sense, partnership implies that private aid agencies are to respect the autonomy of their 
partners while offering long-term and flexible funding arrangements and capacity 
building support. This is based on the idea that the autonomy of Southern NGOs is 
crucial for ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of development interventions.
 Partnership has been the subject of intense debate within international 
development cooperation. Since the mid-1990s, private aid agencies have been 
consistently criticised for failing to live up to principles of partnership. Due to the 
funding involved, partnerships are said to assume the characteristics of donor-recipient 
relations in which private aid agencies enforce their agendas upon their ‘partners’.  As a 
consequence, the picture of partnerships that has emerged in the literature is one of 
relations that in reality are top-down rather than bottom-up and characterised by 
conditionality instead of ownership, control rather than trust and dependence rather 
than autonomy. In this dissertation, the contradictions between the principles and the 
practice of North-South NGO relations are referred to as the partnership paradox.
 The partnership paradox is a topic that directly affects the legitimacy of private aid 
agencies. Their perceived inability to live up to the principles of partnership raises 
doubts about the autonomy of their Southern partners and as such the effectiveness 
and sustainability of private development cooperation. Furthermore, it calls private aid 
agencies’ added value in the international aid system into question because their added 
value is based in part on the idea that they are better able than other development 
actors to have ‘genuine’ partnership with Southern NGOs. If private aid agencies are 
unable to have such relations, what do they have to offer beyond being intermediaries 
for government finance? It also implies that private aid agencies - as value-driven 
organisations - fail to ‘practice what they preach’. This is particularly problematic because 
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they derive their credibility for an important part from the alignment between their 
core values and practices. 
 This dissertation seeks to explain the partnership paradox by (1) clarifying the gap 
between the principles and practice of partnership and (2) establishing why private aid 
agencies are unable to live up to these principles. Central to the study is a comparative 
analysis of the partnerships between three established private aid agencies - Christian 
Aid (CA), Interchurch Organisation for Development (ICCO) and Action Aid (AA) - and a 
selection of their local partners in India, Ghana and Nicaragua. Data for this study was 
collected from November 2007 through September 2008 using a combination of 
in-depth interviews, a survey and documentary analysis. The core of the thesis consists 
of four empirical chapters which address different aspects of the partnership paradox. 
Together these chapters clarify and explain the gap between the principles and practice 
of partnership, each doing so from a specific theoretical ‘lens’. 
Decision-making in partnerships
Chapter 2 examines the power inequality that is known to characterise partnerships. 
Within the context of policy-processes, power is usually conceptualised in terms of 
influence in decision-making. While the literature clearly shows that the practice of 
North-South NGO relations is unequal due to the funding involved, this study is the first 
to systematically examine the decision-making in such relations. More specifically, 
chapter 2 maps the relative influence of partners vis-à-vis private aid agencies and 
reveals the processes underlying decision-making outcomes. It asks the following 
research question:
	To what extent are the partners of ICCO, Christian Aid and Action Aid able to influence the 
decision-making within their partnerships and what explains their relative influence?
In answering this question, chapter 2 first identifies those topics that are central to the 
decision-making within partnerships. These topics are about areas like funding, 
project-design and implementation, capacity building, accountability, monitoring, 
evaluation and the policy of ICCO, CA and AA. It shows that the influence of partners 
differs considerably depending on the decision-making topic. On some topics, they 
appeared to have no influence at all while on others they have virtual autonomy. Overall, 
partners were found to have the least influence on topics related to agency-policy, and 
the most influence on topics related to project-design and implementation.
 Chapter 2 shows that the partners’ influence is determined above all by the rules 
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that regulate the decision-making. ICCO, CA and AA are able to unilaterally set the rules 
for decision-making because they control the funding. These rules effectively determine 
for each topic the extent to which their partners are allowed to participate in the 
 decision-making process. Three levels of participation were identified, reflecting three 
levels of influence. At the first level of participation, partners are fully excluded from the 
decision-making process and denied the opportunity to get their own preferences or 
concerns on the decision-making agenda. At the second level of participation, partners 
are allowed to set the agenda, but the final decision remains with staff of ICCO, CA and 
AA. At the third level, partners can set the agenda and are allowed to make final 
decisions. Finally, there is a group of topics on which partners’ participation in the 
 decision-making is inconsistent and varies from case to case. These topics lack clear 
decision-making rules, which enables CA, ICCO and AA to determine on a case-by-case 
basis how much influence to grant their partners.
 Despite the uniformity brought about by the decision-making rules, some partners 
clearly have more influence than others. This was found to depend on project-officers 
- who are responsible for managing partner relations on behalf of ICCO, CA and AA - and 
on the organisational capacity of partners. Project-officers are responsible for inter preting 
and applying the rules and also have to deal with the needs and demands of their 
partners. The willingness of individual project-officers to hand over decision-making 
authority and bend the rules differs considerably. Project-officers appeared to be more 
inclined to interpret the rules flexibly when a partner is trusted. However, partners are 
not merely passive actors at the mercy of agency rules and project-officers. Large 
partners with multiple sources of funding, a reputation of being credible and high 
performing and a strong knowledge/expertise base are attractive to funding agencies. 
Consequently, they are in a better position to negotiate than organisations lacking 
these characteristics.
The strategic behaviour of Southern NGO’s
Chapter 3 further explores the finding that Southern NGOs are not merely powerless in 
their relations with their donors. More specifically, it examines the strategies Southern 
NGOs use to deal with the greater power of their donors. Earlier research on the power 
asymmetries between Northern and Southern NGOs has emphasised the former’s 
domination over the latter, painting a rather bleak picture of Southern NGOs’ ability to 
deal with the conditions that are usually attached to funding. As a result, Southern 
NGOs have been implicitly victimised and portrayed as powerless. Chapter 3 contributes 
to a more balanced power perspective on North-South NGO relations by highlighting 
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Southern NGOs’ ability to manage these conditions. In order to ensure that the analysis 
was as complete as possible, this chapter – unlike the other three empirical chapters) is 
not limited to the partnerships of ICCO, CA and AA. It asks the following research 
question:
	What kind of funding conditions do Southern NGOs perceive as undesirable and what 
kind of strategic responses do they employ to manage those conditions?
The findings of the research show that funding conditions can have a range of 
undesirable effects related to Southern NGOs’ autonomy and their ownership over 
development projects. First, tightly defined programmatic frameworks and rigid 
planning requirements were found to limit Southern NGOs’ ability to pursue local 
priorities, respond to unexpected events and remain consistent with their original 
mission. Second, the unwillingness of many donors to fund overhead costs appeared to 
constrain Southern NGOs’ ability to attract and retain qualified staff and invest in 
research, learning and innovation. Third, short funding periods and single contracts 
turned out to force Southern NGOs to divert much time and resources to fundraising 
while undermining their ability to undertake long-term planning and ensure the 
sustainability of their projects. 
 Southern NGOs appeared to have various strategies at their disposal to deal with 
adverse funding conditions, which shows that they are far from powerless. Four main 
types of strategies are identified: portraying, avoiding, influencing and buffering. 
Portraying refers to a set of in tactics in which Southern NGOs pretend to comply with 
funding conditions and depict themselves in a more positive light. They might, for 
example, emphasise successes and downplay failures in their reporting or adopt a 
gender policy not necessarily because they are convinced of its relevance, but because 
it sends a positive signal to their donors. Avoiding is about steering away from situations 
in which Southern NGOs have to deal with undesirable funding conditions in the first 
place. Avoidance tactics include being selective when looking for new donors, turning 
down funding offers if undesirable strings are attached or terminating an existing 
relation when newly imposed conditions are perceived as unacceptable. Influencing is 
about getting a donor to neutralise the funding conditions’ problematic content. For 
example, Southern NGOs may use their donor’s need for success as leverage during 
negotiations or by engaging donor-staff on a personal level. Buffering refers to a set of 
tactics aimed at mitigating the negative effects of funding conditions when a degree of 
compliance is simply inevitable. Southern NGOs, for example, may use funds generated 
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from consultancies or renting out buildings to finance those elements that donors are 
unwilling to fund.
The rules of partnerships
While Southern NGOs are by no means powerless in their relations with funders, the 
research findings show that the institutional policies underlying detrimental donor 
conditions remain beyond their influence. This again underlines the importance of the 
rules (see chapter 2) in understanding the practice of North-South NGO relations. 
Chapter 4 therefore sets out to further examine the role that rules play in shaping this 
practice. Conceptually, it builds upon the idea that relations between organisations are 
made up of different formal and informal rules that determine what actors can and 
cannot do. Besides the decision-making examined in chapter 2, such rules also establish, 
for example, what type of outcomes ought to be achieved, what the roles and respon-
sibilities are, who qualifies for membership or what kind of information should be 
shared. This study is the first to examine how such rules shape the scope for action 
within partnerships. Chapter 4 postulates the following question:
	What are the rules in the partnerships of ICCO, Christian Aid and Action Aid, what explains 
their main similarities and differences, and how do they affect partners’ room to manoeuvre?
The rules of ICCO and CA were found to be more in line with the principles of partnership 
than those of AA in terms of allowing partners to operate autonomously and providing 
flexible funding arrangements and capacity building support. This difference appeared to 
be directly related to differences in the agencies’ organisational values and development 
(cooperation) philosophy. For ICCO and CA, international solidarity is a key source of 
inspiration meaning that values such as equality and trust are guiding principles in their 
relations with partners. They perceive their partners to be best placed to understand 
and represent the interests of marginalised people. As such, they perceive their added 
value to lie in enabling their partners to do their work. This perspective is based on the 
premise that interventions aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty must be 
firmly anchored in the local context and initiated and driven by local people. As such, 
ICCO’s and CA’s rules have been designed to ensure the autonomy of partners in their 
project-design and implementation. Furthermore, as ICCO and CA identify a strong civil 
society to be at the core of social transformation, they regard strengthening their 
partners’ capacity as a goal in itself. This goal is reflected in the agencies’ rules which are 
accommodating in terms of capacity building support and flexible funding. 
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 In contrast, AA believes it can best contribute to development processes by being 
closely involved at the ground level. As such, AA’s rules reflect a ‘hands on’ role for its 
project-officers who play an active role in project-design and implementation. The 
result is that AA-partners have less autonomy than their colleagues from ICCO and CA. 
While ICCO and CA see a strong civil society to be central to achieving change, AA 
believes that change is triggered by poor people and their communities. Consequently, 
AA’s rules aim to keep its partners’ overheads as low as possible and allow fewer 
opportunities for core funding and capacity building support. Finally, it is due to its 
community-centred philosophy that AA compels its partners to be downwards 
accountable to the communities where they work. In contrast, ICCO and CA – consistent 
with their emphasis on the autonomy of their partners – feel they are not in a position 
to interfere with their partners’ downwards accountability. 
Institutional logics
Organisations are not only influenced by other organisations, but also by the broader 
institutional environment in which they are embedded. Chapter 5 examines how the 
principles and the practice of partnership are shaped by the institutional environment 
in which private aid agencies are embedded. Most policy domains are characterised by 
a community of actors that, through their relationships and interactions, come to share 
the same goals, norms, values, beliefs and practices. Such a set of goals, norms, values, 
beliefs and practices – also referred to as an institutional logic - provides actors with a 
shared language while offering guidance with regard to which problems are to be 
addressed, which solutions get considered, what outcomes are to be achieved and 
what methods are used. Institutional logics tend to mature and solidify over time into 
specified roles, behaviours and interaction-patterns between organisations. As such, 
the concept of institutional logic not only offers insight into why private aid agencies 
attach so much importance to the principles of partnership, but also why they are 
unable to live up to these principles in practice. This study is the first to examine how 
North-South NGO relations are shaped by the shared goals, norms, values, beliefs and 
practices of the private aid channel. Chapter 5 asks the following question:
	What are the prevailing institutional logics within the private aid channel and how do 
they shape the principles and practice of the partnerships of ICCO and Christian Aid?
Chapter 5 demonstrates the existence of two competing institutional logics within the 
private aid channel, referred to in this dissertation as the ‘social transformation logic’ 
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and the ‘managerial logic’. It shows that the principles of partnership must be 
understood as an inherent part of the social transformation logic. Within this logic, 
which emerged in the 1980s, the importance attached to partnership rests on two 
mutually reinforcing pillars. First, it is rooted in a set of beliefs pertaining to the conditions 
under which private aid agencies can best contribute to development processes. In the 
social transformation logic, development is viewed as an indigenous process aimed at 
changing power relations which must be locally owned to be effective and sustainable. 
It is thought that civil society is only able to challenge vested interests and contribute to 
development processes when it is able to operate autonomously from the state and 
from donors. Partnerships are seen as the translation of these premises into operational 
practices. Second, the social transformation logic recognises the intrinsic value of 
partnerships which is seen as an expression of private aid agencies’ own value-base. As 
such, partnerships are not only a means, but also an end in themselves. 
 In the late 1990s, a new institutional logic – referred to in this thesis as the managerial 
logic - entered the private aid channel. The rise of the managerial logic is directly related 
to mounting calls for tangible results from the general public and governmental donors 
on whom many private aid agencies depend for their funding. Central to the managerial 
logic is the demonstration of effectiveness and efficiency by means of quantitative 
performance indicators. The implicit assumption is that development can be planned 
and controlled as long as the right management tools are applied. The use of such tools 
is viewed as a neutral exercise aimed at predictability, reflecting a linear perspective on 
development. The managerial logic represents an instrumental perspective on 
North-South NGO relations. Contrary to the principles of partnership, it views such 
relations as businesslike transactions, enabling private aid agencies to achieve their 
policy goals. It neither attaches particular importance to local ownership nor to the 
autonomy of Southern NGOs. Furthermore, as the managerial logic only values that 
which can be quantified and has direct utility, it does not recognise the value of aspects 
like solidarity, equality, respect and mutuality. While trust is one of the key principles of 
partnership, the managerial logic emphasises the necessity of objective control 
mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds and ensure compliance with contractually 
agreed upon results. 
 To understand how the two logics shape the principles and practice of partnership, 
chapter 5 examines their effect on the partnerships of ICCO and CA. It shows that these 
two agencies try to combine both logics despite their conflicting nature. Although ICCO 
and CA continue to maintain the social transformation logic in terms of their goals, 
values and beliefs, their practices have come to reflect parts of the managerial logic to 
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satisfy the mounting pressure for tangible results. Amongst other things, both agencies 
have embraced the quantification of performance measures, increasingly work with 
professional partners that can deliver results and have introduced explicit and detailed 
results-agreements. The increasing pressure to demonstrate their ‘value for money’ 
presents ICCO and CA with a major problem because it means that their relational 
practices are increasingly at odds with their organisational values and beliefs. While the 
social transformation logic represents a push towards the principles of partnership, the 
managerial logic pulls them away from these principles. Due to these contrary forces, 
both organisations run the risk of ‘organisational schizophrenia’ due to the growing 
discrepancy between what they practice and what they preach, all the more so because 
the pressure for tangible results is more likely to increase in the near future.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Chapter 6 connects and summarises the findings from the different chapters and 
explores their policy implications. It first concludes that the practice of North-South 
NGO relations must be understood as the outcome of the interaction between rules, 
project-officers and partners. The practice of the partnerships of ICCO, CA and AA is 
above all shaped by the rules that structure these relations. These rules, which are 
unilaterally set by the three agencies, offer the scope for action within the relationship 
and at the same time delimit it. In all countries where ICCO, CA and AA work, the 
agencies use the same set of rules. As such, their rules ensure uniform behaviour over 
longer time periods in different contexts. While the rules imply uniformity, they still 
allow a considerable degree of flexibility in their daily use. How this flexibility is used 
depends in the first place on individual project-officers, who have considerable 
autonomy in their day-to-day affairs. As rules are never completely free of ambiguous 
meaning, there are noticeable differences between individual project-officers in how 
they interpret and apply the rules. Partners can also make use of the flexibility of the 
rules. Whether they are able to do so depends above all on their capacity to conduct 
negotiations and the quality of their personal relationship with ‘their’ respective pro-
ject-officer.
 The second conclusion of this dissertation is that the inequality that characterises 
North-South NGO relations is institutionalised in the rules that govern these relations. 
Contrary to the standard notion in the literature that private aid agencies exercise their 
greater power directly by means of their control over funding, this thesis found that in 
day-to-day affairs such power is in fact exerted indirectly by means of the rules. While 
Southern NGOs have a range of strategies at their disposal to maintain or increase their 
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room to manoeuvre within the context of these rules, the rules themselves remain 
beyond their influence. Private aid agencies that decide to work with rules that have 
been established in line with the principles of partnerships, do so on a voluntary basis. 
Southern NGOs cannot do anything if the agencies establish new rules that represent a 
move away from these principles, as is currently the case under the managerial logic. 
There are no sanctions if private aid agencies deviate from their own principles. This also 
means that partners do not have any guarantees within the relationship beyond what is 
captured contractually. Partners of ICCO and CA, for example, do not have the right to 
receive flexible funding or capacity building support; it is given to them on a 
case-by-case basis. Similarly, although it is the intention of all three agencies to 
communicate well in advance that they want to stop funding, they can nevertheless 
decide at the very last moment that they are not going to renew a contract. This implies 
that their partnerships at their core remain fundamentally unequal. This is true even in 
the case of ICCO and CA, whose rules largely reflect the principles of partnership.
 The third main conclusion of this thesis is that the inability of private aid agencies to 
live up to the principles of partnership is directly related to (the rise) of the managerial 
logic. Due to increasing calls for tangible results, private aid agencies are under 
enormous pressure to adopt managerialist ideas and practices. While presented as a 
neutral way to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, the managerial logic contains a set 
of goals, beliefs, values and practices that run counter to the principles of partnership in 
at least three ways. First, the managerial logic only values what can be quantified and 
has direct utility. This is at odds with the notion that partnerships, as an expression of 
international solidarity, also have an intrinsic value. Second, it implies an instrumental 
perspective on North-South NGO relations in which the purpose of the recipient 
organisation is to contribute to the policy objectives of the donor organisation. This 
viewpoint conflicts directly with the importance attached to local ownership and the 
autonomy of Southern NGOs. Third, the managerial logic implicitly assumes that people 
are primarily driven by a desire to maximise personal advantage and perceives objective 
surveillance mechanisms as key to preventing abuse. This perspective clashes directly 
with the idea that trust should be the starting-point of North-South NGO relations. In 
sum, the managerial logic implies utility rather than solidarity, control instead of 
autonomy and distrust rather than trust. 
 The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications for the future of 
private development cooperation and private aid agencies in particular. First of all, they 
must clarify how they (want to) stand in relation to the goals, values, beliefs and practices 
of both the social transformation and managerial logic. More specifically, they need to 
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clarify which ones specific elements of both logics they consider appropriate and useful 
and which they do not. Organisations that fail to do so and simply continue to combine 
both logics in their entirety are likely to become increasingly schizophrenic in terms of 
what they think and do. Those private aid agencies that opt to base their future direction 
and identity on the social transformation logic must consider letting their partners 
co-decide on the rules that govern their partnerships. They should also be prepared to 
face the consequences of a diminished income as they are likely to have increasing 
difficulties in satisfying the growing demands for tangible results and value for money. 
While a future direction based on the managerial logic is initially attractive because it is 
likely to ensure continued access to (state) funding, it also implies reduced independence 
from governmental donors and the risk of becoming increasingly interchangeable with 
businesses. Whatever they decide to do, private aid agencies stand at a crossroads and 
the choices that they make will have key consequences for their future relevance and 
identity.
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Inleiding
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de principes en de praktijk van ‘partnerschap’ tussen Niet-
Gouvernmentele Organisaties (NGO’s) uit geïndustrialiseerde landen (het ‘noorden’) en 
uit ontwikkelingslanden (het ‘zuiden’). De meeste noordelijke NGO’s actief in de ont-
wikkelingssamenwerking, ook wel particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties genoemd, 
werken samen met zuidelijke NGO’s om hun doelen te bereiken. In dergelijke relaties 
zorgen de particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties voor financiële en technische onder-
steuning, terwijl zuidelijke organisaties verantwoordelijk zijn voor de uitvoering van 
ontwikkelingsprojecten. Er bestaat een lange traditie om deze relatie aan te duiden met 
de term partnerschap. Deze term weerspiegelt de wens om samen te werken op basis 
van principes als gelijkheid, vertrouwen, wederzijds respect en wederkerigheid. In meer 
operationele zin verwijst partnerschap naar een relationele benadering waarbij particuliere 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties de autonomie van hun partners respecteren en hen onder - 
steunen met flexibele financiering en capaciteitsversterking. De onderliggende gedachte 
hierbij is dat de autonomie van zuidelijke NGO’s cruciaal is om de effectiviteit en 
duurzaamheid van de ontwikkelingsinterventies te garanderen.
 Partnerschap is een omstreden onderwerp in de internationale ontwikkelings-
samenwerking. Sinds de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn particuliere ontwikke-
lingsorganisaties voortdurend bekritiseerd vanwege hun onvermogen om concreet 
invulling te geven aan de principes van partnerschap. Doordat er sprake is van een 
 financieringsrelatie zouden partnerschappen onvermijdelijk resulteren in machts-
ongelijkheid. Hierdoor is het beeld ontstaan van relaties die ‘top-down’ zijn in plaats 
van ‘bottom-up’ en worden gekenmerkt door voorwaarden in plaats van lokaal 
eigenaarschap, controle in plaats van vertrouwen en afhankelijkheid in plaats van 
autonomie. In dit proefschrift wordt de tegenstelling tussen de principes en de praktijk 
van de noord-zuid NGO-relaties aangeduid als ‘de partnerschap paradox’.
 De partnerschap paradox is een onderwerp dat directe consequenties heeft voor 
de legitimiteit van particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties. Doordat zij niet in staan zijn 
om te handelen volgens de principes van partnerschap kunnen er vraagtekens worden 
geplaatst bij de effectiviteit en duurzaamheid van de particuliere ontwikkelingssamen-
werking. Verder stelt de partnerschap paradox de toegevoegde waarde van particuliere 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties in het internationale hulpsysteem ter discussie. Deze 
toegevoegde waarde is deels gebaseerd op de gedachte dat particuliere ontwikke-
lingsorganisaties, vanwege hun waardegedreven identiteit, beter dan andere spelers in 
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de ontwikkelingssamenwerking in staat zijn om ‘echte’ partnerschappen met zuidelijke 
NGO’s aan te gaan. Zonder deze toegevoegde waarde, zo stellen critici, zijn zij niet veel 
meer dan een doorgeefluik voor (overheids)financiering. De partnerschap paradox 
betekent tenslotte ook dat particuliere hulporganisaties niet in overeenstemming 
handelen met hun principes. Dit is problematisch aangezien zij hun geloofwaardigheid 
juist voor een groot deel aan deze principes ontlenen.
 Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel om de partnerschap paradox te verklaren door (1) de 
discrepantie tussen de principes en de praktijk van partnerschap te verhelderen en 
(2) te achterhalen waarom particuliere hulporganisaties niet in staat zijn om aan deze 
principes te voldoen. Centraal in het onderzoek staat een vergelijkende analyse van de 
partnerschappen tussen drie gevestigde particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties - 
Christian Aid (CA), ICCO en Action Aid (AA) - en een selectie van hun lokale partners in 
India, Ghana en Nicaragua. Data voor deze studie werd verzameld in de periode van 
november 2007 tot en met september 2008 via een combinatie van diepte-interviews, 
een enquête en document analyse. De kern van het proefschrift bestaat uit vier 
empirische hoofdstukken waarin verschillende aspecten van de partnerschap paradox 
centraal staan. Samen verhelderen en verklaren deze hoofdstukken de kloof tussen de 
principes en praktijk van partnerschap, ieder vanuit een specifieke theoretische lens.
Besluitvorming in partnerschappen
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de machtsongelijkheid die partnerschappen kenmerkt. In de 
context van beleidsprocessen wordt macht meestal onderzocht in termen van invloed 
op de besluitvorming. Hoewel uit de literatuur al langer bekend is dat relaties tussen 
noordelijke en zuidelijke NGO’s ongelijk zijn is dit de eerste studie die de besluitvorming 
in dergelijke relaties systematisch onderzoekt. Hoofdstuk 2 kijkt hierbij zowel naar de 
mate van invloed die partners hebben ten opzichte van particuliere hulporganisaties als 
naar de manier waarop besluiten worden genomen. Hierbij staat de volgende onder-
zoeksvraag centraal:
	In welke mate zijn de partners van ICCO, Christian Aid en Action Aid in staat om de 
besluitvorming binnen hun partnerschappen te beïnvloeden en wat verklaart hun 
relatieve invloed?
Voor de beantwoording van deze vraag brengt hoofdstuk 2 allereerst de belangrijkste 
onderwerpen in de besluitvorming binnen partnerschappen in kaart. Deze onder - 
werpen gaan over zaken als financiering, projectontwerp en uitvoering, capaciteits-
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opbouw, verantwoording, monitoring, evaluatie en het beleid van ICCO, CA en AA. Het 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat de invloed van partners zeer verschilt per onderwerp. Op 
sommige terreinen hebben zij geen invloed terwijl ze op andere onderwerpen besluiten 
grotendeels zelfstandig nemen. Over het algemeen genomen hebben partners de 
minste invloed op het beleid van ICCO, CA en AA en de meeste invloed op zaken die 
gerelateerd zijn aan het ontwerpen en uitvoeren van projecten.
 Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de invloed van partners vooral wordt bepaald door de 
institutionele regels die de besluitvorming reguleren. ICCO, CA en AA kunnen deze be-
sluitvormingsregels eenzijdig vaststellen doordat zij over de financiële middelen 
beschikken. Deze regels bepalen per onderwerp de mate waarin partners mogen 
participeren in het besluitvormingsproces. Drie niveaus van participatie werden 
vastgesteld die drie niveaus van invloed weerspiegelen. Bij het eerste participatieniveau 
zijn partners volledig buitengesloten van het besluitvormingsproces en hebben zij 
geen mogelijkheid om hun eigen voorkeuren op de besluitvormingsagenda te plaatsen. 
Bij het tweede participatieniveau krijgen partners weliswaar de mogelijkheid om zaken 
op de agenda te plaatsen, maar zijn het medewerkers van ICCO, CA en AA die de 
eindbeslissing nemen. Bij het derde niveau krijgen partners niet alleen de mogelijkheid 
om zaken op de agenda te plaatsen, maar ook om zelf eindbeslissingen te nemen. Tot 
slot is er een groep van onderwerpen waarbij de participatie van partners in de 
besluitvorming inconsistent is en verschilt van geval tot geval. Voor deze onderwerpen 
zijn er geen eenduidige besluitvormingsregels waardoor ICCO, CA en AA in staat zijn 
om per situatie te bepalen hoeveel invloed ze een partner willen geven.
 Ondanks de uniformiteit van de besluitvormingsregels hebben sommige partners 
duidelijk meer invloed dan anderen. Dit hangt af van relatiebeheerders - die vanuit 
ICCO, CA en AA verantwoordelijk zijn voor het managen van partnerrelaties - en de 
capaciteit van partners. Relatiebeheerders zijn verantwoordelijk voor de interpretatie en 
de toepassing van de regels en moeten tegelijkertijd ook tegemoetkomen aan de 
behoeften en eisen van hun partners. Er zijn aanzienlijke verschillen tussen de bereidheid 
van individuele relatiebeheerders om beslissingsbevoegdheid over te dragen en de 
regels te ‘buigen’. Het is vooral de mate van vertrouwen in een partner dat van invloed 
is op de bereidheid van relatiebeheerders om de regels flexibel te interpreteren. 
Tegelijkertijd zijn partners niet louter overgeleverd aan regels en relatiebeheerders. 
Grote organisaties met meerdere financieringsbronnen, een sterke reputatie en veel 
kennis en expertise zijn aantrekkelijk voor donoren om te financieren. Hierdoor hebben 
zij een betere onderhandelingspositie dan organisaties die deze kenmerken niet 
hebben.
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Het strategisch gedrag van zuidelijke NGO’s
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat nader in op de bevinding dat zuidelijke NGO’s niet machteloos zijn in 
hun relaties met hun donoren. Het hoofdstuk gaat hierbij vooral in op de strategieën 
die zuidelijke NGO’s hanteren om met de grotere macht van hun donoren om te gaan. 
Eerder onderzoek naar noord-zuid relaties in de particuliere ontwikkelingssamenwer-
king heeft vooral de benadrukt dat noordelijke NGO’s hun wil opleggen aan zuidelijke 
NGO’s. Hierdoor zijn zuidelijke NGO’s impliciet als machteloos afgeschilderd en zelfs als 
slachtoffer neergezet. Hoofdstuk 3 draagt bij aan een meer evenwichtig beeld van de 
machtsrelatie tussen noordelijke en zuidelijke NGO’s door inzichtelijk te maken welke 
strategieën zuidelijke NGO’s hanteren. Om de analyse zo compleet mogelijk te maken 
beperkt dit hoofdstuk zich in tegenstelling tot de andere drie empirische hoofdstukken 
niet tot de partnerschappen van ICCO, CA en AA. Hoofdstuk 3 stelt de volgende onder-
zoeksvraag:
	Wat voor soort financieringsvoorwaarden ervaren zuidelijke NGO’s als ongewenst en wat 
voor soort strategische reacties gebruiken ze om met deze voorwaarden om te gaan?
De onderzoeksbevindingen laten zien dat aan voorwaarden verbonden aan financiering 
tal van ongewenste effecten kleven voor de autonomie van zuidelijke NGO’s en hun 
eigenaarschap over ontwikkelingsprojecten. Ten eerste ondermijnen nauw gedefinieerd 
programmatische kaders en rigide planningseisen de capaciteit van zuidelijke NGO’s 
om lokale prioriteiten na te streven, te reageren op onverwachte gebeurtenissen en 
consistent te blijven met hun oorspronkelijke missie. Ten tweede maakt de onwil van 
veel donoren om administratieve kosten te financieren het lastig voor zuidelijke NGO’s 
om gekwalificeerd personeel aan te trekken en te behouden evenals te investeren in 
onderzoek, kennis en innovatie. Ten derde zorgen korte financieringsperioden en 
eenmalige contracten er voor dat zuidelijke NGO’s veel tijd en middelen kwijt zijn aan 
fondsenwerving terwijl het hun vermogen ondermijnt voor lange termijnplanning en 
het veilig stellen van de duurzaamheid van hun projecten.
 Zuidelijke NGO’s zijn echter allerminst machteloos en hanteren verschillende 
strategieën om met dergelijke ongewenste financieringsvoorwaarden om te gaan. Het 
onderzoek identificeert vier hoofdstrategieën: portretteren, vermijden, beïnvloeden en 
bufferen. Portretteren verwijst naar een aantal tactieken dat erop gericht is zo gunstig 
mogelijk over te komen en de indruk te wekken dat men aan de voorwaarden heeft 
voldaan. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn het benadrukken van successen en afzwakken van 
mislukkingen of het enkel opstellen van een genderbeleid omdat het een positief 
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signaal naar donoren uitzendt. Vermijden is een strategie waarbij zuidelijke NGO’s 
proberen te voorkomen dat ze in situaties terechtkomen waarin zij te maken krijgen met 
ongewenste financieringsvoorwaarden. Vermijdingstactieken zijn bijvoorbeeld selectief 
te werk gaan bij het zoeken van nieuwe donoren, het afslaan van financiering wanneer 
deze gepaard gaat met ongewenste voorwaarden of het beëindigen van een relatie 
wanneer nieuw geïntroduceerde eisen onwerkbaar blijken te zijn. Beïnvloeden gaat er 
over dat zuidelijke NGO’s hun donor zo ver krijgen dat problematische financierings-
voorwaarden worden aangepast. Dit doen zij onder andere door tijdens onderhande-
lingen in te spelen op het feit dat donoren afhankelijk zijn van succesvolle organisaties 
voor hun eigen resultaten of door gebruik te maken van hun persoonlijke relatie met 
relatiebeheerders. Bufferen verwijst naar tactieken gericht op het zoveel mogelijk 
minimaliseren van de negatieve effecten van financieringsvoorwaarden. Zo kunnen 
zuidelijke NGO’s bijvoorbeeld het geld dat ze verdienen met consultancyopdrachten of 
het verhuren van gebouwen gebruiken om die zaken te financieren die donoren niet 
bereid zijn om te betalen.
De regels van partnerschappen
Ondanks het feit dat zuidelijke NGO’s niet machteloos zijn in hun relatie met donoren, 
zijn zij niet in staat zijn om het institutionele beleid te beïnvloeden dat aan ongewenste 
financieringsvoorwaarden ten grondslag ligt. Dit onderstreept nogmaals het belang 
van de regels (zie hoofdstuk 2) om de praktijk van noord-zuid NGO-relaties te begrijpen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat daarom nader in op de rol die de regels spelen in het vormgeven van 
deze praktijk. Conceptueel bouwt het voort op het idee dat samenwerkingsrelaties 
worden gestructureerd door formele en informele regels die bepalen wat wel en niet 
mag in de relatie. Naast de besluitvorming die reeds werd onderzocht in hoofdstuk 2, 
bepalen deze regels bijvoorbeeld ook welke soort resultaten er moeten worden bereikt, 
wat wederzijdse rollen en verantwoordelijkheden zijn, wie in aanmerking komt voor 
lidmaatschap of welke informatie er moet worden gedeeld. Dit is de eerste studie die 
het effect van deze regels op de (inter)actie binnen partnerschappen onderzoekt. 
Hoofdstuk 4 stelt de volgende vraag:
	Wat zijn de regels in de partnerschappen van ICCO, Christian Aid en Action Aid, wat 
verklaart hun belangrijkste overeenkomsten en verschillen en wat is hun effect op de ma-
noeuvreerruimte van partners?
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Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat de regels van ICCO en CA veel meer conform de principes van 
partnerschap zijn opgesteld dan die van AA. Zo bieden de regels van de eerste twee 
organisaties veel ruimte aan partners om autonoom te opereren en geven ze meer 
mogelijkheden voor flexibele financiering en capaciteitsopbouw. Dit verschil kan 
worden herleid naar de verschillende waarden en filosofie van ICCO en CA. Voor hen is 
internationale solidariteit een belangrijke inspiratiebron en zij hechten dan ook veel 
waarde aan principes als gelijkheid en vertrouwen in hun partnerrelaties. In hun visie 
zijn partners het beste in staat om de belangen van gemarginaliseerde mensen te 
begrijpen en te behartigen. Hun eigen meerwaarde zien zij hierbij vooral in het bieden 
van de randvoorwaarden die hun partners in staat stellen om zelfstandig te werken. 
Hierbij is de aanname dat interventies die gericht zijn op het aanpakken van de 
dieperliggende oorzaken van armoede verankerd dienen te zijn in de lokale context en 
gedragen dienen te worden door de lokale bevolking. Bovendien zien ICCO en CA een 
sterk maatschappelijk middenveld als de sleutel tot sociale verandering en beschouwen 
zij het versterken van de capaciteit van hun partners als een doel op zich. 
 AA heeft daarentegen de overtuiging dat zij het beste aan ontwikkelingsprocessen 
kan bijdragen door hier zelf nauw bij betrokken te zijn. Om die reden gaan de regels van 
AA uit van een actieve rol voor haar relatiebeheerders tijdens projectontwerp en 
uitvoering. Het resultaat hiervan is dat partners van AA minder autonomie hebben dan 
hun collega’s van ICCO en CA. Terwijl ICCO en CA een sterk maatschappelijk middenveld 
essentieel achten voor sociale verandering, gelooft AA dat verandering teweeg wordt 
gebracht door gemarginaliseerde mensen en hun gemeenschappen. Om deze reden 
zijn de regels van AA er op gericht om de administratieve kosten van partners zo laag 
mogelijk te houden en bieden zij minder mogelijkheden voor flexibele financiering en 
capaciteitsopbouw. Cruciaal is bovendien dat AA, in overeenstemming met haar ge-
meenschapsgeoriënteerde veranderingsfilosofie, haar partners verplicht om 
verantwoording af te leggen aan de lokale gemeenschappen met wie ze werken. Dit is 
een groot verschil met ICCO en CA die, conform hun nadruk op de autonomie van 
partners, van mening zijn dat het niet aan hen is om zich hiermee te bemoeien.
Institutionele logica
Organisaties worden niet alleen beïnvloed door andere organisaties, maar ook door de 
institutionele omgeving waarin ze zijn ingebed. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt hoe de 
principes en de praktijk van partnerschap worden gevormd door de institutionele 
omgeving waarvan particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties onderdeel zijn. De meeste 
beleidsdomeinen kenmerken zich door een gemeenschap van actoren die door hun 
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onderlinge relaties en communicatie gelijksoortige doelen, normen, waarden, 
overtuigingen en praktijken delen. Een dergelijke set van gedeelde doelstellingen, 
normen, waarden, overtuigingen en praktijken - ook wel aangeduid met de term 
‘institutionele logica’ - biedt actoren een gemeenschappelijke taal en handvatten met 
betrekking tot de problemen die aangepakt moeten worden, de oplossingen die in 
aanmerking komen, de resultaten die dienen te worden gerealiseerd en de methoden 
die geschikt worden geacht. Door de tijd heen bestendigen institutionele logica zich in 
min of meer vaststaande rollen en interactiepatronen tussen organisaties. Als zodanig 
biedt dit concept aanknopingspunten om te begrijpen waarom particuliere hulporga-
nisaties zoveel belang hechten aan de principes van partnerschap en waarom zij er in 
de praktijk niet in slagen om aan deze principes te voldoen. Dit is de eerste studie die 
onderzoekt wat het effect is van de gedeelde doelen, normen, waarden, overtuigingen 
en praktijken van het particuliere hulpkanaal op relaties tussen noordelijke en zuidelijke 
NGO’s. Hoofdstuk 5 stelt de volgende vraag:
	Welke institutionele logica zijn van kracht in het particuliere hulpkanaal en welke invloed 
hebben zij op de principes en de praktijk van de partnerschappen van ICCO en Christian 
Aid?
Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat er in het particuliere kanaal twee concurrerende institutionele 
logica naast elkaar bestaan die in dit proefschrift de ‘sociale transformatie logica’ en de 
‘management logica’ worden genoemd. De principes van partnerschap dienen te 
worden gezien als een inherent onderdeel van de sociale transformatie logica. Binnen 
deze logica, die ontstond in de jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw, rust het belang dat 
wordt gehecht aan partnerschap op twee elkaar versterkende pijlers. Ten eerste is 
partnerschap onderdeel van een set van overtuigingen met betrekking tot de 
voorwaarden waaronder particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties het beste kunnen 
bijdragen aan ontwikkelingsprocessen. In de sociale transformatie logica wordt 
ontwikkeling gezien als een endogeen proces gericht op het veranderen van machts-
verhoudingen dat alleen effectief en duurzaam kan zijn als het lokaal verankerd is. 
Hierbij is de gedachte dat het maatschappelijk middenveld alleen in staat is om 
gevestigde belangen ter discussie te stellen en bij te dragen aan ontwikkelingsproces-
sen als zij autonoom kan opereren ten opzichte van de staat en donoren. Partnerschap-
pen zijn de operationele ‘vertaling’ van deze aannames naar de praktijk. Ten tweede 
benadrukt de sociale transformatie logica ook de intrinsieke waarde van partnerschap 
dat wordt gezien als een uiting van de kernwaarden van particuliere ontwikkelingsorga-
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nisaties. Als zodanig zijn partnerschappen niet alleen een middel maar ook een doel op 
zich.
 Tegen het einde van de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw deed een nieuwe 
institutionele logica, in dit proefschrift de management logica genoemd, haar intrede 
in het particuliere hulpkanaal. De opkomst van de management logica is direct 
gerelateerd aan de groeiende roep  om tastbare resultaten vanuit de overheid, van wie 
veel particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties financieel afhankelijk zijn, en het publiek. 
Centraal in deze logica staat het aantonen van effectiviteit en efficiëntie door middel 
van kwantitatieve indicatoren. Een impliciete veronderstelling hierbij is dat ontwikkeling 
kan worden gepland en gecontroleerd, zolang de juiste managementinstrumenten 
worden toegepast. Het gebruik van dergelijke instrumenten wordt gezien als een 
neutrale exercitie en weerspiegelt een lineair perspectief op ontwikkeling. De 
management logica gaat uit van een instrumentele visie op de noord-zuid NGO-relaties. 
In tegenstelling tot de sociale transformatie logica worden dergelijke relaties gezien als 
zakelijke transacties die particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties in staat stellen om hun 
beleidsdoelen te bereiken. De management logica hecht weinig waarde aan lokaal 
eigenaarschap, noch aan de autonomie van zuidelijke NGO’s. Omdat alleen die aspecten 
die gekwantificeerd kunnen worden en direct nut hebben worden (h)erkend, zijn 
aspecten als solidariteit, gelijkheid, respect en wederkerigheid irrelevant in deze logica. 
Terwijl vertrouwen een van de belangrijkste principes is van partnerschap, benadrukt 
de management logica de noodzaak van objectieve controle mechanismen om 
misbruik te voorkomen en de naleving van contractueel overeengekomen resultaten te 
garanderen.
 Om te begrijpen welke invloed de twee logica hebben op de principes en de 
praktijk van partnerschap, onderzoekt hoofdstuk 5 hun effect op de partnerschappen 
van ICCO en CA. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat deze organisaties de beide logica proberen 
te combineren, ondanks hun tegenstrijdige aard. Hoewel ICCO en CA blijven vasthouden 
aan de sociale transformatie logica in termen van hun doelen, waarden en overtuigingen, 
is hun werkwijze door de druk om met concrete resultaten te komen steeds meer in het 
teken komen te staan van de management logica. Zo zijn beide organisaties gaan 
werken met kwantitatieve prestatie-indicatoren, kiezen ze steeds meer voor 
‘professionele’ partner organisaties die resultaten kunnen leveren en zijn ze gaan werken 
met expliciete en gedetailleerde resultaatafspraken. Door de toenemende druk om 
‘waar voor hun geld’ te bieden zitten ICCO en CA echter met een groot probleem. 
Immers, hun werkwijze komt steeds meer op gespannen voet komt te staan met hun 
waarden en overtuigingen. Terwijl de sociale transformatie logica hen richting de 
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principes van partnerschap duwt, trekt de management logica hen juist van deze 
principes weg. Als gevolg van deze tegenovergestelde krachten lopen beide organisaties 
het risico ‘schizofreen’ te worden.
Conclusies en beleidsimplicaties
Hoofdstuk 6 vat de bevindingen van de verschillende hoofdstukken samen, brengt ze 
met elkaar in verband en verkent hun beleidsimplicaties. Zij concludeert allereerst dat 
de praktijk van de relatie tussen noordelijke en zuidelijke NGO’s begrepen dient te 
worden als het resultaat van de interactie tussen regels, relatiebeheerders en partners. 
De praktijk van de partnerschappen van ICCO, CA en AA wordt vooral gevormd door de 
regels die deze relaties structuren. Deze regels, die eenzijdig zijn opgesteld door de drie 
hulporganisaties, bepalen de handelingsruimte in de relatie. In alle landen waar ICCO, 
CA en AA actief zijn, maken zij gebruik van dezelfde set van regels. Als zodanig zorgen 
de regels voor uniformiteit over langere tijdsperioden in verschillende contexten. 
Hoewel de regels dus uniform gedrag impliceren, laten zij nog altijd een bepaalde mate 
van flexibiliteit toe in hun dagelijks gebruik. Hoe deze flexibiliteit wordt gebruikt hangt 
allereerst af van individuele relatiebeheerders. Omdat regels altijd op meerdere 
manieren geïnterpreteerd kunnen worden en relatiebeheerders aanzienlijke autonomie 
hebben in hun dagelijkse werk, zijn er substantiële verschillen tussen de interpretatie en 
toepassing van de regels door individuele relatiebeheerders. Ook partners kunnen 
gebruik maken van de flexibiliteit van de regels. De mate waarin ze hiertoe in staat zijn 
wordt vooral bepaald door hun onderhandelingscapaciteit en de kwaliteit van de 
persoonlijke relatie met ‘hun’ relatiebeheerder.
 De tweede hoofdconclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de ongelijkheid die 
kenmerkend is voor de relatie tussen noordelijke en zuidelijke NGO’s is geïnstitutionali-
seerd in de regels. Terwijl de literatuur vooral de rol van financiering benadrukt in de 
ongelijke relatie, laat dit onderzoek zien dat in de dagelijkse praktijk macht vooral 
indirect wordt uitgeoefend via de regels. Ondanks het feit dat zuidelijke NGO’s 
verschillende strategieën tot hun beschikking hebben om hun manoeuvreerruimte te 
handhaven of te vergroten, kunnen ze op deze regels zelf geen invloed uitoefenen. 
Particuliere hulporganisaties die besluiten om te werken met regels die zijn opgesteld 
op basis van de principes van partnerschap doen dat op vrijwillige basis. Zuidelijke 
NGO’s kunnen niks doen als particuliere ontwikkelingsorganisaties besluiten nieuwe 
regels in te stellen; zelfs niet indien die haaks staan op de principes van partnerschap 
zoals het geval is met regels die zijn gebaseerd op de management logica. Er zijn dan 
ook geen sancties indien particuliere hulporganisaties besluiten af te wijken van hun 
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eigen principes. Dit betekent ook dat partners buiten de contractueel vastgelegde 
zaken geen garanties hebben. Zo hebben partners van ICCO en CA niet het recht om 
flexibele financiering of steun voor capaciteitsopbouw te ontvangen, het wordt ze op 
individuele basis gegeven. Ook al hebben ICCO, CA en AA de intentie om ruim van te 
voren aan te geven dat ze willen stoppen met financiering, toch kunnen ze altijd op het 
laatste moment besluiten om een  contract niet te verlengen. Dit houdt in dat hun part-
nerschappen in de kern fundamenteel ongelijk blijven, zelfs in het geval van ICCO en CA 
waar de regels grotendeels in overeenstemming zijn met principes van partnerschap.
 De derde hoofdconclusie van dit proefschrift is dat het onvermogen van particuliere 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties om te voldoen aan de principes van partnerschap direct 
gerelateerd is aan (de opkomst) van de management logica. Door de toenemende roep 
om tastbare resultaten staan particuliere hulporganisaties  onder enorme druk om deze 
logica te omarmen. Terwijl de management logica wordt gepresenteerd als een 
neutrale manier om de effectiviteit en efficiëntie te vergroten, bestaat zij uit een set van 
doelen, overtuigingen, waarden en praktijken die op tenminste drie niveaus tegenstrijdig 
is met de principes van partnerschap. Ten eerste waardeert de management logica 
enkel die zaken die kunnen worden gekwantificeerd en direct nut hebben. Dit staat op 
gespannen voet met het idee dat partnerschappen, als een uitdrukking van 
internationale solidariteit, ook een intrinsieke waarde hebben. Ten tweede impliceert 
de management logica een instrumentele kijk op noord-zuid NGO-relaties, waarbij het 
doel van de ontvangende organisatie is om bij te dragen aan de beleidsdoelstellingen 
van haar donor. Dit standpunt is strijdig met het belang dat binnen partnerschap wordt 
gehecht aan lokaal eigenaarschap en de autonomie van zuidelijke NGO’s. Ten derde 
gaat de management logica er impliciet van uit dat mensen primair handelen uit 
eigenbelang en benadrukt het de noodzaak van objectieve controle mechanismen om 
misbruik te voorkomen. Dit perspectief botst direct met het idee dat vertrouwen het 
uitgangspunt moet vormen van relaties tussen noordelijke en zuidelijke NGO’s. Kortom, 
de management logica staat voor nut in plaats van de solidariteit, controle in plaats van 
autonomie en wantrouwen in plaats van vertrouwen.
 De bevindingen van dit proefschrift hebben belangrijke beleidsimplicaties voor de 
toekomst van de particuliere ontwikkelingssamenwerking en noordelijke ontwikke-
lingsorganisaties in het bijzonder. In de eerste plaats moeten zij voor zichzelf helder 
krijgen hoe zij zich (willen) verhouden tot de tegenstrijdige doelen, waarden, 
overtuigingen en praktijken van de sociale transformatie en management logica. Hierbij 
zullen zij voor zichzelf duidelijk moeten krijgen welke specifieke elementen van beide 
logica’s zij nuttig vinden en verenigbaar achten met hun ontwikkelingsfilosofie. 
189
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Organisaties die een dergelijke reflectie uit de weg gaan en doorgaan met het 
combineren van beide logica’s zullen steeds meer schizofrene ‘trekjes’ krijgen. Die 
organisaties die kiezen voor een toekomst en identiteit gebaseerd op de sociale 
transformatie logica zullen moeten overwegen om hun partners mee te laten besluiten 
over de regels waarop hun partnerschappen zijn gebaseerd. Daarnaast moeten zij 
bereid zijn om de gevolgen van een verminderd inkomen te accepteren aangezien 
verwacht mag worden dat ze steeds meer moeite zullen hebben om aan de groeiende 
vraag naar concrete resultaten te voldoen. Een toekomst op basis van de management 
logica is in eerste instantie aantrekkelijk vanwege de mogelijkheden die dit biedt om 
toegang te (blijven) krijgen tot (overheids)financiering. Zij impliceert echter ook 
verminderde autonomie ten opzichte van de overheid en het risico om steeds meer 
inwisselbaar te worden met andere ontwikkelingsactoren. Kortom, particuliere hulp-
organisaties bevinden zich  op een kruispunt en de keuzes die zij gaan maken zullen 
belangrijke hebben gevolgen hebben voor hun toekomstige relevantie en identiteit.
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